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Author SHA1 Message Date
ddidderr f44cfc6190 build: add local just workflow 
Add a justfile for the common fcry developer commands. The run recipe is
variadic and uses just positional arguments so program flags are forwarded
through cargo run without needing a second separator.

Keep the default release profile debuggable and checked, then move the
stripped, LTO-enabled artifact settings into the production profile. This
keeps day-to-day release builds easier to inspect while preserving an explicit
production build recipe for optimized distributable binaries.

The clippy recipe uses workspace, all-target, all-feature coverage and denies
warnings so the task runner matches the stricter local verification path.

Test Plan:
- cargo clippy
- cargo clippy --benches
- cargo clippy --tests
- cargo +nightly fmt
- just --fmt --check
- just run --help
- just clippy
- git diff --cached --check

Refs: none
 2026-06-10 21:18:10 +02:00
ddidderr 126a86ec07 cleanup: remove old review files 2026-06-10 20:51:29 +02:00
ddidderr 227f78a767 [release] fcry v0.12.0 2026-06-10 20:49:21 +02:00
ddidderr 1ea1e65deb license: change from GPL-3.0 to MIT-0 2026-06-10 20:49:12 +02:00
ddidderr 90707cc364 updated README 2026-06-10 01:41:41 +02:00
ddidderr 6febf8ee22 fmt: tombi format 2026-06-10 01:24:38 +02:00
ddidderr d79e96c498 [release] fcry v0.11.0 2026-06-10 01:22:42 +02:00
ddidderr 99705afa9e deps: cargo update 2026-06-10 01:21:42 +02:00
ddidderr 3f53c221c8 test: tolerate closed stdin in chunk-size failure 
The chunk-size-zero regression test spawned fcry with stdin piped and
unconditionally unwrapped the write into that pipe. That made the test depend
on scheduler timing: the child may validate --chunk-size 0, report the error,
and exit before it has drained stdin.

Treat BrokenPipe as the expected early-exit shape for this failing command,
while still failing on any other write error and still asserting that the
process exits unsuccessfully. The valid empty-stdin chunk-size case remains
unchanged.

Test Plan:
- cargo fmt --check
- cargo test
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
- git diff --check

Refs: none
 2026-06-10 00:20:10 +02:00
ddidderr 725d33939e fix: read key files through short reads 
Read --key-file input in a loop until EOF or until the 33-byte rejection
threshold is reached. A single read call is enough for ordinary regular files
in practice, but FIFOs and process substitution can legally return fewer than
32 bytes before EOF. Treating that first short read as final made the new
key-file path fail spuriously for exactly the shell-friendly usage it was meant
to support.

Keep the existing exact-length policy: 32 bytes is accepted, shorter files are
rejected, and 33 or more bytes are rejected with the trailing-newline hint.
The intermediate buffer remains zeroizing.

Test Plan:
- cargo test split_fifo_key_file_read_roundtrips
- cargo fmt --check
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test
- git diff --check

Refs: review finding for --key-file short reads
 2026-06-09 23:46:27 +02:00
ddidderr 81ac1475ad feat: harden fcry format and IO policy 
Introduce a central policy module for format and resource validation, then
route header parsing, KDF acceptance, range arithmetic, and pipeline sizing
through that policy. New encryptions now write v3 headers that include an
authenticated key commitment, which lets decrypt reject wrong keys or
passphrases before chunk processing while preserving valid v1/v2 decrypt
compatibility inside the configured caps.

Replace process-list-visible raw key input with --key-file, add passphrase NFC
normalization, enforce stronger new-encryption passphrase/KDF floors unless
--allow-weak-kdf is supplied, and add a configurable decrypt Argon2 memory
ceiling. Chunk buffers in the serial, parallel, and lookahead paths now use
zeroizing storage.

Rework output handling around randomized create-new temporary files with Unix
0600 mode, file fsync before persist, best-effort parent directory fsync,
default no-overwrite behavior, safe in-place replacement, --force, --temp-dir,
and --buffer-verify for decrypt-to-stdout.

Known caveat: --key-file currently reads with a single read call. That is fine
for regular files but can reject short reads from pipes or process
substitution. A follow-up fix will make key-file reads loop before EOF.

Test Plan:
- cargo fmt --check
- cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
- cargo test
- git diff --check
- cargo run -- --help

Refs: fcry security hardening plan
 2026-06-09 23:45:02 +02:00
ddidderr d7b0127d20 review: Claude Fable 5 2026-06-09 22:06:30 +02:00
ddidderr 67b412a1a5 fmt: tombi 2026-05-30 18:57:06 +02:00
ddidderr 6898297973 deps: cargo update 2026-05-16 17:26:15 +02:00
ddidderr 45571c98fe Cargo.toml: remove authors, format with tombi 2026-05-16 17:25:57 +02:00
ddidderr acd2712ade sec review 2026-05-03 14:48:55 +02:00
ddidderr ea2e43fe3d Revert "feat(cli): default to interactive passphrase when no key source given" 
This reverts commit f72f9034f3.
 2026-05-02 21:30:58 +02:00
ddidderr 2c101abdbd fix(cli): reject -j 0 instead of silently falling through to serial 
`--threads` was an `Option<usize>` with no value-parser bound. Passing
`-j 0` slipped past clap and reached the dispatch in `crypto::encrypt`
/ `decrypt`, where the `threads > 1` check evaluates to false for 0 and
the call quietly fell through to the serial path. The user thought
they had asked for "no worker threads" and got something else instead;
either way, 0 workers is not a meaningful configuration.

Switch the field to `Option<u32>` and add `value_parser!(u32).range(1..)`
so clap rejects `-j 0` at parse time with a usage error. Cast to
`usize` at the single use site. Using `u32` rather than `usize` avoids
shipping a host-pointer-width-dependent CLI surface; thread counts well
past 4 billion are not a thing we need to plan for.

Test plan:
  - New integration test `rejects_zero_threads` invokes the binary
    with `-j 0` and asserts non-zero exit.
  - Existing `roundtrip_multi_threaded` (`-j 4`) still passes, so the
    range bound has not broken normal usage.

Refs: external review (GLM51 #1; Gemini #3 misdescribed the symptom
as "silent corruption" — verified the actual behaviour was a fall-
through to the serial path, not output corruption, but the fix is
the same).
 2026-05-02 21:29:28 +02:00
ddidderr 91b459657e fix(pipeline): bound reorder buffer and fail fast on worker error 
The multi-threaded pipeline introduced in 75afadb had two related defects
flagged by external review:

1. The writer's reorder buffer was unbounded. `ordered_writer` accepted
   a `_cap` parameter that was documented as the in-flight bound but
   was never read. The writer drained `done_rx` eagerly into a
   `BTreeMap`, so neither the bounded job channel nor the bounded done
   channel ever exerted backpressure on the reader. A slow or stuck
   worker would let the writer accumulate every subsequent chunk in
   `pending` until the system ran out of memory. With adversarial input
   this is a memory-exhaustion vector; with merely uneven workers it
   silently violated the documented memory ceiling.

2. The pipeline did not fail fast. When a worker hit an AEAD
   authentication failure it returned `Err`, dropped its channel
   clones, and exited — but the other workers, the reader, and the
   writer kept running until natural EOF. On a tampered N-byte file
   we burned full I/O plus (T-1)/T of the AEAD CPU before surfacing
   the error. Combined with (1) this also stretched the window in
   which `pending` could grow.

Both issues are addressed by a single rewrite of `pipeline.rs`:

  - A bounded "permit" channel pre-filled with `in_flight_capacity`
    `()` tokens. The reader acquires one before sending each job; the
    writer releases one after flushing the corresponding chunk in
    order. Total in-flight chunks (queued jobs + in-progress at
    workers + pending in the reorder map) is now hard-capped at
    `4 * threads`, with the writer in lockstep with the actual disk
    write rather than ahead of it.

  - An `Arc<AtomicBool> cancel` flag that workers set on AEAD failure.
    Workers check it at the top of their loop and drain remaining
    queued jobs without doing AEAD work. The reader checks it before
    each new chunk, so a tampered chunk causes the reader to stop
    within the in-flight window rather than after EOF.

The reader uses `permit_rx.recv_timeout(50ms)` rather than a blocking
`recv` so it can poll the cancel flag even when the rest of the
pipeline has quiesced. Without this, a 3-way deadlock is possible:
worker errors after all permits are out, the writer is blocked on a
missing-counter chunk that will never arrive, the other workers are
idle on `jobs_rx`, and the reader is blocked on `permit_rx`. The
50 ms wakeup is well below typical user-perceptible latency and only
runs when the pipeline is otherwise idle, so its cost is negligible.

While rewriting I also collapsed `encrypt_parallel`/`decrypt_parallel`
onto a shared `run_pipeline` helper parameterised by an `is_encrypt`
bool — the two functions previously duplicated ~150 lines of channel
plumbing for a one-line difference (`encrypt_in_place` vs
`decrypt_in_place`). Same for the reorder writer: a single
`ordered_writer` now returns `(OutSink, u64)`, and encrypt simply
ignores the byte count (decrypt uses it for the length cross-check).
Removed the stale "wrapping_add" on the in-order counter — wrapping
here would mask a real bug since `bump_counter` already rejects
overflow upstream — and corrected the per-thread memory estimate in
the module-level doc to match the new bounded model.

The job-channel capacity (`channel_capacity = 2 * threads`) is left
unchanged. The new permit cap (`4 * threads`) is deliberately larger
so out-of-order completion has slack; if the gap is ever exhausted
the only consequence is reader backpressure, never unbounded growth.

Test plan:
  - `cargo test` still passes the full 28-test integration suite,
    including `parallel_and_serial_outputs_round_trip` (proves the
    refactored unified pipeline produces bit-identical output to the
    serial path) and `rejects_tampered_ciphertext` (still surfaces
    the AEAD error, now via the cancel path).
  - Manual fail-fast probe: 200 MiB random plaintext, encrypt with
    `-j 8`, flip a byte at offset 2000 (inside chunk 0), decrypt
    with `-j 8`. Errors in ~2 ms, vs ~28 ms for a clean decrypt of
    the same file — confirming the reader stopped within the
    in-flight window rather than draining the whole input.
  - The `ordered_writer` cancel deadlock case is hit organically by
    the same probe: chunk 0 fails authentication, no further
    counter-0 chunk ever arrives, but the reader exits via the
    50 ms cancel poll and the rest of the pipeline drains.

Refs: external review (P2 / Gemini #1, Gemini #2, GLM51 #2/#7/#8).
 2026-05-02 21:29:08 +02:00
ddidderr 53bb927a87 fix(header): preserve on-disk version through decode/encode 
`Header::encode()` previously hard-coded `VERSION_CURRENT` (= 2) on every
write. Because the encoded header is fed back as AEAD AAD on decrypt, this
broke decryption of any v1 ciphertext written before commit 75afadb: the
file's authenticated AAD has version byte 1, but the recomputed AAD has
byte 2, so AEAD verification fails on every chunk. The release notes for
75afadb explicitly promised v1 compatibility, so this is a regression
against the documented contract — caught by an external reviewer who
reproduced it by encrypting with HEAD^ and decrypting with HEAD.

Fix by adding a `version: u8` field to `Header`. `Header::read()` now
captures the on-disk byte and `encode()` writes it back. New encrypts in
`crypto::encrypt()` set `version = VERSION_CURRENT`, so freshly written
files are unchanged on the wire; only the round-trip path through
`read → encode` is now byte-identical for v1 inputs.

This was the simplest fix that preserves the existing AAD design (header
bytes verbatim → AAD). Alternatives considered:

  - Storing the raw header bytes alongside the parsed struct would also
    work but spends an extra allocation and adds a second source of
    truth for the same data.
  - Conditionally emitting v2 only when flags != 0 would happen to
    produce v1 bytes for a v1 input, but it conflates "what version
    does this file claim" with "does it carry length commitment" — two
    things that should stay independent for future flag bits.

Test plan:
  - `header::tests::reads_v1_header` now also asserts that re-encoding
    a parsed v1 header reproduces the original bytes exactly (so the
    AAD round-trips).
  - New `crypto::tests::decrypts_v1_ciphertext` and
    `decrypts_v1_ciphertext_parallel` build a multi-chunk v1 fixture
    by hand (XChaCha20Poly1305 with version-byte-1 AAD) and confirm
    `decrypt()` succeeds on both the serial and parallel paths.
  - Manual: built `HEAD^` in a worktree, encrypted a 200-byte payload
    with `--chunk-size 64`, decrypted with the patched binary at
    `-j 1` and `-j 4`. Both round-trip; output bytes match input.

Refs: external review identifying this regression.
 2026-05-02 21:28:26 +02:00
ddidderr 75afadb1ec feat!: multi-threaded pipeline + length-committed/random-access decrypt 
Completes the two follow-ups deferred from the v0.10 format/secrets
work: multi-threaded AEAD encrypt/decrypt and a length-committed file
format that enables random-access decryption.

# Format change (file format v2)

Bumps the on-disk header version to 2 and introduces a flag bit
(`FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED`, bit 0). When set, an authenticated `u64 LE`
plaintext length is appended to the header after the nonce prefix. v1
files still decrypt unchanged. v2 readers reject unknown flag bits.

The flag is set automatically when the input is a regular file (we
stat the open FD to avoid TOCTOU). Stdin/pipes/FIFOs encrypt as before
with the flag clear. Sequential decrypt cross-checks the produced byte
count against the committed length as defense in depth (the AEAD
already authenticates the value via header AAD, but failing before we
rename the temp file into place is preferable to failing after).

# Random-access decrypt

`fcry -d -i FILE --offset N --length L` seeks directly to the chunk(s)
covering `[N, N+L)` and decrypts only those, without scanning the
predecessors. Requires a seekable file whose header has the
length-committed flag — stdin/pipe-encrypted files cannot use this
path and the CLI rejects it with a clear error.

The chunk layout is fully determined by `chunk_size` and the committed
total length (last chunk's plaintext is
`total - (n_chunks-1)*chunk_size`; its ciphertext length is
`last_pt + 16`). Each chunk's nonce is
`make_nonce(prefix, chunk_index, is_last_chunk)` which matches what
sequential encrypt produced, so plaintext slices come out
bit-identical to a full sequential decrypt.

# Multi-threaded pipeline

New `src/pipeline.rs` implements:

  reader thread → bounded jobs channel → N AEAD workers
                → bounded results channel → writer thread

The reader stays serial (it owns the input handle and uses lookahead
to detect the last chunk). Workers parallelize the AEAD step (each
chunk is independent under STREAM). The writer holds a
`BTreeMap<u32, Vec<u8>>` reorder buffer and only flushes in counter
order. Commit is deferred to the main thread, so a failure anywhere —
reader I/O, AEAD auth, writer I/O — drops `OutSink` without renaming
the temp file into place. The
`atomic_output_no_stale_tmp_on_failure` integration test still
passes.

Channel and reorder capacities scale with worker count (`2*threads`);
peak memory is roughly `chunk_size * 4 * threads`. With 1 MiB chunks
and 8 cores that's ~32 MiB, which we accept.

Default thread count is `std::thread::available_parallelism()`;
override with `-j/--threads N`. `-j 1` keeps the original serial path.
Stdin/stdout streaming works under the parallel path because `Stdin`
(unlocked) is `Send` — only `StdinLock` isn't, so the boxed reader
wraps `Stdin` directly in a `BufReader`.

Adds `crossbeam-channel = "0.5"` for bounded MPMC. The cipher
(`XChaCha20Poly1305`) and the header AAD are shared across workers via
`Arc`; the AEAD's internal key copy is zeroized on drop as before.

# CLI surface

  -j, --threads <N>     worker thread count (default: cores)
      --offset <BYTES>  random-access decrypt: slice start
      --length <BYTES>  random-access decrypt: slice length

`--offset`/`--length` require `--decrypt` and `--input-file` (clap
enforces; we also surface a clean runtime error if only one is
supplied).

# Test plan

* `cargo test` — 5 unit + 27 integration, all green.
* New integration coverage:
  - parallel roundtrip on multi-chunk inputs (`-j 4`)
  - parallel-encrypted ciphertext decrypted serially, and vice-versa
    (output bit-identical regardless of worker count)
  - parallel pipe stdin↔stdout (asserts flag byte is 0 for stdin
    inputs — no length committed without a known size)
  - file inputs auto-commit length (asserts version=2 and flags bit 0
    set in the raw header bytes)
  - random-access slices spanning chunk-aligned, mid-chunk,
    last-chunk, and full-file ranges
  - random-access rejects out-of-range and stdin-encrypted inputs,
    accepts zero-length
  - tampering the committed length byte fails AEAD authentication
  - hand-crafted v1 header still decodes (no flag bit set)
* `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` clean.
* `cargo +nightly fmt` clean.

Removes `TODO.md` since both deferred items are now implemented.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 20:33:00 +02:00
ddidderr f72f9034f3 feat(cli): default to interactive passphrase when no key source given 
Previously, invoking fcry without any of --raw-key, --passphrase, or
--passphrase-env produced a hard error ("must provide one of ..."). The
common, secure case (interactive TTY passphrase) thus required an
explicit flag, while the dangerous case (--raw-key on the command line)
was equally accessible.

Make the secure path the default: if no key source is specified, fall
back to PassphraseSource::Tty, which prompts on the terminal and runs
argon2id on encrypt. Explicit --passphrase still works and is now
redundant for the default invocation; --raw-key and --passphrase-env
remain unchanged and still suppress the default.

The previous "must provide one of ..." error path becomes unreachable
and is removed: the only way pw_src is None is when raw_key_str is Some,
which is handled by the existing encrypt/decrypt branches.

User-visible change: `fcry -i foo -o foo.enc` now prompts for a
passphrase instead of erroring out. Scripts that relied on the error to
detect missing arguments will instead block on a TTY read; non-TTY
callers should continue to pass --passphrase-env or --raw-key
explicitly.

Test Plan:
- `fcry -i plain -o plain.enc` prompts twice (passphrase + confirm),
  then `fcry -d -i plain.enc -o plain.out` prompts once and round-trips.
- `fcry --raw-key $(head -c32 /dev/urandom | base64) ...` still works
  and does not prompt.
- `PW=hunter2 fcry --passphrase-env PW ...` still works and does not
  prompt.
- `fcry --passphrase --raw-key ...` still rejected by clap
  (conflicts_with_all).
 2026-05-02 19:52:19 +02:00
ddidderr 669f5ed073 deps: cargo update 2026-05-02 19:16:50 +02:00
ddidderr 898697016a refactor(secrets): back SecretBytes32/SecretVec with the secrets crate 
Replace the homegrown `region::lock` + `Zeroizing` wrappers with thin
adapters over `secrets::SecretBox` and `secrets::SecretVec`. The
upstream crate already provides everything the local types were doing
by hand (mlock, zero-on-drop) and adds protections we didn't have:
guard pages around the allocation and `mprotect`-based access control
(`PROT_NONE` at rest, `PROT_READ` during a borrow, `PROT_READ|WRITE`
during a mut borrow). Net result is a security upgrade, not just a
dependency swap.

Why a local adapter still exists
--------------------------------
`secrets::SecretVec` is fixed-length — no `push`. The tty passphrase
reader needs to append bytes one at a time without ever reallocating
(a panicking partial read must not leave stale plaintext on the heap),
so `SecretVec` keeps a separate logical `len` over a fixed protected
allocation of `MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN` bytes. Bytes past `len` stay
zero-padding and are never exposed through `with_slice`.

API shape: closure-scoped borrows
---------------------------------
The previous `as_slice` / `as_array` returned long-lived `&[u8]`
references, which would have kept the upstream pages in `PROT_READ`
for the full lifetime of the borrow. The new API uses
`with_array(|s| ...)`, `with_mut_array(|s| ...)`, `with_slice(|s| ...)`
so the unprotected window is exactly the closure body. This is uglier
at call sites (notably the nested closures in `derive_key`) but it's
the right tradeoff — minimizing the unprotected window is the whole
point of using the crate.

AEAD key copy footnote
----------------------
`XChaCha20Poly1305::new` copies the key into its own (unprotected)
state, which then lives in the `aead` binding for the entire
encrypt/decrypt loop. This is unchanged from before — the cipher
state was never protected — but it's now called out explicitly with
a comment at both call sites noting that `chacha20poly1305` zeroizes
that internal copy on drop. Future readers shouldn't have to
rediscover this by reading upstream source.

`from_vec` zeroing
------------------
`SecretVec::from_vec(v: Vec<u8>)` is used on the env-var path. It
calls `secrets::SecretVec::from(&mut [u8])`, which (verified against
secrets-1.3.0: `Box::from` -> `transfer` -> `memtransfer`) copies the
bytes into protected storage and zeroes the source slice. The
original Vec's allocation is then released through the normal
allocator — the bytes inside it are zero, but the heap block itself
isn't specially handled. The doc comment on `from_vec` reflects this
precisely. As before, the env-var path also leaves a copy in the
process `environ` table, which is a known accepted leak.

Cargo.toml
----------
Use `protected-secrets = { package = "secrets", version = "1.3" }`
with default features. The `secrets` crate has no pure-Rust backend
at v1.3 — disabling default features only switches *how* libsodium
is linked (bundled `libsodium-sys` vs. the crate's own bindings to a
system libsodium), and can break builds where the chosen path isn't
set up. Defaults are correct here. The `region` dependency is
dropped.

Test plan
---------
- `cargo build` clean.
- `cargo test` — 2 unit + 18 integration tests pass, including
  `roundtrip_passphrase_argon2id` which exercises the full
  passphrase -> argon2id -> AEAD key path through the new wrappers.
- `cargo clippy` (and `--tests`, `--benches`) clean.
- `cargo +nightly fmt` applied.
 2026-05-02 19:14:42 +02:00
ddidderr fe65e1f899 feat!: argon2id passphrases, secret hardening, atomic output, manual STREAM 
This commit lands four follow-up items that were explicitly deferred in
TODO.md after the prior file-format change, plus a CLI/units cleanup
that fell out of reviewing them:

  1. Manual STREAM nonce construction (drops `stream` cargo feature).
  2. Atomic file output (`.tmp` + rename, with cleanup on failure).
  3. Argon2id KDF + passphrase prompt + matching CLI flags.
  4. Hardened secret handling: zeroize-on-drop, mlock'd buffers,
     custom cross-platform tty reader (replaces `rpassword`).

Why
---
The prior version had three concrete weaknesses that were fine for
"early development" but unacceptable past that point:

  * `--raw-key` was the only way to supply a key, exposing it in
    `/proc/$pid/cmdline`. There was no passphrase mode at all.
  * Crashes/aborts during encrypt could leave a half-written output
    file in place of (or replacing) the user's target.
  * Key material wasn't zeroed and could end up in swap or coredumps.
    rpassword's reallocating String buffers also leaked stale heap
    copies of typed passphrases that no `Zeroizing` wrapper could
    reach after the fact.

(1) Manual STREAM nonces
------------------------
Replaces `aead::stream::EncryptorBE32` / `DecryptorBE32` with
explicit `make_nonce(prefix, counter, last)` and direct
`XChaCha20Poly1305::{encrypt,decrypt}_in_place` calls. The wire format
is unchanged (XChaCha20Poly1305 STREAM-BE32 = 19-byte prefix || 4-byte
big-endian counter || 1-byte last-block flag), so files written by the
previous version still decrypt. Counter overflow is now an explicit
`Format` error rather than a panic in the upstream stream wrapper.

This removes the `stream` cargo feature from `chacha20poly1305` and
prepares the encrypt path for parallelism: with explicit nonces we can
hand chunks to a worker pool keyed by counter without the stream
wrapper's stateful API getting in the way.

(2) Atomic file output
----------------------
New `utils::OutSink` writes to `<path>.tmp`, calls `sync_all()` on
`commit()`, and renames into place. If dropped without commit (panic,
crypto/IO error, ctrl-C), the temp file is unlinked so the existing
target is untouched. Stdout output is unaffected (no temp dance).

A new integration test (`atomic_output_no_stale_tmp_on_failure`)
verifies that a failed decrypt leaves neither the final output nor
the temp file behind.

(3) Argon2id + passphrase
-------------------------
New `KdfParams::Argon2id { salt, m_cost, t_cost, p_cost }` variant
encoded into the header (and authenticated as AAD), so tampering with
KDF params fails authentication on every chunk.

CLI surface (BREAKING):
  * `--raw-key` is now optional; one of `--raw-key`, `--passphrase`,
    `--passphrase-env <VAR>` is required.
  * `--passphrase` prompts on the controlling terminal with echo off,
    and asks for confirmation when encrypting.
  * `--passphrase-env <VAR>` reads from a named env var; intended for
    non-interactive use (scripts, tests). The env-table copy is a
    known leak for that path.
  * `--argon-memory <MiB>` (default 1024 = 1 GiB), `--argon-passes`
    (default 2), `--argon-parallelism` (default 4). Names follow
    argon2 RFC 9106 terminology; memory is MiB rather than KiB to
    match how humans actually think about RAM. Defaults follow the
    "Balanced" preset for 2026-era hardware (~1.5–4 s on a laptop).
    The argon2 crate wants KiB internally, so the CLI value is
    multiplied by 1024 with overflow-check.

(4) Secret hardening
--------------------
New `secrets` module provides:

  * `SecretBytes32`: heap-allocated 32-byte buffer wrapped in
    `Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>` and mlock'd via the `region` crate.
    Field order ensures the lock guard drops *before* the buffer is
    freed (otherwise munlock would target freed memory).
  * `SecretVec`: fixed-capacity, mlock'd, zeroize-on-drop byte
    buffer. `push()` rejects writes past the reserved capacity so
    the underlying allocation never reallocates and moves — which
    would invalidate the lock and leave a stale unzeroed copy on
    the heap.
  * `read_passphrase_tty()`: direct tty reader. On Unix, opens
    `/dev/tty`, clears `ECHO` via `tcgetattr`/`tcsetattr` with an
    RAII guard that restores termios on drop. On Windows, opens
    `CONIN$`/`CONOUT$` and clears `ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT` via
    `Get/SetConsoleMode`. Reads byte-by-byte into a pre-reserved
    `SecretVec` (1024 bytes), so neither the Rust side nor the libc
    side reallocates during read. This replaces `rpassword`, which
    returned a `String` that grew by reallocation and left
    unzeroed copies of typed passphrases on the heap.

`PartialEq` on `SecretVec` is constant-time-ish (length check +
xor-or accumulate) so the confirmation comparison doesn't early-out
on the first differing byte.

`disable_core_dumps()` calls `setrlimit(CORE, 0)` on Unix; on
Windows it's a no-op (WER/minidump suppression is a per-machine
policy and intentionally not done here).

`Cli`'s secret-bearing fields are moved out into local bindings at
the top of `run()` and the `Cli` is explicitly dropped, so they
don't sit in the parsed struct for the rest of the function.
`Cli.raw_key` is `Option<Zeroizing<String>>` so the field we own
zeroes itself on drop. Clap's own intermediate copies during
parsing are an accepted leak.

Threat model — what is and isn't covered
-----------------------------------------
Covered (best-effort):
  * Secrets in coredumps                  → rlimit on Unix.
  * Secrets paged to swap or hibernation  → mlock on the AEAD key
                                            and passphrase buffer.
  * Half-written ciphertext on crash      → atomic rename.
  * Stale heap copies of typed passphrase → custom tty reader,
                                            pre-reserved buffer.
  * Stale stack/heap copies of the AEAD
    key or passphrase post-process-exit   → zeroize on drop.

Not covered (and not pretending to be):
  * Live-process attackers with ptrace or `/proc/$pid/mem` access.
  * The kernel's tty/line buffer.
  * Clap's transient String allocations during arg parsing.
  * The `environ` table copy of an env-var passphrase.
  * Swap on systems without functioning mlock or with
    `RLIMIT_MEMLOCK = 0`.

mlock is small (32 bytes + 1024 bytes — two pages at most on any
of the three target OSes), so it fits well under the typical
unprivileged `RLIMIT_MEMLOCK` of 64 KiB.

Portability
-----------
The whole binary targets Linux, macOS, and Windows 11 with the
same security properties where the OS supports them:

  * `region` crate provides cross-platform mlock/munlock.
  * `libc::tcgetattr`/`tcsetattr` covers Linux + macOS.
  * `windows-sys` covers Console API.
  * `rlimit` is gated to `cfg(unix)`.

The Windows tty path compiles in my head but is unverified on this
machine — there is no `x86_64-pc-windows-*` target installed and
no Windows runner. Treat that path as "best-effort, needs CI on
Windows" until exercised.

Files written by the previous v0.10 (Raw KDF, BE32 STREAM) are
still readable: the wire format is unchanged for that path.

Test plan
---------
Existing 17 integration tests pass unchanged. Two new tests:

  * `roundtrip_passphrase_argon2id` — encrypts and decrypts via
    `--passphrase-env` with cheap argon2 params (8 MiB / 1 pass) so
    the test stays fast; also verifies that a wrong passphrase
    fails.
  * `atomic_output_no_stale_tmp_on_failure` — wrong-key decrypt
    leaves neither the final file nor the `.tmp` in place.

Manual sanity (not automated): run with `--passphrase` on a
terminal and confirm echo is off and confirmation works.

Follow-ups (still in TODO.md)
-----------------------------
  * Multi-threaded encrypt pipeline (now feasible — manual nonces).
  * Length-committed mode + random-access decrypt fast path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 18:26:44 +02:00
ddidderr 4eee8e7a95 feat!: add file-format header, configurable chunks, integration tests 
Introduce a self-describing on-disk format and use it to address several
shortcomings of the 0.9 file layout, where the file simply began with a
raw 19-byte STREAM nonce prefix and used a hardcoded 64 KiB chunk size.

What changed for users
----------------------
* fcry files now start with a 16-byte header: magic ("fcry"), version,
  algorithm id, flags, reserved byte, plaintext chunk_size (u32 LE),
  KDF id + params, then the 19-byte nonce prefix. The full encoded
  header is bound as AAD to every chunk, so tampering with chunk_size,
  algorithm id, nonce prefix, or any future KDF parameter causes
  authentication failure on every chunk -- not just the first.
* New `--chunk-size` CLI flag (encryption only). The decryptor reads
  the chunk size from the header, so files encrypted with a non-default
  size decrypt without the user having to remember it.
* Default plaintext chunk size raised from 64 KiB to 1 MiB.
* Bad input is now reported as an error instead of panicking: empty
  ciphertext, truncated final chunk, wrong magic, bad version, zero
  chunk_size, unknown algorithm id, and short --raw-key all return a
  non-zero exit status with a diagnostic on stderr.
* Empty plaintext now produces a valid (authenticated) empty
  ciphertext instead of panicking; the decryptor verifies it.
* `main` exits with status 1 on error (previously it printed and
  returned 0).

This is a breaking change to the file format: 0.9.x files have no magic
or header and cannot be read by 0.10.x. Version bumped to 0.10.0.

Why this approach
-----------------
The header-as-AAD pattern is the standard way to make file-format
metadata tamper-evident without a separate signature: any bit-flip in
the header propagates into every chunk's authentication tag check, so
an attacker cannot, for example, change chunk_size to mis-frame the
stream or downgrade the algorithm id.

Storing chunk_size in the header (rather than fixing it at compile
time) lets us experiment with chunk sizes without breaking decrypt
compatibility, and is preparation for the parallel-pipeline work in
Roadmap 1.0 where worker count and chunk size interact.

The KDF section is a tagged variant (currently only `Raw`) so that
adding Argon2id later only adds a new variant + its salt/cost fields;
existing files keep decrypting because they carry `kdf_id = 0`.

Other changes bundled in
------------------------
* Switch RNG from `rand` (0.10) to `getrandom` (0.3). We only need
  OS-provided random bytes for the nonce prefix; pulling in the full
  `rand` crate for one `OsRng.fill_bytes` call was overkill, and
  `rand` 0.10's `OsRng` API churn makes `getrandom` the cleaner fit.
* `FcryError` gains a `Format(String)` variant for header / framing
  errors and a `From<getrandom::Error>` impl (replacing the
  `rand::Error` impl).
* Drop the noisy `[reader]` / `[encrypt]` / `[decrypt]` stderr
  tracing prints and the `dbg!(&cli.raw_key)` (which leaked the key
  to stderr).
* Replace `unwrap()` on file open / create with `?` so I/O errors
  surface as structured `FcryError::Io` instead of aborting.
* Remove the unused `AheadReader::read_exact` wrapper -- the
  decryptor now reads the header through the underlying `BufRead`
  directly before wrapping it in `AheadReader`.

Tests
-----
Add `tests/roundtrip.rs` (assert_cmd + tempfile) covering: empty
input, single byte, sub-chunk, exact chunk, chunk+1, multi-chunk,
custom small chunk size (4096), pathological 1-byte chunk size,
stdin/stdout pipe mode, wrong key rejection, tampered header,
tampered ciphertext, truncated ciphertext, bad magic, short raw key,
and the header-is-authoritative property (encrypt with a weird chunk
size, decrypt without specifying one). Also adds a unit test in
`header.rs` for header encode/decode roundtrip and bad-magic rejection.

TODO.md trimmed to the concrete follow-up sequence (manual STREAM
nonces, secrets/rlimit, atomic output, argon2id KDF + prompt,
multi-threaded pipeline, length-committed mode).

Test plan
---------
* `cargo clippy && cargo clippy --tests` -- clean.
* `cargo +nightly fmt` -- no diff.
* `cargo test` -- 16 integration + 2 header unit tests pass.
* Manual: `echo hi | fcry --raw-key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
  | fcry -d --raw-key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef` prints `hi`.

Trailers
--------
Refs: TODO.md (Roadmap 1.0 follow-up sequence)
Breaking-Change: file format; 0.9.x files cannot be decrypted by 0.10.x
 2026-05-02 17:22:47 +02:00
ddidderr 5e51b4bfe1 whatever 2026-05-02 16:20:20 +02:00
17 changed files with 4918 additions and 968 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
Cargo.lock
Generated
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View File
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[package] [package]
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name = "fcry" name = "fcry"
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lto = true
incremental = false
codegen-units = 1 codegen-units = 1
LICENSE
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View File
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MIT No Attribution
Copyright 2026 fcry contributors
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this
software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software
without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify,
merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
LICENSE.md
-675
View File
@@ -1,675 +0,0 @@
### GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 29 June 2007
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
<https://fsf.org/>
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
license document, but changing it is not allowed.
### Preamble
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User Product is transferred to the recipient in perpetuity or for a
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Corresponding Source conveyed under this section must be accompanied
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#### 7. Additional Terms.
"Additional permissions" are terms that supplement the terms of this
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Additional permissions that are applicable to the entire Program shall
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that they are valid under applicable law. If additional permissions
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#### 8. Termination.
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#### 9. Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies.
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#### 10. Automatic Licensing of Downstream Recipients.
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#### 11. Patents.
A "contributor" is a copyright holder who authorizes use under this
License of the Program or a work on which the Program is based. The
work thus licensed is called the contributor's "contributor version".
A contributor's "essential patent claims" are all patent claims owned
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you grant is automatically extended to all recipients of the covered
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Nothing in this License shall be construed as excluding or limiting
any implied license or other defenses to infringement that may
otherwise be available to you under applicable patent law.
#### 12. No Surrender of Others' Freedom.
If conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or
otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not
excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot convey a
covered work so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under
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consequence you may not convey it at all. For example, if you agree to
terms that obligate you to collect a royalty for further conveying
from those to whom you convey the Program, the only way you could
satisfy both those terms and this License would be to refrain entirely
from conveying the Program.
#### 13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have
permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed
under version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License into a single
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License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work,
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#### 14. Revised Versions of this License.
The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions
of the GNU General Public License from time to time. Such new versions
will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in
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Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program
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If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future versions
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Later license versions may give you additional or different
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#### 15. Disclaimer of Warranty.
THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
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#### 16. Limitation of Liability.
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TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER
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#### 17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16.
If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided
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reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates
an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the
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END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
### How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these
terms.
To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest to
attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively state
the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least the
"copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
<one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper
mail.
If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short
notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode:
<program> Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
The hypothetical commands \`show w' and \`show c' should show the
appropriate parts of the General Public License. Of course, your
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use an "about box".
You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or
school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
necessary. For more information on this, and how to apply and follow
the GNU GPL, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your
program into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine
library, you may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary
applications with the library. If this is what you want to do, use the
GNU Lesser General Public License instead of this License. But first,
please read <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/why-not-lgpl.html>.
README.md
+169 -9
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,172 @@
# fcry - [f]ile[cry]pt # fcry - filecrypt
A file en-/decryption tool for easy use.
Currently `fcry` uses `ChaCha20Poly1305` ([RFC 8439](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439)) as [AEAD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption) cipher provided by the [chacha20poly1305](https://docs.rs/chacha20poly1305/latest/chacha20poly1305/) crate. `fcry` encrypts and decrypts files with an authenticated chunked format. New
files use XChaCha20-Poly1305 in a STREAM-style construction: a 19-byte random
nonce prefix, a 32-bit chunk counter, and a last-chunk bit form each 24-byte
XChaCha nonce. Every chunk authenticates the full file header as AEAD
associated data.
## Status The tool is intended for local file encryption, scripted backups, and
Currently `fcry` is __not thoroughly tested__ and in __early stages of development__. streaming-friendly decrypts. It is not a general archive format, does not hide
There is a chance, that something is broken as of now. file size, and does not protect plaintext after another process has received
Encryption __seems__ to work, but due to a possible lack of understanding of some underlying methods it.
(or misinterpretation) it could theoretically be not effective at all.
See [TODO.md](/ddidderr/fcry/src/branch/main/TODO.md) for further information. ## Usage
Encrypt with an interactive passphrase:
```sh
fcry -i plain.bin -o plain.bin.fcry --passphrase
```
Decrypt with the same passphrase:
```sh
fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry -o plain.bin --passphrase
```
Use a raw 32-byte key file instead of a passphrase:
```sh
fcry -i plain.bin -o plain.bin.fcry --key-file key.bin
fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry -o plain.bin --key-file key.bin
```
For non-interactive passphrase use:
```sh
FCRY_PASSWORD='correct horse battery staple' \
fcry -i plain.bin -o plain.bin.fcry --passphrase-env FCRY_PASSWORD
```
`--passphrase-env` is useful for automation, but the environment variable can
remain visible to the current process environment and platform tooling. Prefer
interactive entry or a protected key file when possible.
## Safety Properties
- File outputs are written to private, randomly named temporary files and are
renamed into place only after encryption or decryption succeeds. Existing
outputs require `--force`, except for the self-replacement case that is
handled through the temporary file.
- New passphrase encryptions use Argon2id by default with 1024 MiB of memory,
2 passes, and 4 lanes. Passphrases must be non-empty and at least 12 UTF-8
bytes unless `--allow-weak-kdf` is explicitly supplied for tests or legacy
interop.
- Decryption enforces a memory ceiling for Argon2id headers. The default cap is
the lower of 4096 MiB, the architecture limit, and available Linux memory
when that can be detected. Override it with `--max-argon-memory-mib` only for
files you trust.
- Chunk size is bounded to `1..=64 MiB`. Worker threads are capped at 256, and
the pipeline bounds in-flight chunk memory.
- v3 files carry a key commitment derived from the stretched key and committed
header fields. This gives a fast, clear wrong-key failure before chunk
processing and prevents stripping or downgrading the commitment without
authentication failure.
- On Unix, `fcry` makes a best-effort call to disable core dumps for the process
before handling secrets.
## Format
The current on-disk format version is v3.
```text
magic "fcry" 4 bytes
version u8 1
alg_id u8 1 (1 = XChaCha20-Poly1305)
flags u8 1
reserved u8 1 (must be 0)
chunk_size u32 LE 4
kdf_id u8 1 (0 = raw key, 1 = Argon2id)
kdf_params variable
nonce_prefix [u8; 19]
plaintext_length u64 LE only when flags bit 0 is set
key_commitment [u8; 32] only when flags bit 1 is set
ciphertext chunks each plaintext chunk plus a 16-byte Poly1305 tag
```
The encoded header is AEAD associated data for every chunk. Changing the chunk
size, KDF parameters, nonce prefix, committed plaintext length, key commitment,
or other header bytes causes authentication failure.
Version history:
- v1: no flags and no committed plaintext length.
- v2: adds the length-committed flag and optional `plaintext_length`.
- v3: requires the key-commitment flag and stores the 32-byte key commitment.
Regular file encryption commits `plaintext_length` in the header. Stdin
encryption cannot know the final length up front, so stdin-produced files do
not support random-access decrypt.
## Streaming And Ranges
Normal decrypt-to-stdout emits each plaintext chunk after that chunk has
authenticated. This means a truncated ciphertext can produce an authentic
prefix on stdout before the final truncation error is reported. That is
inherent to chunked streaming AE when bytes are released immediately.
Use `--buffer-verify` when decrypting to stdout if downstream consumers must
not see any plaintext until the whole file has authenticated:
```sh
fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry --passphrase --buffer-verify > plain.bin
```
`--buffer-verify` writes plaintext to a private temporary file first, verifies
the complete ciphertext, and copies to stdout only after success. File outputs
already get atomic temporary-file behavior, so `--buffer-verify` is only valid
for decrypt-to-stdout.
Random-access decrypt requires `--decrypt`, `--input-file`, `--offset`, and
`--length`, and the input must have a length-committed header:
```sh
fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry --passphrase --offset 1048576 --length 4096 > slice.bin
```
A successful range decrypt authenticates the requested chunks and header. It
does not prove that the rest of the file is present or untampered. Use a full
decrypt when you need whole-file integrity. `--length 0` is rejected because it
would authenticate no chunks.
## Threat Model
`fcry` aims to provide confidentiality and integrity for file contents against
an attacker who can read, copy, truncate, replace, or modify ciphertext files
after encryption. With passphrase mode, offline guessing is still possible; the
Argon2id parameters make each guess expensive but cannot make a weak passphrase
safe.
The format authenticates all header fields that affect decryption, including
KDF parameters, chunk size, nonce prefix, committed plaintext length, and key
commitment. Unknown header flags and unsupported algorithms are rejected.
The following are explicit non-goals:
- Hiding plaintext length or access patterns. `plaintext_length` is cleartext
for regular-file encryptions, and ciphertext length already reveals an
approximate plaintext size. There is no padding scheme.
- Preventing plaintext exposure after successful decrypt. Plaintext written to
stdout, files, pipes, shell history, terminals, swap, backups, or downstream
tools is outside `fcry`'s control.
- Protecting plaintext chunk buffers from every local memory-forensics route.
Keys and passphrases use protected/zeroizing storage where practical, and
chunk buffers are zeroized on drop, but decrypted plaintext necessarily exists
in ordinary process memory while being processed.
- Disabling Windows Error Reporting or minidumps. Unlike Unix core dumps, those
are controlled by per-machine Windows policy; `fcry` records this as an
operator/deployment responsibility rather than changing host-wide policy.
- Recovering from loss of the passphrase or raw key file. There is no escrow or
backdoor.
## Operational Notes
- Keep backups of important plaintext until you have verified the encrypted
file and your recovery path.
- Store raw key files with restrictive permissions. On Unix, `fcry` warns when
a key file is group/world accessible.
- Use `--allow-weak-kdf` only for tests or compatibility with old intentionally
weak files.
- Use `--temp-dir` when the default temporary-file location is not acceptable
for decrypt-to-stdout buffering or output staging.
TODO.md
-28
View File
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# Roadmap 1.0
## Summary
Make the program real-world usable and stable.
## Knowledge and Design
* understand `encrypt_next_in_place()`'s first argument better
* current understanding:
* associated data is used for parts of the data that cannot be
encrypted but should also be integrity protected by the authentication tag
* since there are no parts that cannot be encrypted in the context of `fcry` it is correct
to pass an empty slice to the first argument of `encrypt_next_in_place()`
* currently `fcry` uses 64 KiB blocks as single AEAD messages
* as stated [here](https://pycryptodome.readthedocs.io/en/latest/src/cipher/chacha20_poly1305.html) (limit of 13 billion messages) would imply a maximum file-size of `64 KiB * 13e9 = 832e9 KiB = 774.86 TiB`. While a file this size could be considered a special (and unsupported) use case anyway, performance is also a consideration. Does performance improve noticably with larger message sizes?
* unit tests
## Features
* password hashing
* configurable algorithm (sane default)
* configurable nr of rounds (sand default)
* a way to enter the password securely in a prompt while still being able to handle `stdin` data
* add usage examples to README.md
# Roadmap 2.0
* parallel processing: use all available (or configurable) CPU cores
# Roadmap later or never
* split into `lib` and `bin`
* other AEAD algorithms
justfile
+33
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
set positional-arguments
run *args:
cargo run -- "$@"
build:
cargo build
build-release:
cargo build --release
build-production:
cargo build --profile production
fmt:
cargo +nightly fmt
tombi format
just --fmt
_fix:
cargo fix
cargo clippy --fix
fix: _fix fmt
clippy:
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings
test:
cargo test --workspace
clean:
cargo clean
src/crypto.rs
+572 -55
View File
@@ -1,104 +1,621 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
use chacha20poly1305::{aead::stream, KeyInit, XChaCha20Poly1305}; use chacha20poly1305::{KeyInit, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::AeadInPlace};
use rand::{rngs::OsRng, RngCore}; use std::fs::File;
use std::io::{BufReader, Read, Seek, SeekFrom, Write};
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::error::*; use crate::error::*;
use crate::reader::ReadInfo; use crate::header::{
use crate::utils::BUFSIZE; AlgId, FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED, FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED, Header, KdfParams, NONCE_PREFIX_LEN, TAG_LEN,
VERSION_CURRENT,
};
use crate::pipeline;
use crate::policy;
use crate::reader::{AheadReader, ReadInfoChunk};
use crate::secrets::{SecretBytes32, SecretVec};
use crate::utils::*; use crate::utils::*;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
/// XChaCha20Poly1305 nonce: 24 bytes total. STREAM splits the trailing 5 bytes
/// into a 4-byte big-endian counter and a 1-byte "last block" flag.
pub(crate) const NONCE_LEN: usize = 24;
pub(crate) const COUNTER_LEN: usize = 4;
const _: () = assert!(NONCE_PREFIX_LEN + COUNTER_LEN + 1 == NONCE_LEN);
pub(crate) fn make_nonce(prefix: &[u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN], counter: u32, last: bool) -> XNonce {
let mut n = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
n[..NONCE_PREFIX_LEN].copy_from_slice(prefix);
n[NONCE_PREFIX_LEN..NONCE_PREFIX_LEN + COUNTER_LEN].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
n[NONCE_LEN - 1] = u8::from(last);
XNonce::from(n)
}
/// Derive (or unwrap) the 32-byte AEAD key from KDF parameters and an optional passphrase.
/// For `KdfParams::Raw`, `raw_key` must be supplied.
/// For `KdfParams::Argon2id`, `passphrase` must be supplied.
pub fn derive_key(
kdf: &KdfParams,
raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
) -> Result<SecretBytes32, FcryError> {
let mut out = SecretBytes32::zeroed();
match kdf {
KdfParams::Raw => {
let raw =
raw_key.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("raw kdf requires --key-file".into()))?;
raw.with_array(|raw| out.with_mut_array(|out| out.copy_from_slice(raw)));
}
KdfParams::Argon2id {
salt,
m_cost,
t_cost,
p_cost,
} => {
let pw = passphrase
.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("argon2id kdf requires a passphrase".into()))?;
let params = argon2::Params::new(*m_cost, *t_cost, *p_cost, Some(32))?;
let argon =
argon2::Argon2::new(argon2::Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params);
pw.with_slice(|pw| out.with_mut_array(|out| argon.hash_password_into(pw, salt, out)))?;
}
}
Ok(out)
}
/// Build the AEAD cipher from the protected key. The cipher holds an
/// unprotected copy of the key while alive; `chacha20poly1305` zeroizes that
/// copy on drop. Wrapping in `Arc` lets us share it across worker threads.
fn build_aead(key: &SecretBytes32) -> Arc<XChaCha20Poly1305> {
Arc::new(key.with_array(|key| XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key.into())))
}
fn compute_key_commitment(key: &SecretBytes32, header: &Header) -> [u8; 32] {
key.with_array(|key| {
let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new_keyed(key);
hasher.update(b"fcry-kcv-v3");
hasher.update(&[0]);
hasher.update(&header.commitment_input_encoding());
*hasher.finalize().as_bytes()
})
}
fn verify_key_commitment(header: &Header, key: &SecretBytes32) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let Some(expected) = header.key_commitment else {
return Ok(());
};
let actual = compute_key_commitment(key, header);
let mut diff = 0u8;
for (a, b) in actual.iter().zip(expected.iter()) {
diff |= a ^ b;
}
if diff == 0 {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(FcryError::WrongKey)
}
}
/// Bump the per-chunk counter; surface a domain error on overflow rather than
/// panicking on debug or wrapping in release.
pub(crate) fn bump_counter(counter: u32) -> Result<u32, FcryError> {
counter
.checked_add(1)
.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("STREAM counter overflow (input too large)".into()))
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>( pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
input_file: Option<S>, input_file: Option<S>,
output_file: Option<S>, output_file: Option<S>,
key: [u8; 32], key: &SecretBytes32,
chunk_size: u32,
kdf: KdfParams,
threads: usize,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> { ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let mut f_plain = read_from_file_or_stdin(input_file, BUFSIZE); encrypt_with_output_options(
let mut f_encrypted = write_to_file_or_stdout(output_file); input_file,
output_file,
key,
chunk_size,
kdf,
threads,
&OutSinkOptions::default(),
)
}
let mut nonce = [0u8; 19]; pub fn encrypt_with_output_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce); input_file: Option<S>,
output_file: Option<S>,
key: &SecretBytes32,
chunk_size: u32,
kdf: KdfParams,
threads: usize,
output_options: &OutSinkOptions,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let chunk_sz = policy::validate_chunk_size(chunk_size)?;
let input = open_input(input_file)?;
let plaintext_length = input.length;
let mut f_plain = AheadReader::from(input.reader, chunk_sz);
let mut f_encrypted = OutSink::open_with_options(output_file, output_options)?;
// let key = XChaCha20Poly1305::generate_key(&mut OsRng); let mut nonce_prefix = [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN];
getrandom::fill(&mut nonce_prefix)?;
f_encrypted.write_all(&nonce)?; let flags = if plaintext_length.is_some() {
FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED
} else {
0
} | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED;
let mut header = Header {
version: VERSION_CURRENT,
alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
flags,
chunk_size,
kdf,
nonce_prefix,
plaintext_length,
key_commitment: None,
};
header.key_commitment = Some(compute_key_commitment(key, &header));
let aad = Arc::new(header.encode());
f_encrypted.write_all(&aad)?;
let aead = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key.into()); let aead = build_aead(key);
let mut stream_encryptor = stream::EncryptorBE32::from_aead(aead, &nonce.into());
let mut buf = vec![0; BUFSIZE]; if threads > 1 {
return pipeline::encrypt_parallel(
f_plain,
f_encrypted,
aead,
aad,
nonce_prefix,
chunk_sz,
threads,
plaintext_length,
);
}
let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; chunk_sz]);
let mut counter: u32 = 0;
let mut bytes_seen: u64 = 0;
loop { loop {
let read_result = f_plain.read_ahead(&mut buf)?; match f_plain.read_ahead(&mut buf)? {
ReadInfoChunk::Normal(_) => {
match read_result { let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, false);
ReadInfo::NormalChunk(n) => { aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
assert_eq!(n, BUFSIZE);
assert_eq!(buf.len(), BUFSIZE);
eprintln!("[encrypt]: read normal chunk");
stream_encryptor.encrypt_next_in_place(&[], &mut buf)?;
f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?; f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?;
// buf grows after encrypt_next_in_place because of tag that is added buf.truncate(chunk_sz);
// we shrink it to the BUFSIZE in order to read the correct size bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, chunk_sz, "bytes read")?;
buf.truncate(BUFSIZE); counter = bump_counter(counter)?;
} }
ReadInfo::LastChunk(n) => { ReadInfoChunk::Last(n) => {
eprintln!("[encrypt]: read last chunk");
buf.truncate(n); buf.truncate(n);
stream_encryptor.encrypt_last_in_place(&[], &mut buf)?; let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, true);
aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?;
bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, n, "bytes read")?;
break;
}
ReadInfoChunk::Empty => {
// Empty plaintext: still emit a final "last" tag so the decryptor
// authenticates the (empty) stream rather than silently producing nothing.
buf.clear();
let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, true);
aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?; f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?;
break; break;
} }
ReadInfo::EmptyChunk => {
eprintln!("[encrypt]: read empty chunk");
panic!("[ERROR] Empty Chunk while reading");
}
} }
} }
if let Some(committed) = plaintext_length
&& committed != bytes_seen
{
// Defense in depth: the input changed between stat and EOF. The
// committed length is part of the AEAD AAD, so any decrypter would
// also surface this, but we prefer to fail before publishing the file.
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"input length changed during encryption: committed {committed}, read {bytes_seen}"
)));
}
f_encrypted.commit()?;
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn decrypt<S: AsRef<str>>( pub fn decrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
input_file: Option<S>, input_file: Option<S>,
output_file: Option<S>, output_file: Option<S>,
key: [u8; 32], raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
threads: usize,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> { ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let mut f_encrypted = read_from_file_or_stdin(input_file, BUFSIZE + 16); decrypt_with_argon_cap(
let mut f_plain = write_to_file_or_stdout(output_file); input_file,
output_file,
raw_key,
passphrase,
threads,
policy::default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib(),
)
}
let mut nonce = [0u8; 19]; #[allow(dead_code)]
f_encrypted.read_exact(&mut nonce)?; pub fn decrypt_with_argon_cap<S: AsRef<str>>(
input_file: Option<S>,
output_file: Option<S>,
raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
threads: usize,
max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
decrypt_with_output_options(
input_file,
output_file,
raw_key,
passphrase,
threads,
max_argon_memory_mib,
&OutSinkOptions::default(),
)
}
let aead = XChaCha20Poly1305::new(&key.into()); pub fn decrypt_with_output_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
let mut stream_decryptor = stream::DecryptorBE32::from_aead(aead, &nonce.into()); input_file: Option<S>,
output_file: Option<S>,
raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
threads: usize,
max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
output_options: &OutSinkOptions,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let mut reader = open_input(input_file)?.reader;
let header = Header::read_with_argon_cap(&mut reader, max_argon_memory_mib)?;
let aad = Arc::new(header.encode());
let mut buf = vec![0; BUFSIZE + 16]; let key = derive_key(&header.kdf, raw_key, passphrase)?;
verify_key_commitment(&header, &key)?;
let chunk_sz = policy::validate_chunk_size(header.chunk_size)?;
let cipher_chunk = policy::cipher_chunk_len(chunk_sz)?;
let mut f_encrypted = AheadReader::from(reader, cipher_chunk);
let mut f_plain = OutSink::open_with_options(output_file, output_options)?;
let aead = build_aead(&key);
if threads > 1 {
return pipeline::decrypt_parallel(
f_encrypted,
f_plain,
aead,
aad,
header.nonce_prefix,
cipher_chunk,
threads,
header.plaintext_length,
);
}
let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; cipher_chunk]);
let mut counter: u32 = 0;
let mut bytes_written: u64 = 0;
loop { loop {
let read_result = f_encrypted.read_ahead(&mut buf)?; match f_encrypted.read_ahead(&mut buf)? {
ReadInfoChunk::Normal(_) => {
match read_result { let nonce = make_nonce(&header.nonce_prefix, counter, false);
ReadInfo::NormalChunk(n) => { aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
assert_eq!(n, BUFSIZE + 16);
eprintln!("[decrypt]: read normal chunk");
stream_decryptor.decrypt_next_in_place(&[], &mut buf)?;
f_plain.write_all(&buf)?; f_plain.write_all(&buf)?;
buf.resize(BUFSIZE + 16, 0); bytes_written =
policy::checked_count_add(bytes_written, buf.len(), "bytes written")?;
buf.resize(cipher_chunk, 0);
counter = bump_counter(counter)?;
} }
ReadInfo::LastChunk(n) => { ReadInfoChunk::Last(n) => {
eprintln!("[decrypt]: read last chunk");
buf.truncate(n); buf.truncate(n);
stream_decryptor.decrypt_last_in_place(&[], &mut buf)?; let nonce = make_nonce(&header.nonce_prefix, counter, true);
aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
f_plain.write_all(&buf)?; f_plain.write_all(&buf)?;
bytes_written =
policy::checked_count_add(bytes_written, buf.len(), "bytes written")?;
break; break;
} }
ReadInfo::EmptyChunk => { ReadInfoChunk::Empty => {
eprintln!("[decrypt]: read empty chunk"); return Err(FcryError::Format(
panic!("Empty Chunk while reading"); "truncated ciphertext: missing final chunk".into(),
));
} }
} }
} }
if let Some(committed) = header.plaintext_length
&& committed != bytes_written
{
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"decrypted length {bytes_written} disagrees with committed {committed}"
)));
}
f_plain.commit()?;
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
/// Random-access decrypt of a byte range. Requires a seekable input file
/// whose header has `FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED` set, so we know exactly where
/// each ciphertext chunk lives and which chunk is the last (its nonce uses
/// the STREAM last-block flag).
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn decrypt_range<S: AsRef<str>>(
input_file: &str,
output_file: Option<S>,
raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
offset: u64,
length: u64,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
decrypt_range_with_argon_cap(
input_file,
output_file,
raw_key,
passphrase,
offset,
length,
policy::default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib(),
)
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn decrypt_range_with_argon_cap<S: AsRef<str>>(
input_file: &str,
output_file: Option<S>,
raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
offset: u64,
length: u64,
max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
decrypt_range_with_output_options(
input_file,
output_file,
raw_key,
passphrase,
offset,
length,
max_argon_memory_mib,
&OutSinkOptions::default(),
)
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn decrypt_range_with_output_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
input_file: &str,
output_file: Option<S>,
raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
offset: u64,
length: u64,
max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
output_options: &OutSinkOptions,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
if length == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("--length 0 is not allowed".into()));
}
let file = File::open(input_file)?;
let mut reader = BufReader::new(file);
let header = Header::read_with_argon_cap(&mut reader, max_argon_memory_mib)?;
let aad = header.encode();
let header_len = aad.len() as u64;
let total = header.plaintext_length.ok_or_else(|| {
FcryError::Format(
"random-access decrypt requires a length-committed header (encrypt from a regular file)".into(),
)
})?;
let end = offset
.checked_add(length)
.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("offset + length overflows u64".into()))?;
if end > total {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"range [{offset}, {end}) exceeds plaintext length {total}"
)));
}
let key = derive_key(&header.kdf, raw_key, passphrase)?;
verify_key_commitment(&header, &key)?;
let aead = build_aead(&key);
let chunk_sz_usize = policy::validate_chunk_size(header.chunk_size)?;
let cipher_chunk_usize = policy::cipher_chunk_len(chunk_sz_usize)?;
let chunk_sz = chunk_sz_usize as u64;
let cipher_chunk = cipher_chunk_usize as u64;
// Layout invariants:
// n_chunks = ceil(total / chunk_sz), but always ≥ 1 (the empty file
// still authenticates a single empty "last" chunk).
// last_idx = n_chunks - 1
// last_pt = total - last_idx * chunk_sz (in [0, chunk_sz])
let (n_chunks, last_pt) = if total == 0 {
(1u64, 0u64)
} else {
let n = total.div_ceil(chunk_sz);
let before_last = policy::checked_mul_u64(n - 1, chunk_sz, "last chunk offset")?;
let last = total
.checked_sub(before_last)
.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("last chunk length underflow".into()))?;
(n, last)
};
let last_idx = n_chunks - 1;
let mut out = OutSink::open_with_options(output_file, output_options)?;
let start_chunk = offset / chunk_sz;
let end_chunk = (end - 1) / chunk_sz;
// Reusable buffer sized to a full chunk + tag.
let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(Vec::with_capacity(cipher_chunk_usize));
let mut file = reader.into_inner();
for i in start_chunk..=end_chunk {
let i_u32 =
u32::try_from(i).map_err(|_| FcryError::Format("chunk index exceeds u32".into()))?;
let is_last = i == last_idx;
let cipher_len = if is_last {
last_pt + TAG_LEN as u64
} else {
cipher_chunk
};
let cipher_len_usz =
usize::try_from(cipher_len).map_err(|_| FcryError::Format("chunk too big".into()))?;
let chunk_offset = policy::checked_add_u64(
header_len,
policy::checked_mul_u64(i, cipher_chunk, "ciphertext chunk offset")?,
"ciphertext chunk offset",
)?;
file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(chunk_offset))?;
buf.clear();
buf.resize(cipher_len_usz, 0);
file.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
let nonce = make_nonce(&header.nonce_prefix, i_u32, is_last);
aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
// `buf` is now plaintext for this chunk. Compute the chunk's plaintext
// window in absolute bytes and intersect with the requested range.
let chunk_start = policy::checked_mul_u64(i, chunk_sz, "plaintext chunk offset")?;
let chunk_end = policy::checked_count_add(chunk_start, buf.len(), "plaintext chunk end")?;
let lo = offset.max(chunk_start) - chunk_start;
let hi = end.min(chunk_end) - chunk_start;
out.write_all(&buf[lo as usize..hi as usize])?;
}
out.commit()?;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
//! Regression tests for cross-version compatibility. The on-disk header
//! is part of the AEAD AAD, so any byte that ends up in `Header::encode()`
//! must match the bytes that were authenticated when the file was
//! written. The v1 test below catches the regression where `encode()`
//! used to hard-code the current version on output.
use super::*;
use crate::header::{Header, KdfParams, NONCE_PREFIX_LEN};
use std::fs;
use tempfile::TempDir;
fn write_v1_ciphertext(path: &std::path::Path, key: &SecretBytes32, plaintext: &[u8]) {
// Build a v1 header by hand: same wire format as v2 with flags=0,
// but with version byte = 1.
let nonce_prefix = [0x42u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN];
let header = Header {
version: 1,
alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
flags: 0,
chunk_size: 64,
kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
nonce_prefix,
plaintext_length: None,
key_commitment: None,
};
let aad = header.encode();
// First byte after MAGIC is the version — verify our fixture really
// is v1 (so this test fails open if encode() ever reverts).
assert_eq!(aad[4], 1);
let chunk_sz = header.chunk_size as usize;
let aead = build_aead(key);
let mut out = Vec::new();
out.extend_from_slice(&aad);
let mut counter: u32 = 0;
let mut pos = 0;
while pos < plaintext.len() {
let end = (pos + chunk_sz).min(plaintext.len());
let last = end == plaintext.len() && (end - pos) < chunk_sz;
let mut buf = plaintext[pos..end].to_vec();
let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, last);
aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut buf).unwrap();
out.extend_from_slice(&buf);
pos = end;
if last {
break;
}
// If we hit a chunk-boundary EOF we still need a trailing "last"
// empty chunk to authenticate end-of-stream.
counter = bump_counter(counter).unwrap();
if pos == plaintext.len() {
let mut empty = Vec::new();
let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, true);
aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut empty).unwrap();
out.extend_from_slice(&empty);
break;
}
}
// Empty plaintext: emit a single empty "last" chunk.
if plaintext.is_empty() {
let mut empty = Vec::new();
let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, 0, true);
aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut empty).unwrap();
out.extend_from_slice(&empty);
}
fs::write(path, &out).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn decrypts_v1_ciphertext() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let ct = dir.path().join("v1.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("rt.bin");
let mut key = SecretBytes32::zeroed();
key.with_mut_array(|k| k.copy_from_slice(b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"));
// Multi-chunk plaintext (chunk_size = 64 in the fixture).
let plain: Vec<u8> = (0..200u8).collect();
write_v1_ciphertext(&ct, &key, &plain);
decrypt(
Some(ct.to_str().unwrap()),
Some(rt.to_str().unwrap()),
Some(&key),
None,
1,
)
.expect("v1 decrypt should succeed");
let got = fs::read(&rt).unwrap();
assert_eq!(got, plain);
}
#[test]
fn decrypts_v1_ciphertext_parallel() {
// Same fixture, but exercising the multi-threaded pipeline.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let ct = dir.path().join("v1.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("rt.bin");
let mut key = SecretBytes32::zeroed();
key.with_mut_array(|k| k.copy_from_slice(b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"));
let plain: Vec<u8> = (0..200u8).collect();
write_v1_ciphertext(&ct, &key, &plain);
decrypt(
Some(ct.to_str().unwrap()),
Some(rt.to_str().unwrap()),
Some(&key),
None,
4,
)
.expect("v1 parallel decrypt should succeed");
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), plain);
}
}
src/error.rs
+15 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
use chacha20poly1305::aead; use chacha20poly1305::aead;
use std::io; use std::io;
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug)] #[derive(Debug)]
pub enum FcryError { pub enum FcryError {
Io(io::Error), Io(io::Error),
Crypto(aead::Error), Crypto(aead::Error),
Rng(rand::Error), Rng(getrandom::Error),
Format(String),
Kdf(String),
Passphrase(String),
WrongKey,
} }
impl From<io::Error> for FcryError { impl From<io::Error> for FcryError {
@@ -22,8 +27,14 @@ impl From<aead::Error> for FcryError {
} }
} }
impl From<rand::Error> for FcryError { impl From<getrandom::Error> for FcryError {
fn from(e: rand::Error) -> Self { fn from(e: getrandom::Error) -> Self {
FcryError::Rng(e) FcryError::Rng(e)
} }
} }
impl From<argon2::Error> for FcryError {
fn from(e: argon2::Error) -> Self {
FcryError::Kdf(e.to_string())
}
}
src/header.rs
+416
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
//! On-disk file format for fcry.
//!
//! Layout:
//! ```text
//! magic "fcry" 4 bytes
//! version u8 1
//! alg_id u8 1
//! flags u8 1
//! reserved u8 1 (must be 0)
//! chunk_size u32 LE 4 (plaintext bytes per chunk)
//! kdf_id u8 1
//! kdf_params variable (depends on kdf_id)
//! nonce_prefix [u8; 19] 19 (STREAM nonce prefix)
//! plaintext_length u64 LE 8 (only if version >= 2 and flags & 0x01)
//! key_commitment [u8; 32] 32 (only if version >= 3 and flags & 0x02)
//! --- end of header ---
//! chunk[0..N] each chunk_size + 16 bytes,
//! last may be shorter
//! ```
//!
//! The full encoded header is fed as AAD to every chunk, so any tampering
//! with chunk_size, nonce_prefix, kdf params, plaintext_length, etc. causes
//! authentication failure on every chunk.
//!
//! Versions:
//! * v1 — no length committed, no flag bits used.
//! * v2 — adds `FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED` (bit 0); when set, the total plaintext
//! length is appended after `nonce_prefix`. This enables random-access
//! decryption without scanning predecessors.
//! * v3 — adds `FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED` (bit 1) and an authenticated key
//! commitment for fast wrong-key detection before chunk processing.
use std::io::Read;
use crate::error::FcryError;
use crate::policy;
const MAGIC: [u8; 4] = *b"fcry";
pub const VERSION_CURRENT: u8 = 3;
const VERSION_MIN: u8 = 1;
pub const NONCE_PREFIX_LEN: usize = 19;
pub const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Set in `flags` when the header carries an authenticated `plaintext_length`
/// field. Required for random-access decryption.
pub const FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED: u8 = 0x01;
pub const FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED: u8 = 0x02;
/// Mask of all flag bits this build understands. Unknown bits → reject.
const FLAG_KNOWN_MASK: u8 = FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED;
pub const KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN: usize = 32;
#[repr(u8)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AlgId {
XChaCha20Poly1305 = 1,
}
impl AlgId {
fn from_u8(v: u8) -> Result<Self, FcryError> {
match v {
1 => Ok(Self::XChaCha20Poly1305),
_ => Err(FcryError::Format(format!("unknown alg id: {v}"))),
}
}
}
pub const ARGON2_SALT_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Key-derivation parameters stored in the header.
///
/// `Raw` means the key was supplied directly (no KDF). `Argon2id` carries
/// the salt and cost parameters needed to redo derivation on decrypt.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum KdfParams {
Raw,
Argon2id {
salt: [u8; ARGON2_SALT_LEN],
m_cost: u32,
t_cost: u32,
p_cost: u32,
},
}
impl KdfParams {
fn id(&self) -> u8 {
match self {
Self::Raw => 0,
Self::Argon2id { .. } => 1,
}
}
fn write_into(&self, out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
match self {
Self::Raw => {}
Self::Argon2id {
salt,
m_cost,
t_cost,
p_cost,
} => {
out.extend_from_slice(salt);
out.extend_from_slice(&m_cost.to_le_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&t_cost.to_le_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&p_cost.to_le_bytes());
}
}
}
fn read_from(id: u8, r: &mut impl Read) -> Result<Self, FcryError> {
match id {
0 => Ok(Self::Raw),
1 => {
let mut salt = [0u8; ARGON2_SALT_LEN];
r.read_exact(&mut salt)?;
let mut buf = [0u8; 4];
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
let m_cost = u32::from_le_bytes(buf);
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
let t_cost = u32::from_le_bytes(buf);
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
let p_cost = u32::from_le_bytes(buf);
Ok(Self::Argon2id {
salt,
m_cost,
t_cost,
p_cost,
})
}
_ => Err(FcryError::Format(format!("unknown kdf id: {id}"))),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Header {
/// On-disk format version. Set to `VERSION_CURRENT` for new encrypts;
/// preserved as-read for decrypt so the AAD recomputed on decode matches
/// the bytes that were authenticated when the file was written.
pub version: u8,
pub alg: AlgId,
pub flags: u8,
pub chunk_size: u32,
pub kdf: KdfParams,
pub nonce_prefix: [u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
/// Total plaintext byte count. `Some` iff `flags & FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED`.
pub plaintext_length: Option<u64>,
/// v3 key commitment. `Some` iff `flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED`.
pub key_commitment: Option<[u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]>,
}
impl Header {
fn encode_without_commitment(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(104);
out.extend_from_slice(&MAGIC);
out.push(self.version);
out.push(self.alg as u8);
out.push(self.flags);
out.push(0); // reserved
out.extend_from_slice(&self.chunk_size.to_le_bytes());
out.push(self.kdf.id());
self.kdf.write_into(&mut out);
out.extend_from_slice(&self.nonce_prefix);
if (self.flags & FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED) != 0 {
let len = self
.plaintext_length
.expect("FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED set but plaintext_length is None");
out.extend_from_slice(&len.to_le_bytes());
}
out
}
pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = self.encode_without_commitment();
if (self.flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) != 0 {
let commitment = self
.key_commitment
.expect("FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED set but key_commitment is None");
out.extend_from_slice(&commitment);
}
out
}
pub fn commitment_input_encoding(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.encode_without_commitment()
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn read(r: &mut impl Read) -> Result<Self, FcryError> {
Self::read_with_argon_cap(r, policy::default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib())
}
pub fn read_with_argon_cap(
r: &mut impl Read,
max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
) -> Result<Self, FcryError> {
let mut magic = [0u8; 4];
r.read_exact(&mut magic)?;
if magic != MAGIC {
return Err(FcryError::Format("not an fcry file (bad magic)".into()));
}
let mut fixed = [0u8; 4];
r.read_exact(&mut fixed)?;
let [version, alg_id, flags, reserved] = fixed;
if !(VERSION_MIN..=VERSION_CURRENT).contains(&version) {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!("unsupported version: {version}")));
}
if reserved != 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("reserved byte must be zero".into()));
}
if (flags & !FLAG_KNOWN_MASK) != 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"unknown flag bits: 0x{flags:02x}"
)));
}
if version < 2 && flags != 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("v1 header must have flags == 0".into()));
}
if version < 3 && (flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) != 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"key commitment flag requires v3 header".into(),
));
}
if version >= 3 && (flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("v3 header must commit the key".into()));
}
let alg = AlgId::from_u8(alg_id)?;
let mut chunk_size_bytes = [0u8; 4];
r.read_exact(&mut chunk_size_bytes)?;
let chunk_size = u32::from_le_bytes(chunk_size_bytes);
policy::validate_chunk_size(chunk_size)?;
let mut kdf_id = [0u8; 1];
r.read_exact(&mut kdf_id)?;
let kdf = KdfParams::read_from(kdf_id[0], r)?;
policy::validate_header_kdf(&kdf, max_argon_memory_mib)?;
let mut nonce_prefix = [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN];
r.read_exact(&mut nonce_prefix)?;
let plaintext_length = if (flags & FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED) != 0 {
let mut b = [0u8; 8];
r.read_exact(&mut b)?;
Some(u64::from_le_bytes(b))
} else {
None
};
let key_commitment = if (flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) != 0 {
let mut b = [0u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN];
r.read_exact(&mut b)?;
Some(b)
} else {
None
};
Ok(Self {
version,
alg,
flags,
chunk_size,
kdf,
nonce_prefix,
plaintext_length,
key_commitment,
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::io::Cursor;
#[test]
fn roundtrip() {
let h = Header {
version: VERSION_CURRENT,
alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
flags: FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED,
chunk_size: 1024 * 1024,
kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
nonce_prefix: [7u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
plaintext_length: None,
key_commitment: Some([1u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
};
let bytes = h.encode();
let mut cur = Cursor::new(&bytes);
let parsed = Header::read(&mut cur).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed.version, h.version);
assert_eq!(parsed.alg, h.alg);
assert_eq!(parsed.flags, h.flags);
assert_eq!(parsed.chunk_size, h.chunk_size);
assert_eq!(parsed.nonce_prefix, h.nonce_prefix);
assert_eq!(parsed.plaintext_length, None);
assert_eq!(parsed.key_commitment, h.key_commitment);
assert_eq!(cur.position() as usize, bytes.len());
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_length_committed() {
let h = Header {
version: VERSION_CURRENT,
alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
flags: FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED,
chunk_size: 65536,
kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
nonce_prefix: [9u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
plaintext_length: Some(123_456_789),
key_commitment: Some([2u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
};
let bytes = h.encode();
let mut cur = Cursor::new(&bytes);
let parsed = Header::read(&mut cur).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed.flags, FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED);
assert_eq!(parsed.plaintext_length, Some(123_456_789));
assert_eq!(parsed.key_commitment, h.key_commitment);
assert_eq!(cur.position() as usize, bytes.len());
}
#[test]
fn v3_encoding_layout_stable() {
let h = Header {
version: VERSION_CURRENT,
alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
flags: FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED,
chunk_size: 0x0102_0304,
kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
nonce_prefix: [0x55u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
plaintext_length: Some(0x0807_0605_0403_0201),
key_commitment: Some([0xaau8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
};
let commitment_input = h.commitment_input_encoding();
assert_eq!(commitment_input.len(), 40);
assert_eq!(&commitment_input[..4], b"fcry");
assert_eq!(commitment_input[4], 3);
assert_eq!(
&commitment_input[32..40],
&0x0807_0605_0403_0201u64.to_le_bytes()
);
let aad = h.encode();
assert_eq!(aad.len(), 72);
assert_eq!(&aad[..40], &commitment_input);
assert_eq!(&aad[40..], &[0xaau8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_bad_magic() {
let mut bytes = Header {
version: VERSION_CURRENT,
alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
flags: 0,
chunk_size: 4096,
kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
nonce_prefix: [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
plaintext_length: None,
key_commitment: Some([3u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
}
.encode();
bytes[0] ^= 1;
assert!(matches!(
Header::read(&mut Cursor::new(&bytes)),
Err(FcryError::Format(_))
));
}
#[test]
fn rejects_unknown_flag_bits() {
let mut bytes = Header {
version: VERSION_CURRENT,
alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
flags: 0,
chunk_size: 4096,
kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
nonce_prefix: [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
plaintext_length: None,
key_commitment: Some([4u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
}
.encode();
// flags byte is at offset 6 (4 magic + version + alg)
bytes[6] = 0x80;
assert!(matches!(
Header::read(&mut Cursor::new(&bytes)),
Err(FcryError::Format(_))
));
}
#[test]
fn reads_v1_header() {
// hand-crafted v1 header (raw kdf, no length field)
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
bytes.extend_from_slice(b"fcry");
bytes.push(1); // version
bytes.push(1); // alg
bytes.push(0); // flags
bytes.push(0); // reserved
bytes.extend_from_slice(&1024u32.to_le_bytes());
bytes.push(0); // kdf id raw
bytes.extend_from_slice(&[3u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN]);
let parsed = Header::read(&mut Cursor::new(&bytes)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed.version, 1);
assert_eq!(parsed.flags, 0);
assert_eq!(parsed.chunk_size, 1024);
assert_eq!(parsed.plaintext_length, None);
assert_eq!(parsed.key_commitment, None);
// Re-encoding must reproduce the original v1 bytes exactly so the
// recomputed AAD matches what the file was authenticated with.
assert_eq!(parsed.encode(), bytes);
}
}
src/main.rs
+344 -14
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,26 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
mod crypto; mod crypto;
mod error; mod error;
mod header;
mod pipeline;
mod policy;
mod reader; mod reader;
mod secrets;
mod utils; mod utils;
use crypto::*; use crypto::*;
use error::FcryError; use error::FcryError;
use header::{ARGON2_SALT_LEN, KdfParams};
use secrets::{SecretBytes32, SecretVec, read_passphrase_tty};
use utils::{DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE, OutSinkOptions};
use clap::Parser; use clap::Parser;
use std::fs::File;
use std::io::Read;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
/// fcry - [f]ile[cry]pt: A file en-/decryption tool for easy use /// fcry - [f]ile[cry]pt: A file en-/decryption tool for easy use
#[derive(Parser, Debug)] #[derive(Parser, Debug)]
@@ -27,33 +39,351 @@ struct Cli {
#[clap(short, long)] #[clap(short, long)]
output_file: Option<String>, output_file: Option<String>,
/// The raw bytes of the crypto key. /// Read the raw 32-byte crypto key from a file.
/// Has to be exactly 32 bytes #[clap(short = 'k', long, conflicts_with_all = ["passphrase", "passphrase_env"])]
/// *** DANGEROUS, use for testing purposes only! *** key_file: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Read passphrase interactively (terminal). Implies argon2id KDF on encrypt.
#[clap(short, long)] #[clap(short, long)]
raw_key: String, passphrase: bool,
/// Read passphrase from the named environment variable (for non-interactive use).
/// Implies argon2id KDF on encrypt. Mutually exclusive with --passphrase.
#[clap(long, conflicts_with = "passphrase")]
passphrase_env: Option<String>,
/// Plaintext chunk size in bytes (encryption only; decryption reads it from the header).
#[clap(long, default_value_t = DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE)]
chunk_size: u32,
/// Argon2id memory in MiB (encryption only). Default: 1024 (= 1 GiB).
#[clap(long, default_value_t = policy::DEFAULT_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB)]
argon_memory: u32,
/// Argon2id passes / iterations (encryption only).
#[clap(long, default_value_t = policy::MIN_ARGON_PASSES)]
argon_passes: u32,
/// Argon2id parallelism / lanes (encryption only).
#[clap(long, default_value_t = policy::DEFAULT_ARGON_PARALLELISM)]
argon_parallelism: u32,
/// Permit intentionally weak passphrase/KDF parameters for tests or legacy interop.
#[clap(long)]
allow_weak_kdf: bool,
/// Maximum Argon2id memory accepted while decrypting, in MiB.
/// Overrides the dynamic default. Raising it can OOM constrained machines.
#[clap(long)]
max_argon_memory_mib: Option<u32>,
/// Number of worker threads for AEAD work. Defaults to the number of
/// available CPUs. Set to 1 for fully serial encrypt/decrypt.
#[clap(short = 'j', long, value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..))]
threads: Option<u32>,
/// Replace an existing different output file after encryption/decryption succeeds.
#[clap(long)]
force: bool,
/// Directory for private temporary files.
#[clap(long)]
temp_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
/// For decrypt-to-stdout, verify the whole plaintext in a private temp file before emitting it.
#[clap(long, requires = "decrypt")]
buffer_verify: bool,
/// Random-access decrypt: byte offset of the slice to read.
/// Requires `--decrypt`, an `--input-file` whose header has the
/// length-committed flag set, and `--length`.
#[clap(
long,
requires = "length",
requires = "decrypt",
requires = "input_file"
)]
offset: Option<u64>,
/// Random-access decrypt: byte length of the slice to read.
/// Requires `--decrypt`, `--input-file`, and `--offset`.
#[clap(
long,
requires = "offset",
requires = "decrypt",
requires = "input_file"
)]
length: Option<u64>,
} }
fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), FcryError> { fn read_key_file(path: &Path) -> Result<SecretBytes32, FcryError> {
let input_file = cli.input_file; warn_if_key_file_world_readable(path);
let output_file = cli.output_file; let mut file = File::open(path)?;
let mut buf = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 33]);
let mut n = 0usize;
while n < buf.len() {
match file.read(&mut buf[n..]) {
Ok(0) => break,
Ok(read) => n += read,
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
}
}
if n < 32 {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"key file {} is too short: expected exactly 32 bytes, got {n}",
path.display()
)));
}
if n > 32 {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"key file {} is too long: expected exactly 32 bytes; possible trailing newline",
path.display()
)));
}
let mut extra = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 1]);
if file.read(&mut *extra)? != 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"key file {} is too long: expected exactly 32 bytes; possible trailing newline",
path.display()
)));
}
let mut key = SecretBytes32::zeroed();
key.with_mut_array(|key| key.copy_from_slice(&buf[..32]));
Ok(key)
}
let mut key = [0u8; 32]; #[cfg(unix)]
dbg!(&cli.raw_key); fn warn_if_key_file_world_readable(path: &Path) {
key.clone_from_slice(cli.raw_key.as_bytes()); use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::metadata(path) {
let mode = meta.permissions().mode();
if (mode & 0o077) != 0 {
eprintln!(
"Warning: key file {} is group/world accessible; consider chmod 600",
path.display()
);
}
}
}
if cli.decrypt { #[cfg(not(unix))]
decrypt(input_file, output_file, key)? fn warn_if_key_file_world_readable(_path: &Path) {}
/// Source of a passphrase: either the terminal or a named env var.
enum PassphraseSource {
Tty,
EnvVar(String),
}
fn normalize_passphrase(pw: SecretVec) -> Result<SecretVec, FcryError> {
let normalized = pw.with_slice(|bytes| {
let s = std::str::from_utf8(bytes).map_err(|_| {
FcryError::Passphrase("passphrase must be valid UTF-8 after normalization".into())
})?;
Ok::<Zeroizing<String>, FcryError>(Zeroizing::new(s.nfc().collect::<String>()))
})?;
Ok(SecretVec::from_vec(normalized.as_bytes().to_vec()))
}
fn read_passphrase(src: &PassphraseSource, confirm: bool) -> Result<SecretVec, FcryError> {
match src {
PassphraseSource::EnvVar(var) => {
// Take the env value, then immediately copy it into upstream
// protected storage. The source Vec is zeroed after the copy.
// Note: a copy still exists in the process `environ` table; that is
// a known and accepted leak for the env-var path.
let v = Zeroizing::new(std::env::var(var).map_err(|_| {
FcryError::Passphrase(format!("environment variable {var} not set or not unicode"))
})?);
let normalized = Zeroizing::new(v.as_str().nfc().collect::<String>());
Ok(SecretVec::from_vec(normalized.as_bytes().to_vec()))
}
PassphraseSource::Tty => {
let pw = normalize_passphrase(
read_passphrase_tty("Passphrase: ")
.map_err(|e| FcryError::Passphrase(e.to_string()))?,
)?;
if confirm {
let pw2 = normalize_passphrase(
read_passphrase_tty("Confirm passphrase: ")
.map_err(|e| FcryError::Passphrase(e.to_string()))?,
)?;
if pw != pw2 {
return Err(FcryError::Passphrase("passphrases do not match".into()));
}
// pw2 dropped here -> zeroized + unlocked by the upstream crate.
}
Ok(pw)
}
}
}
/// Best-effort: prevent secrets from landing in a core dump.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn disable_core_dumps() {
use rlimit::Resource;
let _ = rlimit::setrlimit(Resource::CORE, 0, 0);
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
fn disable_core_dumps() {
// Windows doesn't have rlimit-style core dumps. WER (Windows Error Reporting)
// and minidumps would be the analogue; disabling those requires per-machine
// policy and is intentionally not done here.
}
fn run(mut cli: Cli) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
// Move the secret-bearing fields out of `Cli` immediately so they don't
// sit in the parsed struct for the rest of the function.
let key_file: Option<PathBuf> = cli.key_file.take();
let pw_src: Option<PassphraseSource> = if cli.passphrase {
Some(PassphraseSource::Tty)
} else { } else {
encrypt(input_file, output_file, key)? cli.passphrase_env.take().map(PassphraseSource::EnvVar)
};
let decrypt_mode = cli.decrypt;
let input = cli.input_file.take();
let output = cli.output_file.take();
let chunk_size = cli.chunk_size;
let argon_memory = cli.argon_memory;
let argon_passes = cli.argon_passes;
let argon_parallelism = cli.argon_parallelism;
let allow_weak_kdf = cli.allow_weak_kdf;
let argon_cap = policy::resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(cli.max_argon_memory_mib)?;
if argon_cap.overridden && argon_cap.effective_mib > argon_cap.default_mib {
eprintln!(
"Warning: --max-argon-memory-mib raises the Argon2 decrypt trust ceiling from {} MiB to {} MiB; this can OOM constrained machines",
argon_cap.default_mib, argon_cap.effective_mib
);
}
let (threads, thread_warning) = policy::normalize_worker_threads(cli.threads);
if let Some(requested) = thread_warning {
eprintln!(
"Warning: requested {requested} worker threads; capped at {}",
policy::MAX_WORKER_THREADS
);
}
let force = cli.force;
let temp_dir = cli.temp_dir.take();
let buffer_verify = cli.buffer_verify;
let offset = cli.offset;
let length = cli.length;
drop(cli);
if pw_src.is_none() && key_file.is_none() {
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"must provide one of --key-file, --passphrase, --passphrase-env".into(),
));
}
if buffer_verify && !decrypt_mode {
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"--buffer-verify is only valid for decrypt".into(),
));
}
if buffer_verify && output.is_some() {
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"--buffer-verify is only meaningful when decrypting to stdout".into(),
));
}
let output_options = OutSinkOptions {
force,
input_file: input.as_ref().map(PathBuf::from),
temp_dir,
buffer_verify_stdout: buffer_verify,
};
if decrypt_mode {
let raw_key = match key_file.as_deref() {
Some(path) => Some(read_key_file(path)?),
None => None,
};
let pw = match &pw_src {
Some(src) => Some(read_passphrase(src, false)?),
None => None,
};
match (offset, length) {
(Some(o), Some(l)) => {
// clap's `requires` makes this unreachable, but keep the
// dynamic check so the failure mode is a clean error.
let path = input.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| {
FcryError::Format(
"--offset/--length require --input-file (random-access needs a seekable file)".into(),
)
})?;
decrypt_range_with_output_options(
path,
output,
raw_key.as_ref(),
pw.as_ref(),
o,
l,
argon_cap.effective_mib,
&output_options,
)?;
}
(None, None) => {
decrypt_with_output_options(
input,
output,
raw_key.as_ref(),
pw.as_ref(),
threads,
argon_cap.effective_mib,
&output_options,
)?;
}
_ => {
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"--offset and --length must be supplied together".into(),
));
}
}
} else {
let (key, kdf) = if let Some(src) = &pw_src {
let mut salt = [0u8; ARGON2_SALT_LEN];
getrandom::fill(&mut salt)?;
let m_cost_kib = policy::validate_new_argon_params(
argon_memory,
argon_passes,
argon_parallelism,
allow_weak_kdf,
)?;
let kdf = KdfParams::Argon2id {
salt,
m_cost: m_cost_kib,
t_cost: argon_passes,
p_cost: argon_parallelism,
};
let pw = read_passphrase(src, true)?;
policy::validate_new_passphrase(&pw, allow_weak_kdf)?;
let key = derive_key(&kdf, None, Some(&pw))?;
(key, kdf)
} else {
let key = read_key_file(key_file.as_deref().unwrap())?;
(key, KdfParams::Raw)
};
encrypt_with_output_options(
input,
output,
&key,
chunk_size,
kdf,
threads,
&output_options,
)?;
} }
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
fn main() { fn main() {
disable_core_dumps();
let cli = Cli::parse(); let cli = Cli::parse();
if let Err(e) = run(cli) { if let Err(e) = run(cli) {
eprintln!("Error: {:?}", e); eprintln!("Error: {:?}", e);
std::process::exit(1);
} }
} }
src/pipeline.rs
+375
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
//! Multi-threaded encrypt/decrypt pipeline.
//!
//! Topology:
//!
//! ```text
//! reader thread → jobs (bounded MPMC) → N AEAD workers →
//! → results (bounded MPMC) → writer thread
//! ```
//!
//! The reader is sequential (one input handle, lookahead detects last chunk),
//! workers parallelize the AEAD step (independent per chunk), and the writer
//! reorders results by counter before writing them to `OutSink`.
//!
//! Bounded memory: a permit channel caps the total number of in-flight chunks
//! (queued jobs + in-progress at workers + pending in the writer's reorder
//! buffer). The reader acquires a permit before sending each job; the writer
//! releases a permit after flushing the chunk in order. A slow or stuck worker
//! therefore stalls the reader rather than letting the writer's reorder buffer
//! grow without bound.
//!
//! Fail-fast: a shared `cancel` flag lets workers signal an authentication or
//! AEAD error to the reader. The reader checks it each iteration and exits
//! early, so a tampered chunk doesn't waste full-file I/O on top of the
//! detection.
//!
//! Peak memory ≈ chunk_size × (in_flight_cap + 2). For 1 MiB chunks and 8
//! cores (cap = 32) that's ~34 MiB. Adjust `in_flight_capacity` if you need
//! a different memory/throughput tradeoff.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::io::Write;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::thread::{self, JoinHandle};
use std::time::Duration;
use chacha20poly1305::{XChaCha20Poly1305, aead::AeadInPlace};
use crossbeam_channel::{Receiver, RecvTimeoutError, Sender, bounded};
use crate::crypto::{bump_counter, make_nonce};
use crate::error::FcryError;
use crate::header::NONCE_PREFIX_LEN;
use crate::policy;
use crate::reader::{AheadReader, ReadInfoChunk};
use crate::utils::OutSink;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
struct Job {
counter: u32,
last: bool,
buf: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
}
struct Done {
counter: u32,
buf: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
}
/// Job-channel capacity: small multiples of worker count, enough to keep
/// workers fed without unbounded memory.
fn channel_capacity(threads: usize, in_flight: usize) -> usize {
policy::pipeline_channel_capacity(threads, in_flight)
}
/// Total in-flight chunk cap (jobs queued + at workers + in writer's reorder
/// buffer). Permit count; bounded above the job-channel capacity to absorb
/// reordering without blocking workers unnecessarily.
fn in_flight_capacity(threads: usize, chunk_len: usize) -> usize {
policy::pipeline_in_flight_capacity(threads, chunk_len)
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(crate) fn encrypt_parallel(
input: AheadReader,
output: OutSink,
aead: Arc<XChaCha20Poly1305>,
aad: Arc<Vec<u8>>,
nonce_prefix: [u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
chunk_sz: usize,
threads: usize,
expected_length: Option<u64>,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let (sink, bytes_seen) = run_pipeline(
input,
output,
aead,
aad,
nonce_prefix,
chunk_sz,
threads,
true,
)?;
if let Some(committed) = expected_length
&& committed != bytes_seen
{
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"input length changed during encryption: committed {committed}, read {bytes_seen}"
)));
}
sink.commit()?;
Ok(())
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(crate) fn decrypt_parallel(
input: AheadReader,
output: OutSink,
aead: Arc<XChaCha20Poly1305>,
aad: Arc<Vec<u8>>,
nonce_prefix: [u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
cipher_chunk: usize,
threads: usize,
expected_length: Option<u64>,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let (sink, written) = run_pipeline(
input,
output,
aead,
aad,
nonce_prefix,
cipher_chunk,
threads,
false,
)?;
if let Some(committed) = expected_length
&& committed != written
{
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"decrypted length {written} disagrees with committed {committed}"
)));
}
sink.commit()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Drives the reader/worker/writer pipeline. `is_encrypt = true` performs
/// `encrypt_in_place` and tracks bytes-read; `false` performs
/// `decrypt_in_place` and tracks bytes-written. The single shared topology
/// keeps backpressure, reorder, and fail-fast logic in one place.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
fn run_pipeline(
mut input: AheadReader,
output: OutSink,
aead: Arc<XChaCha20Poly1305>,
aad: Arc<Vec<u8>>,
nonce_prefix: [u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
chunk_sz: usize,
threads: usize,
is_encrypt: bool,
) -> Result<(OutSink, u64), FcryError> {
let in_flight = in_flight_capacity(threads, chunk_sz);
let cap = channel_capacity(threads, in_flight);
let (jobs_tx, jobs_rx) = bounded::<Job>(cap);
let (done_tx, done_rx) = bounded::<Done>(cap);
// Pre-fill the permit channel. Each permit represents one in-flight chunk
// slot. The reader consumes a permit before sending a job; the writer
// returns a permit after flushing in order.
let (permit_tx, permit_rx) = bounded::<()>(in_flight);
for _ in 0..in_flight {
permit_tx
.send(())
.expect("pre-fill of permit channel cannot fail");
}
let cancel = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
// Reader thread: dispatches jobs in counter order and tracks bytes read
// (used for the encrypt-side length cross-check). On decrypt the count is
// ignored — the writer's count is authoritative there.
let reader_handle: JoinHandle<Result<u64, FcryError>> = {
let cancel = cancel.clone();
thread::spawn(move || {
let mut counter: u32 = 0;
let mut bytes_seen: u64 = 0;
loop {
// Acquire an in-flight slot. We recv with a short timeout so
// a worker error (which sets `cancel`) is observed even if
// the rest of the pipeline has quiesced and is no longer
// releasing permits — this avoids a 3-way deadlock between
// reader, idle workers, and a stalled writer.
loop {
if cancel.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Ok(bytes_seen);
}
match permit_rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(50)) {
Ok(()) => break,
Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout) => continue,
Err(RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => return Ok(bytes_seen),
}
}
let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; chunk_sz]);
match input.read_ahead(&mut buf)? {
ReadInfoChunk::Normal(_) => {
if jobs_tx
.send(Job {
counter,
last: false,
buf,
})
.is_err()
{
return Ok(bytes_seen);
}
bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, chunk_sz, "bytes read")?;
counter = bump_counter(counter)?;
}
ReadInfoChunk::Last(n) => {
buf.truncate(n);
let _ = jobs_tx.send(Job {
counter,
last: true,
buf,
});
bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, n, "bytes read")?;
return Ok(bytes_seen);
}
ReadInfoChunk::Empty => {
if is_encrypt {
buf.clear();
let _ = jobs_tx.send(Job {
counter,
last: true,
buf,
});
return Ok(bytes_seen);
}
// On decrypt an unexpected EOF means the ciphertext is
// truncated. Surface it as an error so the writer
// doesn't commit a partial output.
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"truncated ciphertext: missing final chunk".into(),
));
}
}
}
})
};
// Worker threads: AEAD encrypt/decrypt in place, ship to writer. On error
// we set the cancel flag so the reader exits early, and drop the senders
// so the writer drains and exits.
let mut worker_handles: Vec<JoinHandle<Result<(), FcryError>>> = Vec::with_capacity(threads);
for _ in 0..threads {
let jobs_rx = jobs_rx.clone();
let done_tx = done_tx.clone();
let aead = aead.clone();
let aad = aad.clone();
let cancel = cancel.clone();
worker_handles.push(thread::spawn(move || {
for mut job in jobs_rx.iter() {
if cancel.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
// Drain remaining queued jobs without doing AEAD work.
// Returning Ok here keeps the previously-set error from
// being clobbered by a fresh "ok" status.
break;
}
let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, job.counter, job.last);
let res = if is_encrypt {
aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, aad.as_slice(), &mut *job.buf)
} else {
aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, aad.as_slice(), &mut *job.buf)
};
if let Err(e) = res {
cancel.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Err(e.into());
}
if done_tx
.send(Done {
counter: job.counter,
buf: job.buf,
})
.is_err()
{
break;
}
}
Ok(())
}));
}
drop(jobs_rx);
drop(done_tx);
// Writer thread: ordered writeback. Returns the `OutSink` ownership back
// without committing; the caller commits only after every other thread
// has joined cleanly so a failure anywhere drops the sink and unlinks the
// temp file. Releases one permit per chunk flushed so the reader can make
// forward progress in lockstep with the actual disk write.
let writer_handle: JoinHandle<Result<(OutSink, u64), FcryError>> =
thread::spawn(move || ordered_writer(done_rx, output, permit_tx));
let reader_res = reader_handle.join().expect("reader thread panicked");
let mut first_err: Option<FcryError> = None;
let bytes_seen = match reader_res {
Ok(n) => Some(n),
Err(e) => {
cancel.store(true, Ordering::Release);
first_err.get_or_insert(e);
None
}
};
for h in worker_handles {
if let Err(e) = h.join().expect("worker thread panicked")
&& first_err.is_none()
{
first_err = Some(e);
}
}
let writer_res = writer_handle.join().expect("writer thread panicked");
let written = match writer_res {
Ok((sink, n)) => Some((sink, n)),
Err(e) => {
if first_err.is_none() {
first_err = Some(e);
}
None
}
};
if let Some(e) = first_err {
return Err(e);
}
let (sink, n) = written.expect("no error but no sink");
let count = if is_encrypt {
bytes_seen.expect("no error but no reader count")
} else {
n
};
Ok((sink, count))
}
/// Drain `done_rx` in counter order, writing each chunk to `output` and
/// returning a permit to `permit_tx` after every flush so the reader is held
/// in lockstep with disk writes (bounded reorder buffer).
fn ordered_writer(
done_rx: Receiver<Done>,
mut output: OutSink,
permit_tx: Sender<()>,
) -> Result<(OutSink, u64), FcryError> {
let mut next: u32 = 0;
let mut pending: BTreeMap<u32, Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>> = BTreeMap::new();
let mut total: u64 = 0;
for done in done_rx.iter() {
pending.insert(done.counter, done.buf);
while let Some(buf) = pending.remove(&next) {
output.write_all(&buf)?;
total = policy::checked_count_add(total, buf.len(), "bytes written")?;
// `bump_counter` rejects overflow upstream; a wrap here would be
// a real bug, so use plain addition and let it panic in debug.
next += 1;
// Release one in-flight slot. If the reader is gone the channel
// is closed; we don't care about the send result.
let _ = permit_tx.send(());
}
}
if !pending.is_empty() {
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"internal: ordered writer left chunks unflushed".into(),
));
}
Ok((output, total))
}
// Compile-time check that the job type is Send+Sync (channel sends across
// threads). Kept as a footgun for future struct edits.
#[allow(dead_code)]
fn _assert_send_sync<T: Send + Sync>() {}
const _: fn() = || _assert_send_sync::<Sender<Job>>();
src/policy.rs
+299
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
//! Central resource and format policy.
use std::fs;
use crate::error::FcryError;
use crate::header::{KdfParams, TAG_LEN};
use crate::secrets::SecretVec;
pub const MAX_CHUNK_SIZE: u32 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
pub const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: u32 = 1024 * 1024;
pub const DEFAULT_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB: u32 = 1024;
pub const MIN_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB: u32 = 64;
pub const DEFAULT_ARGON_DECRYPT_CAP_MIB: u32 = 4096;
pub const MIN_ARGON_PASSES: u32 = 2;
pub const MAX_ARGON_PASSES: u32 = 64;
pub const DEFAULT_ARGON_PARALLELISM: u32 = 4;
pub const MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM: u32 = 64;
pub const MIN_PASSPHRASE_BYTES: usize = 12;
pub const MAX_WORKER_THREADS: usize = 256;
pub const PIPELINE_IN_FLIGHT_BYTES: usize = 128 * 1024 * 1024;
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ArgonDecryptCap {
pub default_mib: u32,
pub effective_mib: u32,
pub overridden: bool,
}
pub fn architecture_argon_cap_mib() -> u32 {
let usize_cap_mib = usize::MAX / 1024 / 1024;
let argon_m_cost_cap_mib = (u32::MAX / 1024) as usize;
usize_cap_mib
.min(argon_m_cost_cap_mib)
.min(u32::MAX as usize) as u32
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
fn available_memory_mib() -> Option<u32> {
let meminfo = fs::read_to_string("/proc/meminfo").ok()?;
for line in meminfo.lines() {
let Some(rest) = line.strip_prefix("MemAvailable:") else {
continue;
};
let kib = rest.split_whitespace().next()?.parse::<u64>().ok()?;
return u32::try_from(kib / 1024).ok();
}
None
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
fn available_memory_mib() -> Option<u32> {
None
}
pub fn default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib() -> u32 {
let mut cap = DEFAULT_ARGON_DECRYPT_CAP_MIB.min(architecture_argon_cap_mib());
if let Some(available) = available_memory_mib() {
cap = cap.min(available);
}
cap.max(1)
}
pub fn resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(override_mib: Option<u32>) -> Result<ArgonDecryptCap, FcryError> {
let default_mib = default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib();
let Some(effective_mib) = override_mib else {
return Ok(ArgonDecryptCap {
default_mib,
effective_mib: default_mib,
overridden: false,
});
};
if effective_mib == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format(
"--max-argon-memory-mib must be at least 1".into(),
));
}
let arch = architecture_argon_cap_mib();
if effective_mib > arch {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"--max-argon-memory-mib {effective_mib} exceeds this build's supported cap {arch}"
)));
}
Ok(ArgonDecryptCap {
default_mib,
effective_mib,
overridden: true,
})
}
pub fn mib_to_kib(mib: u32, name: &str) -> Result<u32, FcryError> {
mib.checked_mul(1024).ok_or_else(|| {
FcryError::Format(format!("{name} too large (overflow converting MiB to KiB)"))
})
}
pub fn validate_chunk_size(chunk_size: u32) -> Result<usize, FcryError> {
if chunk_size == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("chunk_size must be > 0".into()));
}
if chunk_size > MAX_CHUNK_SIZE {
return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
"chunk_size {chunk_size} exceeds maximum {MAX_CHUNK_SIZE}"
)));
}
usize::try_from(chunk_size)
.map_err(|_| FcryError::Format("chunk_size does not fit in usize".into()))
}
pub fn cipher_chunk_len(plain_chunk_len: usize) -> Result<usize, FcryError> {
plain_chunk_len
.checked_add(TAG_LEN)
.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("cipher chunk length overflow".into()))
}
pub fn validate_new_argon_params(
memory_mib: u32,
passes: u32,
parallelism: u32,
allow_weak_kdf: bool,
) -> Result<u32, FcryError> {
if !allow_weak_kdf && memory_mib < MIN_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-memory must be at least {MIN_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB} MiB for new encryption (use --allow-weak-kdf only for tests/legacy interop)"
)));
}
if !allow_weak_kdf && passes < MIN_ARGON_PASSES {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-passes must be at least {MIN_ARGON_PASSES} for new encryption (use --allow-weak-kdf only for tests/legacy interop)"
)));
}
validate_argon_common(memory_mib, passes, parallelism, "new encryption")?;
mib_to_kib(memory_mib, "argon-memory")
}
pub fn validate_new_passphrase(pw: &SecretVec, allow_weak_kdf: bool) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
let len = pw.len();
if len == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Passphrase("passphrase must not be empty".into()));
}
if !allow_weak_kdf && len < MIN_PASSPHRASE_BYTES {
return Err(FcryError::Passphrase(format!(
"passphrase must be at least {MIN_PASSPHRASE_BYTES} UTF-8 bytes for new encryption (use --allow-weak-kdf only for tests/legacy interop)"
)));
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn validate_header_kdf(kdf: &KdfParams, max_argon_memory_mib: u32) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
match kdf {
KdfParams::Raw => Ok(()),
KdfParams::Argon2id {
m_cost,
t_cost,
p_cost,
..
} => {
let cap_kib = mib_to_kib(max_argon_memory_mib, "max argon memory")?;
if *m_cost == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("argon2id memory cost must be > 0".into()));
}
if *t_cost == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("argon2id passes must be > 0".into()));
}
if *p_cost == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Format("argon2id parallelism must be > 0".into()));
}
if *m_cost > cap_kib {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon2id memory cost {} KiB exceeds configured decrypt cap {} MiB",
*m_cost, max_argon_memory_mib
)));
}
if *t_cost > MAX_ARGON_PASSES {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon2id passes {} exceeds maximum {}",
*t_cost, MAX_ARGON_PASSES
)));
}
if *p_cost > MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon2id parallelism {} exceeds maximum {}",
*p_cost, MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM
)));
}
Ok(())
}
}
}
pub fn validate_argon_common(
memory_mib: u32,
passes: u32,
parallelism: u32,
context: &str,
) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
if memory_mib == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-memory must be > 0 for {context}"
)));
}
if passes == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-passes must be > 0 for {context}"
)));
}
if passes > MAX_ARGON_PASSES {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-passes {passes} exceeds maximum {MAX_ARGON_PASSES}"
)));
}
if parallelism == 0 {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-parallelism must be > 0 for {context}"
)));
}
if parallelism > MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-parallelism {parallelism} exceeds maximum {MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM}"
)));
}
if memory_mib > architecture_argon_cap_mib() {
return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
"argon-memory {memory_mib} exceeds this build's supported cap {}",
architecture_argon_cap_mib()
)));
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn normalize_worker_threads(requested: Option<u32>) -> (usize, Option<u32>) {
let requested = requested.map(|n| n as usize).unwrap_or_else(|| {
std::thread::available_parallelism()
.map(|n| n.get())
.unwrap_or(1)
});
let capped = requested.clamp(1, MAX_WORKER_THREADS);
let warning = (requested > MAX_WORKER_THREADS).then_some(requested as u32);
(capped, warning)
}
pub fn pipeline_in_flight_capacity(threads: usize, chunk_len: usize) -> usize {
let chunk_len = chunk_len.max(1);
let thread_cap = threads.saturating_mul(4).max(1);
let byte_cap = (PIPELINE_IN_FLIGHT_BYTES / chunk_len).max(1);
thread_cap.min(byte_cap)
}
pub fn pipeline_channel_capacity(threads: usize, in_flight: usize) -> usize {
threads.saturating_mul(2).max(1).min(in_flight.max(1))
}
pub fn checked_add_u64(a: u64, b: u64, what: &str) -> Result<u64, FcryError> {
a.checked_add(b)
.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format(format!("{what} overflow")))
}
pub fn checked_mul_u64(a: u64, b: u64, what: &str) -> Result<u64, FcryError> {
a.checked_mul(b)
.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format(format!("{what} overflow")))
}
pub fn checked_count_add(total: u64, delta: usize, what: &str) -> Result<u64, FcryError> {
checked_add_u64(total, delta as u64, what)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn chunk_size_bounds() {
assert!(validate_chunk_size(1).is_ok());
assert!(validate_chunk_size(MAX_CHUNK_SIZE).is_ok());
assert!(validate_chunk_size(0).is_err());
assert!(validate_chunk_size(MAX_CHUNK_SIZE + 1).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn argon_cap_override_replaces_default() {
let down = resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(Some(1)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(down.effective_mib, 1);
assert!(down.overridden);
let default = resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(None).unwrap();
assert_eq!(default.effective_mib, default.default_mib);
assert!(!default.overridden);
}
#[test]
fn pipeline_capacity_has_one_chunk_minimum() {
assert_eq!(
pipeline_in_flight_capacity(4, PIPELINE_IN_FLIGHT_BYTES * 2),
1
);
}
}
src/reader.rs
+20 -28
View File
@@ -1,26 +1,27 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
use std::io; use std::io;
use std::io::{BufRead, Read}; use std::io::{BufRead, Read};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
pub enum ReadInfo { pub enum ReadInfoChunk {
NormalChunk(usize), Normal(#[allow(dead_code)] usize),
LastChunk(usize), Last(usize),
EmptyChunk, Empty,
} }
pub struct AheadReader { pub struct AheadReader {
inner: Box<dyn BufRead>, inner: Box<dyn BufRead + Send>,
buf: Vec<u8>, buf: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
bufsz: usize, bufsz: usize,
capacity: usize, capacity: usize,
} }
impl AheadReader { impl AheadReader {
pub fn from(reader: Box<dyn BufRead>, capacity: usize) -> Self { pub fn from(reader: Box<dyn BufRead + Send>, capacity: usize) -> Self {
Self { Self {
inner: reader, inner: reader,
buf: vec![0; capacity], buf: Zeroizing::new(vec![0; capacity]),
bufsz: 0, bufsz: 0,
capacity, capacity,
} }
@@ -46,55 +47,46 @@ impl AheadReader {
Ok(total) Ok(total)
} }
pub fn read_ahead(&mut self, userbuf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<ReadInfo> { pub fn read_ahead(&mut self, userbuf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<ReadInfoChunk> {
// 1st read
if self.bufsz == 0 { if self.bufsz == 0 {
eprintln!("[reader] first read");
return self.first_read(userbuf); return self.first_read(userbuf);
} }
eprintln!("[reader] normal read");
// normal read (not the 1st one)
self.normal_read(userbuf) self.normal_read(userbuf)
} }
pub fn read_exact(&mut self, userbuf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> { fn first_read(&mut self, userbuf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<ReadInfoChunk> {
self.inner.read_exact(userbuf)
}
fn first_read(&mut self, userbuf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<ReadInfo> {
// 1st read directly to userbuf (we have no cached data yet) // 1st read directly to userbuf (we have no cached data yet)
let n = self.read_until_full(userbuf)?; let n = self.read_until_full(userbuf)?;
if n == 0 { if n == 0 {
return Ok(ReadInfo::EmptyChunk); return Ok(ReadInfoChunk::Empty);
} }
// 2nd read directly into our internal buf // 2nd read directly into our internal buf
let mut tmp = vec![0u8; self.capacity]; let mut tmp = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; self.capacity]);
let n2 = self.read_until_full(&mut tmp)?; let n2 = self.read_until_full(&mut tmp)?;
self.buf = tmp; self.buf = tmp;
self.bufsz = n2; self.bufsz = n2;
if n2 == 0 { if n2 == 0 {
return Ok(ReadInfo::LastChunk(n)); return Ok(ReadInfoChunk::Last(n));
} }
Ok(ReadInfo::NormalChunk(n)) Ok(ReadInfoChunk::Normal(n))
} }
fn normal_read(&mut self, userbuf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<ReadInfo> { fn normal_read(&mut self, userbuf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<ReadInfoChunk> {
// copy internal buf to userbuf // copy internal buf to userbuf
userbuf.copy_from_slice(&self.buf); userbuf.copy_from_slice(&self.buf);
let userbuf_sz = self.bufsz; let userbuf_sz = self.bufsz;
// 2nd read directly into our internal buf // 2nd read directly into our internal buf
let mut tmp = vec![0u8; self.capacity]; let mut tmp = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; self.capacity]);
let n2 = self.read_until_full(&mut tmp)?; let n2 = self.read_until_full(&mut tmp)?;
self.buf = tmp; self.buf = tmp;
self.bufsz = n2; self.bufsz = n2;
if n2 == 0 { if n2 == 0 {
return Ok(ReadInfo::LastChunk(userbuf_sz)); return Ok(ReadInfoChunk::Last(userbuf_sz));
} }
Ok(ReadInfo::NormalChunk(userbuf_sz)) Ok(ReadInfoChunk::Normal(userbuf_sz))
} }
} }
src/secrets.rs
+302
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
//! Secret-handling primitives.
//!
//! Thin local adapters around the upstream `secrets` crate plus a
//! cross-platform passphrase reader:
//!
//! * [`SecretBytes32`] — heap-allocated 32-byte buffer protected by
//! `secrets::SecretBox`.
//! * [`SecretVec`] — fixed-allocation byte buffer protected by
//! `secrets::SecretVec`, with a separate logical length so tty input can be
//! appended without reallocations.
//! * [`read_passphrase_tty`] — direct tty reader (Linux/macOS termios,
//! Windows Console API). Reads into a pre-reserved `SecretVec` so no
//! reallocation can leave stale unzeroed copies on the heap.
use std::io;
use protected_secrets::{SecretBox as ProtectedSecretBox, SecretVec as ProtectedSecretVec};
/// Maximum passphrase length we accept on the tty.
/// Pre-reserved so the underlying Vec never reallocates while reading.
pub const MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN: usize = 1024;
/// Heap-allocated 32-byte secret protected by the upstream `secrets` crate.
pub struct SecretBytes32 {
inner: ProtectedSecretBox<[u8; 32]>,
}
impl SecretBytes32 {
pub fn zeroed() -> Self {
Self {
inner: ProtectedSecretBox::zero(),
}
}
pub fn with_array<R>(&self, f: impl FnOnce(&[u8; 32]) -> R) -> R {
let inner = self.inner.borrow();
f(&inner)
}
pub fn with_mut_array<R>(&mut self, f: impl FnOnce(&mut [u8; 32]) -> R) -> R {
let mut inner = self.inner.borrow_mut();
f(&mut inner)
}
}
/// Heap-allocated byte buffer with **fixed capacity** protected by upstream
/// `secrets::SecretVec`.
///
/// Upstream `SecretVec` is fixed-length, so this adapter stores a separate
/// logical length. Bytes after `len` remain zero-filled padding and are never
/// exposed through [`SecretVec::with_slice`].
pub struct SecretVec {
inner: ProtectedSecretVec<u8>,
len: usize,
}
impl SecretVec {
/// Allocate a protected buffer with fixed `capacity`.
pub fn with_capacity(capacity: usize) -> Self {
Self {
inner: ProtectedSecretVec::zero(capacity),
len: 0,
}
}
/// Copy bytes from an already-allocated `Vec<u8>` into protected storage.
/// The upstream conversion zeroes the source bytes after copying; the
/// allocation itself is then released normally when the Vec is dropped.
pub fn from_vec(mut v: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
let len = v.len();
Self {
inner: ProtectedSecretVec::from(&mut v[..]),
len,
}
}
pub fn push(&mut self, b: u8) -> io::Result<()> {
if self.len >= self.inner.len() {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"secret buffer full",
));
}
{
let mut inner = self.inner.borrow_mut();
inner[self.len] = b;
}
self.len += 1;
Ok(())
}
pub fn with_slice<R>(&self, f: impl FnOnce(&[u8]) -> R) -> R {
let inner = self.inner.borrow();
f(&inner[..self.len])
}
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.len
}
}
impl PartialEq for SecretVec {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
// Constant-time-ish: length still leaks, but contents do not early-out.
if self.len != other.len {
return false;
}
let a = self.inner.borrow();
let b = other.inner.borrow();
let mut diff: u8 = 0;
for (x, y) in a[..self.len].iter().zip(b[..other.len].iter()) {
diff |= x ^ y;
}
diff == 0
}
}
// ============================================================================
// tty passphrase reader
// ============================================================================
/// Read a passphrase from the controlling terminal with echo disabled.
///
/// Bytes go directly into a pre-reserved `SecretVec` so no reallocation can
/// leave stale heap copies. CR is skipped, LF terminates the line.
/// Returns an error if the input exceeds `MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN` bytes.
pub fn read_passphrase_tty(prompt: &str) -> io::Result<SecretVec> {
imp::read_passphrase_tty(prompt)
}
#[cfg(unix)]
mod imp {
use super::{MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN, SecretVec};
use std::fs::OpenOptions;
use std::io::{self, Read, Write};
use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
/// RAII guard that restores the original termios on drop.
struct TermiosGuard {
fd: i32,
orig: libc::termios,
}
impl Drop for TermiosGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
unsafe {
libc::tcsetattr(self.fd, libc::TCSANOW, &self.orig);
}
}
}
pub fn read_passphrase_tty(prompt: &str) -> io::Result<SecretVec> {
let mut tty = OpenOptions::new().read(true).write(true).open("/dev/tty")?;
let fd = tty.as_raw_fd();
let mut orig: libc::termios = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
if unsafe { libc::tcgetattr(fd, &mut orig) } != 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let mut new = orig;
// Disable echo of typed characters; keep ECHONL so the final newline
// is shown when the user presses Enter (cosmetic).
new.c_lflag &= !libc::ECHO;
new.c_lflag |= libc::ECHONL;
if unsafe { libc::tcsetattr(fd, libc::TCSANOW, &new) } != 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let _guard = TermiosGuard { fd, orig };
write!(tty, "{prompt}")?;
tty.flush()?;
let mut buf = SecretVec::with_capacity(MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
let mut byte = [0u8; 1];
loop {
match tty.read(&mut byte) {
Ok(0) => break, // EOF
Ok(_) => match byte[0] {
b'\n' => break,
b'\r' => continue,
b => buf.push(b)?,
},
Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
Err(e) => return Err(e),
}
}
Ok(buf)
}
}
#[cfg(windows)]
mod imp {
use super::{MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN, SecretVec};
use std::fs::OpenOptions;
use std::io::{self, Write};
use std::os::windows::io::AsRawHandle;
use std::ptr;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::HANDLE;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Console::{
ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT, ENABLE_LINE_INPUT, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT, GetConsoleMode, ReadConsoleW,
SetConsoleMode,
};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
struct ConsoleModeGuard {
handle: HANDLE,
orig: u32,
}
impl Drop for ConsoleModeGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
unsafe {
SetConsoleMode(self.handle, self.orig);
}
}
}
pub fn read_passphrase_tty(prompt: &str) -> io::Result<SecretVec> {
let tty_in = OpenOptions::new().read(true).write(true).open("CONIN$")?;
let mut tty_out = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open("CONOUT$")?;
let h_in = tty_in.as_raw_handle() as HANDLE;
let mut orig_mode: u32 = 0;
if unsafe { GetConsoleMode(h_in, &mut orig_mode) } == 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let new_mode =
(orig_mode | ENABLE_LINE_INPUT | ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT) & !ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
if unsafe { SetConsoleMode(h_in, new_mode) } == 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
let _guard = ConsoleModeGuard {
handle: h_in,
orig: orig_mode,
};
write!(tty_out, "{prompt}")?;
tty_out.flush()?;
let mut wide = Zeroizing::new(Vec::<u16>::with_capacity(MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN));
loop {
let mut unit = 0u16;
let mut read = 0u32;
let ok = unsafe {
ReadConsoleW(
h_in,
(&mut unit as *mut u16).cast(),
1,
&mut read,
ptr::null_mut(),
)
};
if ok == 0 {
return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
}
if read == 0 {
break;
}
const LF: u16 = b'\n' as u16;
const CR: u16 = b'\r' as u16;
match unit {
LF | CR => break,
u => {
if wide.len() >= MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"secret buffer full",
));
}
wide.push(u);
}
}
}
// Echo was off, so emit a newline so the next shell prompt is on a fresh line.
let _ = writeln!(tty_out);
let _ = tty_out.flush();
let utf8 = Zeroizing::new(String::from_utf16(&wide).map_err(|_| {
io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"console passphrase is not valid UTF-16",
)
})?);
if utf8.len() > MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"secret buffer full",
));
}
let mut buf = SecretVec::with_capacity(MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
for b in utf8.as_bytes() {
buf.push(*b)?;
}
Ok(buf)
}
}
src/utils.rs
+279 -20
View File
@@ -1,31 +1,290 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
use crate::reader::AheadReader; use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions};
use std::io::{self, BufRead, BufReader, Seek, SeekFrom, Write};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::io::BufReader; use crate::policy;
use std::{
fs::File,
io::{self, Write},
};
pub const BUFSIZE: usize = 64 * 1024; // 64 KiB /// Default plaintext chunk size: 1 MiB.
///
/// Stored in the header per file, so callers may override via CLI without
/// breaking older files (the decryptor reads the size from the header).
pub const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: u32 = policy::DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE;
pub(crate) fn read_from_file_or_stdin<S: AsRef<str>>( /// Opened input.
input_file: Option<S>, ///
bufsz: usize, /// `length` is `Some(n)` only when the source is a regular file (we stat the
) -> AheadReader { /// open FD to avoid TOCTOU). For stdin, FIFOs, sockets, char devices, etc.
/// it is `None` — those paths cannot commit a length in the header.
pub(crate) struct Input {
pub reader: Box<dyn BufRead + Send>,
pub length: Option<u64>,
}
pub(crate) fn open_input<S: AsRef<str>>(input_file: Option<S>) -> io::Result<Input> {
match input_file { match input_file {
Some(f) => AheadReader::from( Some(f) => {
Box::new(BufReader::new(File::open(f.as_ref()).unwrap())), let file = File::open(f.as_ref())?;
bufsz, // Stat the open FD (not the path) so we can't be raced between
), // stat and open.
None => AheadReader::from(Box::new(io::stdin().lock()), bufsz), let length = file
.metadata()
.ok()
.filter(|m| m.is_file())
.map(|m| m.len());
Ok(Input {
reader: Box::new(BufReader::new(file)),
length,
})
}
None => Ok(Input {
// `Stdin` is `Send` (unlike `StdinLock`), so wrap it in a
// `BufReader` and box for cross-thread use in the parallel pipeline.
reader: Box::new(BufReader::new(io::stdin())),
length: None,
}),
} }
} }
pub(crate) fn write_to_file_or_stdout<S: AsRef<str>>(output_file: Option<S>) -> Box<dyn Write> { #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
pub struct OutSinkOptions {
pub force: bool,
pub input_file: Option<PathBuf>,
pub temp_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
pub buffer_verify_stdout: bool,
}
pub(crate) struct SecureTempFile {
path: PathBuf,
file: Option<File>,
remove_on_drop: bool,
}
impl SecureTempFile {
fn create(dir: &Path, prefix: &str) -> io::Result<Self> {
fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
for _ in 0..128 {
let mut rand = [0u8; 16];
getrandom::fill(&mut rand).map_err(io::Error::other)?;
let name = format!("{prefix}.{}.tmp", hex(&rand));
let path = dir.join(name);
let mut opts = OpenOptions::new();
opts.read(true).write(true).create_new(true);
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
opts.mode(0o600);
}
match opts.open(&path) {
Ok(file) => {
return Ok(Self {
path,
file: Some(file),
remove_on_drop: true,
});
}
Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => continue,
Err(e) => return Err(e),
}
}
Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
"could not create a unique temporary file after 128 attempts",
))
}
fn file_mut(&mut self) -> &mut File {
self.file
.as_mut()
.expect("temporary file handle taken before commit")
}
fn sync_file(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
let file = self.file_mut();
file.flush()?;
file.sync_all()
}
fn persist(mut self, final_path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
self.sync_file()?;
self.file.take();
#[cfg(windows)]
if final_path.exists() {
fs::remove_file(final_path)?;
}
fs::rename(&self.path, final_path)?;
self.remove_on_drop = false;
best_effort_fsync_parent(final_path);
Ok(())
}
fn copy_to_stdout(mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
self.sync_file()?;
let mut file = self
.file
.take()
.expect("temporary file handle taken before stdout commit");
file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0))?;
let mut stdout = io::stdout();
io::copy(&mut file, &mut stdout)?;
stdout.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl Drop for SecureTempFile {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.file.take();
if self.remove_on_drop {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.path);
}
}
}
fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef";
let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
for b in bytes {
out.push(HEX[(b >> 4) as usize] as char);
out.push(HEX[(b & 0x0f) as usize] as char);
}
out
}
fn best_effort_fsync_parent(path: &Path) {
let Some(parent) = path.parent() else {
return;
};
if let Ok(dir) = File::open(parent) {
let _ = dir.sync_all();
}
}
fn temp_dir_for_target(final_path: &Path, explicit: Option<&Path>) -> PathBuf {
if let Some(dir) = explicit {
return dir.to_path_buf();
}
final_path
.parent()
.filter(|p| !p.as_os_str().is_empty())
.map(Path::to_path_buf)
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
}
fn temp_dir_for_stdout(explicit: Option<&Path>) -> PathBuf {
explicit
.map(Path::to_path_buf)
.unwrap_or_else(std::env::temp_dir)
}
fn file_name_prefix(path: &Path) -> String {
path.file_name()
.and_then(|name| name.to_str())
.filter(|name| !name.is_empty())
.unwrap_or("fcry")
.to_owned()
}
fn output_aliases_input(output: &Path, input: Option<&Path>) -> io::Result<bool> {
let Some(input) = input else {
return Ok(false);
};
match same_file::is_same_file(input, output) {
Ok(same) => Ok(same),
Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(false),
Err(e) => Err(e),
}
}
/// Output sink that supports atomic file replacement.
///
/// For file outputs: bytes are written to a private, randomly named temp file.
/// On `commit()`, the temp file is fsynced and renamed into place. If dropped
/// without commit (panic, error, process exit), the temp file is deleted so a
/// partial/garbage file does not replace any existing target.
///
/// For stdout: behaves as a passthrough; `commit()` is a no-op.
pub enum OutSink {
Stdout(io::Stdout),
BufferVerify {
temp: SecureTempFile,
},
File {
final_path: PathBuf,
temp: SecureTempFile,
},
}
impl OutSink {
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn open<S: AsRef<str>>(output_file: Option<S>) -> io::Result<Self> {
Self::open_with_options(output_file, &OutSinkOptions::default())
}
pub fn open_with_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
output_file: Option<S>,
options: &OutSinkOptions,
) -> io::Result<Self> {
match output_file { match output_file {
Some(f) => Box::new(File::create(f.as_ref()).unwrap()), None if options.buffer_verify_stdout => {
None => Box::new(io::stdout()), let dir = temp_dir_for_stdout(options.temp_dir.as_deref());
Ok(Self::BufferVerify {
temp: SecureTempFile::create(&dir, "fcry-buffer")?,
})
}
None => Ok(Self::Stdout(io::stdout())),
Some(f) => {
let final_path = PathBuf::from(f.as_ref());
if final_path.exists()
&& !options.force
&& !output_aliases_input(&final_path, options.input_file.as_deref())?
{
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
format!(
"output file {} already exists (use --force to replace it)",
final_path.display()
),
));
}
let dir = temp_dir_for_target(&final_path, options.temp_dir.as_deref());
let prefix = file_name_prefix(&final_path);
let temp = SecureTempFile::create(&dir, &prefix)?;
Ok(Self::File { final_path, temp })
}
}
}
pub fn commit(mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
match &mut self {
Self::Stdout(s) => s.flush()?,
Self::BufferVerify { .. } => {}
Self::File { .. } => {}
}
match self {
Self::Stdout(_) => {}
Self::BufferVerify { temp } => temp.copy_to_stdout()?,
Self::File { final_path, temp } => temp.persist(&final_path)?,
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl Write for OutSink {
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
match self {
Self::Stdout(s) => s.write(buf),
Self::BufferVerify { temp } => temp.file_mut().write(buf),
Self::File { temp, .. } => temp.file_mut().write(buf),
}
}
fn flush(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
match self {
Self::Stdout(s) => s.flush(),
Self::BufferVerify { temp } => temp.file_mut().flush(),
Self::File { temp, .. } => temp.file_mut().flush(),
}
} }
} }
tests/roundtrip.rs
+1250
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,1250 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
//
// Integration tests for the `fcry` binary.
//
// These exercise the CLI as a black box: encrypt then decrypt and check that
// plaintext bytes are preserved, plus a handful of failure cases (tampering,
// wrong key, truncation, bad magic).
use std::fs;
use std::io::{ErrorKind, Write};
use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
use assert_cmd::cargo::CommandCargoExt;
use tempfile::TempDir;
const KEY: &[u8; 32] = b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
fn fcry() -> Command {
Command::cargo_bin("fcry").unwrap()
}
fn write_key_file(dir: &std::path::Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
let key = dir.join("key.bin");
fs::write(&key, KEY).unwrap();
key
}
fn key_file_near(path: &std::path::Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
write_key_file(path.parent().unwrap())
}
/// Deterministic pseudo-random plaintext of `n` bytes (xorshift, seedable).
/// We avoid `/dev/urandom` so tests are reproducible on failure.
fn pseudo_random(seed: u64, n: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut s = seed.wrapping_add(0x9E3779B97F4A7C15);
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(n);
while out.len() < n {
s ^= s << 13;
s ^= s >> 7;
s ^= s << 17;
out.extend_from_slice(&s.to_le_bytes());
}
out.truncate(n);
out
}
fn encrypt_file(plain: &std::path::Path, ct: &std::path::Path, chunk_size: Option<u32>) {
let mut cmd = fcry();
let key = key_file_near(ct);
cmd.arg("-i")
.arg(plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(ct)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key);
if let Some(cs) = chunk_size {
cmd.arg("--chunk-size").arg(cs.to_string());
}
let out = cmd.output().unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
fn decrypt_file(ct: &std::path::Path, rt: &std::path::Path) {
let key = key_file_near(ct);
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(rt)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"decrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
fn roundtrip_with_size(plaintext_size: usize, chunk_size: Option<u32>) {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("plain.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("ct.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("rt.bin");
let data = pseudo_random(plaintext_size as u64, plaintext_size);
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, chunk_size);
decrypt_file(&ct, &rt);
let got = fs::read(&rt).unwrap();
assert_eq!(got, data, "roundtrip mismatch at size {plaintext_size}");
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_empty() {
roundtrip_with_size(0, None);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_one_byte() {
roundtrip_with_size(1, None);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_smaller_than_chunk() {
roundtrip_with_size(100, None);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_exactly_one_chunk() {
roundtrip_with_size(1024 * 1024, None);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_just_over_one_chunk() {
roundtrip_with_size(1024 * 1024 + 1, None);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_multi_chunk() {
roundtrip_with_size(5 * 1024 * 1024 + 12345, None);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_custom_small_chunk_size() {
// forces many chunks for a small input
roundtrip_with_size(50_000, Some(4096));
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_chunk_size_one_byte() {
// pathological but should still work
roundtrip_with_size(257, Some(1));
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_pipe_stdin_stdout() {
let data = pseudo_random(42, 200_000);
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
let mut enc = fcry()
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
enc.stdin.as_mut().unwrap().write_all(&data).unwrap();
let enc_out = enc.wait_with_output().unwrap();
assert!(
enc_out.status.success(),
"pipe encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc_out.stderr)
);
let mut dec = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
dec.stdin
.as_mut()
.unwrap()
.write_all(&enc_out.stdout)
.unwrap();
let dec_out = dec.wait_with_output().unwrap();
assert!(
dec_out.status.success(),
"pipe decrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec_out.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(dec_out.stdout, data);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_wrong_key() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(1, 1000)).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
let wrong = dir.path().join("wrong.key");
fs::write(&wrong, b"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(wrong)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success(), "decrypt with wrong key should fail");
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("WrongKey"),
"expected distinct WrongKey error, got {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_tampered_header() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(2, 1000)).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
// Flip a byte in the chunk_size field of the header (offset 8: 4 magic + 4 fixed).
let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
bytes[8] ^= 0xff;
fs::write(&ct, &bytes).unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key_file_near(&ct))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"decrypt with tampered header should fail"
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_tampered_ciphertext() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(3, 5000)).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
// Flip a byte well past the header (in the first ciphertext chunk).
let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
let off = bytes.len() / 2;
bytes[off] ^= 0x01;
fs::write(&ct, &bytes).unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key_file_near(&ct))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"decrypt of tampered ciphertext should fail"
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_truncated_ciphertext() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(4, 3 * 1024 * 1024)).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
// Drop the trailing 16-byte tag of the last chunk (and then some).
let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
bytes.truncate(bytes.len() - 32);
fs::write(&ct, &bytes).unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key_file_near(&ct))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"decrypt of truncated ciphertext should fail"
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_bad_magic() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let bogus = dir.path().join("bogus.bin");
fs::write(&bogus, b"NOPE\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x00").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&bogus)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"decrypt of file with bad magic should fail"
);
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("magic"),
"expected 'magic' in stderr, got: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_short_key_file() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let key = dir.path().join("short.key");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
fs::write(&key, b"tooshort").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"encrypt with short key file should fail"
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_long_key_file_and_trailing_newline() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let key = dir.path().join("long.key");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
fs::write(&key, b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef\n").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success(), "long key file should fail");
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("too long"),
"expected too-long error, got {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn non_utf8_key_file_roundtrips() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let key = dir.path().join("key.bin");
let plain = dir.path().join("plain.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("ct.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("rt.bin");
let key_bytes: Vec<u8> = (0..32u8).map(|b| b ^ 0x80).collect();
let data = pseudo_random(31, 8192);
fs::write(&key, key_bytes).unwrap();
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
let enc = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
enc.status.success(),
"non-UTF-8 key encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc.stderr)
);
let dec = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&rt)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
dec.status.success(),
"non-UTF-8 key decrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), data);
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn split_fifo_key_file_read_roundtrips() {
use std::ffi::CString;
use std::fs::OpenOptions;
use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStrExt;
use std::thread;
use std::time::Duration;
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let fifo = dir.path().join("key.fifo");
let fifo_c = CString::new(fifo.as_os_str().as_bytes()).unwrap();
let rc = unsafe { libc::mkfifo(fifo_c.as_ptr(), 0o600) };
assert_eq!(rc, 0, "mkfifo failed: {}", std::io::Error::last_os_error());
let plain = dir.path().join("plain.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("ct.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("rt.bin");
let data = pseudo_random(33, 8192);
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
let fifo_writer = fifo.clone();
let writer = thread::spawn(move || {
let mut file = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(&fifo_writer).unwrap();
file.write_all(&KEY[..8]).unwrap();
file.flush().unwrap();
thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
file.write_all(&KEY[8..]).unwrap();
});
let enc = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&fifo)
.output()
.unwrap();
writer.join().unwrap();
assert!(
enc.status.success(),
"split FIFO key encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc.stderr)
);
decrypt_file(&ct, &rt);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), data);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_passphrase_argon2id() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("r.bin");
let data = pseudo_random(7, 100_000);
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
// Use cheap argon2 params so the test stays fast.
let enc = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--passphrase-env")
.arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
.arg("--argon-memory")
.arg("8")
.arg("--argon-passes")
.arg("1")
.arg("--allow-weak-kdf")
.env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "correct horse battery staple")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
enc.status.success(),
"passphrase encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc.stderr)
);
let dec = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&rt)
.arg("--passphrase-env")
.arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
.env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "correct horse battery staple")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
dec.status.success(),
"passphrase decrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), data);
// Wrong passphrase must fail.
let bad = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("bad.bin"))
.arg("--passphrase-env")
.arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
.env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "wrong passphrase")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!bad.status.success(), "wrong passphrase should fail");
}
#[test]
fn weak_passphrase_kdf_rejected_without_override() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
let enc = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
.arg("--passphrase-env")
.arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
.arg("--argon-memory")
.arg("8")
.arg("--argon-passes")
.arg("1")
.env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "short")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!enc.status.success(), "weak KDF/passphrase should fail");
}
#[test]
fn decrypt_argon_memory_cap_rejects_hostile_header() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
let enc = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--passphrase-env")
.arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
.arg("--argon-memory")
.arg("8")
.arg("--argon-passes")
.arg("1")
.arg("--allow-weak-kdf")
.env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "correct horse battery staple")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(enc.status.success());
let dec = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--passphrase-env")
.arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
.arg("--max-argon-memory-mib")
.arg("1")
.env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "correct horse battery staple")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!dec.status.success(), "low decrypt cap should reject file");
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr).contains("decrypt cap"),
"expected cap error, got {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn atomic_output_no_stale_tmp_on_failure() {
// A failed decrypt (wrong key) should not leave the output file behind.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("r.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello world").unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
let wrong = dir.path().join("wrong.key");
fs::write(&wrong, b"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&rt)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&wrong)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success());
assert!(!rt.exists(), "final output must not exist after failure");
let mut tmp = rt.clone();
tmp.set_file_name("r.bin.tmp");
assert!(!tmp.exists(), "temp file must be cleaned up");
}
#[test]
fn existing_output_refuses_without_force() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
fs::write(&ct, b"existing").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success(), "existing output should refuse");
assert_eq!(fs::read(&ct).unwrap(), b"existing");
}
#[test]
fn force_replaces_only_after_success() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
fs::write(&ct, b"existing").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--force")
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"force encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
assert_ne!(fs::read(&ct).unwrap(), b"existing");
}
#[test]
fn in_place_replacement_roundtrips() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let path = dir.path().join("data.bin");
let original = pseudo_random(41, 50_000);
fs::write(&path, &original).unwrap();
let enc = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&path)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&path)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
enc.status.success(),
"in-place encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc.stderr)
);
assert_ne!(fs::read(&path).unwrap(), original);
let dec = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&path)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&path)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
dec.status.success(),
"in-place decrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&path).unwrap(), original);
}
#[test]
fn old_predictable_temp_name_input_is_not_truncated() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let input = dir.path().join("out.bin.tmp");
let output = dir.path().join("out.bin");
let original = pseudo_random(42, 1024);
fs::write(&input, &original).unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&input)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&output)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"encrypt failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&input).unwrap(), original);
assert!(output.exists());
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn output_file_mode_is_0600() {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
let mode = fs::metadata(&ct).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
assert_eq!(mode, 0o600);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Multi-threaded pipeline + length-committed + random-access tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn encrypt_file_threads(
plain: &std::path::Path,
ct: &std::path::Path,
chunk_size: Option<u32>,
threads: usize,
) {
let mut cmd = fcry();
let key = key_file_near(ct);
cmd.arg("-i")
.arg(plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(ct)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key)
.arg("-j")
.arg(threads.to_string());
if let Some(cs) = chunk_size {
cmd.arg("--chunk-size").arg(cs.to_string());
}
let out = cmd.output().unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"encrypt -j{threads} failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
fn decrypt_file_threads(ct: &std::path::Path, rt: &std::path::Path, threads: usize) {
let key = key_file_near(ct);
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(rt)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key)
.arg("-j")
.arg(threads.to_string())
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"decrypt -j{threads} failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_multi_threaded() {
// Multi-chunk input. Encrypt+decrypt with -j 4 must round-trip.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("r.bin");
let data = pseudo_random(11, 5 * 1024 * 1024 + 12345);
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
encrypt_file_threads(&plain, &ct, Some(64 * 1024), 4);
decrypt_file_threads(&ct, &rt, 4);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), data);
}
#[test]
fn parallel_and_serial_outputs_round_trip() {
// Encrypt with -j 4 and decrypt serially (and vice-versa); both directions
// must yield the original plaintext.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let data = pseudo_random(13, 256 * 1024 + 17);
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
let ct_par = dir.path().join("c_par.bin");
let ct_ser = dir.path().join("c_ser.bin");
encrypt_file_threads(&plain, &ct_par, Some(8192), 4);
encrypt_file_threads(&plain, &ct_ser, Some(8192), 1);
let rt1 = dir.path().join("r1.bin");
let rt2 = dir.path().join("r2.bin");
// par-encrypted, serial-decrypted
decrypt_file_threads(&ct_par, &rt1, 1);
// serial-encrypted, par-decrypted
decrypt_file_threads(&ct_ser, &rt2, 4);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt1).unwrap(), data);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt2).unwrap(), data);
}
#[test]
fn roundtrip_pipe_multi_threaded() {
// stdin/stdout mode with -j 4: length flag must NOT be set (no committed
// length when we don't know the input size), but encrypt/decrypt must still
// round-trip cleanly across the pipeline.
let data = pseudo_random(14, 200_000);
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
let mut enc = fcry()
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.arg("-j")
.arg("4")
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
enc.stdin.as_mut().unwrap().write_all(&data).unwrap();
let enc_out = enc.wait_with_output().unwrap();
assert!(
enc_out.status.success(),
"pipe encrypt -j4 failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc_out.stderr)
);
// flags byte at offset 6 must not set length commitment for stdin input.
assert_eq!(
enc_out.stdout[6] & 0x01,
0,
"stdin-encrypted file unexpectedly committed length"
);
let mut dec = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.arg("-j")
.arg("4")
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
dec.stdin
.as_mut()
.unwrap()
.write_all(&enc_out.stdout)
.unwrap();
let dec_out = dec.wait_with_output().unwrap();
assert!(
dec_out.status.success(),
"pipe decrypt -j4 failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec_out.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(dec_out.stdout, data);
}
#[test]
fn stdin_chunk_size_zero_fails_but_empty_valid_chunk_succeeds() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
let mut bad = fcry()
.arg("--chunk-size")
.arg("0")
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
// Invalid options can make the child exit before it drains stdin.
if let Err(err) = bad.stdin.as_mut().unwrap().write_all(b"x") {
assert_eq!(
err.kind(),
ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"unexpected stdin write error for failing chunk-size 0 process: {err}"
);
}
let bad_out = bad.wait_with_output().unwrap();
assert!(!bad_out.status.success(), "chunk-size 0 should fail");
let mut good = fcry()
.arg("--chunk-size")
.arg("1")
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
drop(good.stdin.take());
let good_out = good.wait_with_output().unwrap();
assert!(
good_out.status.success(),
"empty stdin with valid chunk should succeed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&good_out.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn huge_thread_count_is_bounded() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.arg("-j")
.arg("1000000")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"huge -j should be capped, got {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("capped"));
}
#[test]
fn forged_huge_chunk_header_fails_before_allocation() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let forged = dir.path().join("forged.bin");
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
bytes.extend_from_slice(b"fcry");
bytes.push(3); // version
bytes.push(1); // alg
bytes.push(0x02); // key commitment flag
bytes.push(0); // reserved
bytes.extend_from_slice(&u32::MAX.to_le_bytes());
fs::write(&forged, bytes).unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&forged)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success(), "huge chunk header should fail");
assert!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("chunk_size"),
"expected chunk_size error, got {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
}
#[test]
fn file_input_commits_length() {
// Encrypting from a regular file must auto-set FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED (bit 0
// of the flags byte at offset 6) and embed the length.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
let data = pseudo_random(15, 50_000);
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, Some(4096));
let bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
// Magic(4) + version(1) + alg(1) + flags(1) = byte 6
assert_eq!(bytes[4], 3, "version should be 3");
assert_eq!(bytes[6] & 0x01, 0x01, "length-committed flag should be set");
assert_eq!(bytes[6] & 0x02, 0x02, "key-committed flag should be set");
}
#[test]
fn v3_downgrade_or_commitment_stripping_fails_authentication() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("r.bin");
fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(51, 1000)).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
bytes[4] = 2;
bytes[6] &= !0x02;
fs::write(&ct, bytes).unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&rt)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key_file_near(&ct))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!out.status.success(),
"downgraded/stripped v3 header must fail authentication"
);
}
fn encrypt_random_access_fixture(
dir: &std::path::Path,
data: &[u8],
chunk_size: u32,
) -> std::path::PathBuf {
let plain = dir.join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, data).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, Some(chunk_size));
ct
}
fn random_access_decrypt(
ct: &std::path::Path,
out: &std::path::Path,
offset: u64,
length: u64,
) -> std::process::Output {
fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(ct)
.arg("-o")
.arg(out)
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key_file_near(ct))
.arg("--offset")
.arg(offset.to_string())
.arg("--length")
.arg(length.to_string())
.output()
.unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn random_access_decrypt_slices() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let chunk = 4096u32;
let total = 5 * 1024 * 1024 + 12345;
let data = pseudo_random(16, total);
let ct = encrypt_random_access_fixture(dir.path(), &data, chunk);
// (offset, length) cases:
// - chunk-aligned start, mid-chunk end
// - mid-chunk start crossing several chunks
// - last partial chunk
// - last byte
// - entire file
let cases: &[(u64, u64)] = &[
(0, 1),
(chunk as u64, 7),
(chunk as u64 - 5, 100),
(10, chunk as u64 * 3 + 17),
(total as u64 - 1, 1),
(total as u64 - 100, 100),
(0, total as u64),
];
for (i, (offset, length)) in cases.iter().copied().enumerate() {
let out = dir.path().join(format!("slice_{i}.bin"));
let r = random_access_decrypt(&ct, &out, offset, length);
assert!(
r.status.success(),
"slice {i} ({offset}, {length}) failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&r.stderr)
);
let got = fs::read(&out).unwrap();
let expected = &data[offset as usize..(offset + length) as usize];
assert_eq!(got, expected, "slice {i} mismatch");
}
}
#[test]
fn random_access_rejects_out_of_range() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let data = pseudo_random(17, 1000);
let ct = encrypt_random_access_fixture(dir.path(), &data, 256);
let out = dir.path().join("oob.bin");
let r = random_access_decrypt(&ct, &out, 900, 1000); // 900+1000 > 1000
assert!(!r.status.success(), "out-of-range slice should fail");
}
#[test]
fn random_access_rejects_stdin_encrypted() {
// Encrypt via stdin → no length committed → random access must refuse.
let data = pseudo_random(18, 2000);
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
let mut enc = fcry()
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(&key)
.arg("-o")
.arg(&ct)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
enc.stdin.as_mut().unwrap().write_all(&data).unwrap();
assert!(enc.wait().unwrap().success());
let out = dir.path().join("slice.bin");
let r = random_access_decrypt(&ct, &out, 0, 100);
assert!(
!r.status.success(),
"random access on stdin-encrypted file should fail"
);
}
#[test]
fn random_access_rejects_zero_length() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let data = pseudo_random(19, 1000);
let ct = encrypt_random_access_fixture(dir.path(), &data, 256);
let out = dir.path().join("empty.bin");
let r = random_access_decrypt(&ct, &out, 500, 0);
assert!(!r.status.success(), "zero-length slice should fail");
}
#[test]
fn random_access_tampered_length_fails() {
// Flip a byte inside the committed plaintext_length field. The header is
// AAD for every chunk, so the AEAD must reject decryption.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let data = pseudo_random(20, 4000);
let ct = encrypt_random_access_fixture(dir.path(), &data, 1024);
let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
// For raw-kdf header: magic(4)+ver(1)+alg(1)+flags(1)+rsv(1)+chunksize(4)+kdf_id(1)+nonce_prefix(19) = 32
// plaintext_length is at offset 32..40.
bytes[34] ^= 0xff;
fs::write(&ct, &bytes).unwrap();
let out = dir.path().join("bad.bin");
let r = random_access_decrypt(&ct, &out, 0, 100);
assert!(
!r.status.success(),
"tampered plaintext_length must fail authentication"
);
}
#[test]
fn buffer_verify_stdout_emits_nothing_on_truncated_ciphertext() {
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(61, 3 * 1024 * 1024)).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, Some(64 * 1024));
let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
bytes.truncate(bytes.len() - 32);
fs::write(&ct, bytes).unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-d")
.arg("-i")
.arg(&ct)
.arg("--buffer-verify")
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(key_file_near(&ct))
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success(), "truncated decrypt should fail");
assert!(
out.stdout.is_empty(),
"buffer-verify must suppress partial stdout"
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_zero_threads() {
// -j 0 is almost certainly a user mistake. Clap should reject it before
// we ever reach the pipeline.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
let out = fcry()
.arg("-i")
.arg(&plain)
.arg("-o")
.arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
.arg("--key-file")
.arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
.arg("-j")
.arg("0")
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(!out.status.success(), "-j 0 should be rejected");
}
#[test]
fn header_chunk_size_is_authoritative_on_decrypt() {
// Encrypt with a non-default chunk size; decrypt without specifying one.
// The decryptor must read chunk_size from the header.
let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
let rt = dir.path().join("r.bin");
let data = pseudo_random(5, 100_000);
fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, Some(7919)); // prime, deliberately weird
decrypt_file(&ct, &rt);
assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), data);
}