build: add local just workflow

Add a justfile for the common fcry developer commands. The run recipe is variadic and uses just positional arguments so program flags are forwarded through cargo run without needing a second separator. Keep the default release profile debuggable and checked, then move the stripped, LTO-enabled artifact settings into the production profile. This keeps day-to-day release builds easier to inspect while preserving an explicit production build recipe for optimized distributable binaries. The clippy recipe uses workspace, all-target, all-feature coverage and denies warnings so the task runner matches the stricter local verification path. Test Plan: - cargo clippy - cargo clippy --benches - cargo clippy --tests - cargo +nightly fmt - just --fmt --check - just run --help - just clippy - git diff --cached --check Refs: none
cleanup: remove old review files
2026-06-10 21:18:10 +02:00 · 2026-06-10 20:51:29 +02:00 · 2026-06-10 20:49:21 +02:00 · 2026-06-10 20:49:12 +02:00 · 2026-06-10 01:41:41 +02:00 · 2026-06-10 01:24:38 +02:00
16 changed files with 1972 additions and 960 deletions
@@ -76,15 +76,27 @@ checksum = "3c3610892ee6e0cbce8ae2700349fcf8f98adb0dbfbee85aec3c9179d29cc072"
 dependencies = [
 "base64ct",
 "blake2",
- "cpufeatures",
+ "cpufeatures 0.2.17",
 "password-hash",
 ]
 [[package]]
-name = "assert_cmd"
+name = "arrayref"
-version = "2.2.1"
+version = "0.3.9"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "39bae1d3fa576f7c6519514180a72559268dd7d1fe104070956cb687bc6673bd"
+checksum = "76a2e8124351fda1ef8aaaa3bbd7ebbcb486bbcd4225aca0aa0d84bb2db8fecb"
 [[package]]
 name = "arrayvec"
 version = "0.7.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7c02d123df017efcdfbd739ef81735b36c5ba83ec3c59c80a9d7ecc718f92e50"
 [[package]]
 name = "assert_cmd"
 version = "2.2.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "2aa3a22042e45de04255c7bf3626e239f450200fd0493c1e382263544b20aea6"
 dependencies = [
 "anstyle",
 "bstr",
@@ -103,9 +115,9 @@ checksum = "2af50177e190e07a26ab74f8b1efbfe2ef87da2116221318cb1c2e82baf7de06"
 [[package]]
 name = "bitflags"
-version = "2.11.1"
+version = "2.13.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c4512299f36f043ab09a583e57bceb5a5aab7a73db1805848e8fef3c9e8c78b3"
+checksum = "b4388bee8683e3d04af747c73422af53102d2bd24d9eadb6cbc100baef4b43f8"
 [[package]]
 name = "blake2"
@@ -116,6 +128,20 @@ dependencies = [
 "digest",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "blake3"
 version = "1.8.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "0aa83c34e62843d924f905e0f5c866eb1dd6545fc4d719e803d9ba6030371fce"
 dependencies = [
 "arrayref",
 "arrayvec",
 "cc",
 "cfg-if",
 "constant_time_eq",
 "cpufeatures 0.3.0",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "block-buffer"
 version = "0.10.4"
@@ -136,6 +162,16 @@ dependencies = [
 "serde",
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 [[package]]
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 version = "1.2.63"
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 checksum = "556e016178bb5662a08681bbe0f00f8e17631781a4dfc8c45e466e4b185ec27f"
 dependencies = [
 "find-msvc-tools",
 "shlex",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "cfg-if"
 version = "1.0.4"
@@ -150,7 +186,7 @@ checksum = "c3613f74bd2eac03dad61bd53dbe620703d4371614fe0bc3b9f04dd36fe4e818"
 dependencies = [
 "cfg-if",
 "cipher",
- "cpufeatures",
+ "cpufeatures 0.2.17",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -223,6 +259,12 @@ version = "1.0.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "1d07550c9036bf2ae0c684c4297d503f838287c83c53686d05370d0e139ae570"
 [[package]]
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 checksum = "3d52eff69cd5e647efe296129160853a42795992097e8af39800e1060caeea9b"
 [[package]]
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 version = "0.2.17"
@@ -232,6 +274,15 @@ dependencies = [
 "libc",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "cpufeatures"
 version = "0.3.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "8b2a41393f66f16b0823bb79094d54ac5fbd34ab292ddafb9a0456ac9f87d201"
 dependencies = [
 "libc",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "crossbeam-channel"
 version = "0.5.15"
@@ -299,22 +350,31 @@ checksum = "9f1f227452a390804cdb637b74a86990f2a7d7ba4b7d5693aac9b4dd6defd8d6"
 [[package]]
 name = "fcry"
-version = "0.10.0"
+version = "0.12.0"
 dependencies = [
 "argon2",
 "assert_cmd",
 "blake3",
 "chacha20poly1305",
 "clap",
 "crossbeam-channel",
 "getrandom 0.4.2",
 "libc",
 "rlimit",
 "same-file",
 "secrets",
 "tempfile",
 "unicode-normalization",
 "windows-sys",
 "zeroize",
 ]
 [[package]]
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 checksum = "5baebc0774151f905a1a2cc41989300b1e6fbb29aff0ceffa1064fdd3088d582"
 [[package]]
 name = "foldhash"
 version = "0.1.5"
@@ -366,9 +426,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "hashbrown"
-version = "0.17.0"
+version = "0.17.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4f467dd6dccf739c208452f8014c75c18bb8301b050ad1cfb27153803edb0f51"
+checksum = "ed5909b6e89a2db4456e54cd5f673791d7eca6732202bbf2a9cc504fe2f9b84a"
 [[package]]
 name = "heck"
@@ -389,7 +449,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "d466e9454f08e4a911e14806c24e16fba1b4c121d1ea474396f396069cf949d9"
 dependencies = [
 "equivalent",
- "hashbrown 0.17.0",
+ "hashbrown 0.17.1",
 "serde",
 "serde_core",
 ]
@@ -435,15 +495,15 @@ checksum = "32a66949e030da00e8c7d4434b251670a91556f4144941d37452769c25d58a53"
 [[package]]
 name = "log"
-version = "0.4.29"
+version = "0.4.32"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5e5032e24019045c762d3c0f28f5b6b8bbf38563a65908389bf7978758920897"
+checksum = "953f07c43838f8e6f9758cab68bf5bed85465e7587ebe0b823f1bcd81978ad3a"
 [[package]]
 name = "memchr"
-version = "2.8.0"
+version = "2.8.1"
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-checksum = "f8ca58f447f06ed17d5fc4043ce1b10dd205e060fb3ce5b979b8ed8e59ff3f79"
+checksum = "6b947ae49db0d222b1dbc6b113ce7248a3fc3a6ca21b696717bfc000ba4484d8"
 [[package]]
 name = "once_cell"
@@ -496,7 +556,7 @@ version = "0.8.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "8159bd90725d2df49889a078b54f4f79e87f1f8a8444194cdca81d38f5393abf"
 dependencies = [
- "cpufeatures",
+ "cpufeatures 0.2.17",
 "opaque-debug",
 "universal-hash",
 ]
@@ -599,6 +659,15 @@ dependencies = [
 "windows-sys",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "same-file"
 version = "1.0.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "93fc1dc3aaa9bfed95e02e6eadabb4baf7e3078b0bd1b4d7b6b0b68378900502"
 dependencies = [
 "winapi-util",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "secrets"
 version = "1.3.0"
@@ -648,9 +717,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "serde_json"
-version = "1.0.149"
+version = "1.0.150"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "83fc039473c5595ace860d8c4fafa220ff474b3fc6bfdb4293327f1a37e94d86"
+checksum = "e8014e44b4736ed0538adeecded0fce2a272f22dc9578a7eb6b2d9993c74cfb9"
 dependencies = [
 "itoa",
 "memchr",
@@ -659,6 +728,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "zmij",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "shlex"
 version = "2.0.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "f8fadd59c855ef2080decdef8ff161eb6661b86933c9d82e5ba29dc602a55aba"
 [[package]]
 name = "strsim"
 version = "0.11.1"
@@ -702,10 +777,25 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "8f50febec83f5ee1df3015341d8bd429f2d1cc62bcba7ea2076759d315084683"
 [[package]]
-name = "typenum"
+name = "tinyvec"
-version = "1.20.0"
+version = "1.11.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "40ce102ab67701b8526c123c1bab5cbe42d7040ccfd0f64af1a385808d2f43de"
+checksum = "3e61e67053d25a4e82c844e8424039d9745781b3fc4f32b8d55ed50f5f667ef3"
 dependencies = [
 "tinyvec_macros",
 ]
 [[package]]
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 [[package]]
 name = "typenum"
 version = "1.20.1"
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 checksum = "b6f5e870be6c3b371b77fe0ee0bafb859fa4964b4404c27de1d380043c4dda20"
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-ident"
@@ -713,6 +803,15 @@ version = "1.0.24"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e6e4313cd5fcd3dad5cafa179702e2b244f760991f45397d14d4ebf38247da75"
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-normalization"
 version = "0.1.25"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "5fd4f6878c9cb28d874b009da9e8d183b5abc80117c40bbd187a1fde336be6e8"
 dependencies = [
 "tinyvec",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-xid"
 version = "0.2.6"
@@ -830,6 +929,15 @@ version = "0.4.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "ac3b87c63620426dd9b991e5ce0329eff545bccbbb34f3be09ff6fb6ab51b7b6"
 [[package]]
 name = "winapi-util"
 version = "0.1.11"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22"
 dependencies = [
 "windows-sys",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "winapi-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu"
 version = "0.4.0"
@@ -1,37 +1,55 @@
 [package]
 authors = ["ddidderr <ddidderr@paul.network>"]
 edition = "2024"
 name = "fcry"
-version = "0.10.0"
+version = "0.12.0"
 edition = "2024"
 license = "MIT-0"
 [dependencies]
 argon2 = "0.5"
 blake3 = "1"
 chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
-clap = {version = "4", features = ["derive"]}
+clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] }
 crossbeam-channel = "0.5"
-getrandom = {version = "0.4"}
+getrandom = { version = "0.4" }
-protected-secrets = {package = "secrets", version = "1.3"}
+protected-secrets = { package = "secrets", version = "1.3" }
-zeroize = {version = "1", features = ["derive"]}
+same-file = "1"
 unicode-normalization = "0.1"
 zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 [dev-dependencies]
 assert_cmd = "2"
 tempfile = "3"
 [target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
 libc = "0.2"
 rlimit = "0.11"
 [target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
-windows-sys = {version = "0.61", features = [
+windows-sys = {
-    "Win32_System_Console",
+  version = "0.61",
  features = [
    "Win32_Foundation",
    "Win32_Storage_FileSystem",
    "Win32_Security",
-]}
+    "Win32_Storage_FileSystem",
-
+    "Win32_System_Console",
-[dev-dependencies]
+  ]
-assert_cmd = "2"
+}
 tempfile = "3"
 [profile.release]
 debug = true
 strip = false
 debug-assertions = true
 overflow-checks = true
 lto = false
 panic = "unwind"
 incremental = true
 [profile.production]
 inherits = "release"
 debug = false
 strip = true
-panic = "unwind"
+debug-assertions = false
 overflow-checks = false
 lto = true
 incremental = false
 codegen-units = 1
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 MIT No Attribution
 Copyright 2026 fcry contributors
 Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this
 software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software
 without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify,
 merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
 permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so.
 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
 INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
 PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
 HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
 OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
 SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
@@ -1,675 +0,0 @@
 ### GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
 Version 3, 29 June 2007
 Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 <https://fsf.org/>
 Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
 license document, but changing it is not allowed.
 ### Preamble
 The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
 software and other kinds of works.
 The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
 to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast,
 the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom
 to share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains
 free software for all its users. We, the Free Software Foundation, use
 the GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies
 also to any other work released this way by its authors. You can apply
 it to your programs, too.
 When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
 price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
 have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
 them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you
 want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new
 free programs, and that you know you can do these things.
 To protect your rights, we need to prevent others from denying you
 these rights or asking you to surrender the rights. Therefore, you
 have certain responsibilities if you distribute copies of the
 software, or if you modify it: responsibilities to respect the freedom
 of others.
 For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
 gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same
 freedoms that you received. You must make sure that they, too, receive
 or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
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 Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps:
 (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer you this License
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 For the developers' and authors' protection, the GPL clearly explains
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 #### 12. No Surrender of Others' Freedom.
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 #### 13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License.
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        (at your option) any later version.
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        but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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 Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper
 mail.
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        <program>  Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
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        This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
        under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
 The hypothetical commands \`show w' and \`show c' should show the
 appropriate parts of the General Public License. Of course, your
 program's commands might be different; for a GUI interface, you would
 use an "about box".
 You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or
 school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
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 The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your
 program into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine
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@@ -1,12 +1,172 @@
-# fcry - [f]ile[cry]pt
+# fcry - filecrypt
 A file en-/decryption tool for easy use.
-Currently `fcry` uses `ChaCha20Poly1305` ([RFC 8439](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439)) as [AEAD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption) cipher provided by the [chacha20poly1305](https://docs.rs/chacha20poly1305/latest/chacha20poly1305/) crate.
+`fcry` encrypts and decrypts files with an authenticated chunked format. New
 files use XChaCha20-Poly1305 in a STREAM-style construction: a 19-byte random
 nonce prefix, a 32-bit chunk counter, and a last-chunk bit form each 24-byte
 XChaCha nonce. Every chunk authenticates the full file header as AEAD
 associated data.
-## Status
+The tool is intended for local file encryption, scripted backups, and
-Currently `fcry` is __not thoroughly tested__ and in __early stages of development__.  
+streaming-friendly decrypts. It is not a general archive format, does not hide
-There is a chance, that something is broken as of now.  
+file size, and does not protect plaintext after another process has received
-Encryption __seems__ to work, but due to a possible lack of understanding of some underlying methods
+it.
 (or misinterpretation) it could theoretically be not effective at all.
-See [TODO.md](/ddidderr/fcry/src/branch/main/TODO.md) for further information.
+## Usage
 Encrypt with an interactive passphrase:
 ```sh
 fcry -i plain.bin -o plain.bin.fcry --passphrase
 ```
 Decrypt with the same passphrase:
 ```sh
 fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry -o plain.bin --passphrase
 ```
 Use a raw 32-byte key file instead of a passphrase:
 ```sh
 fcry -i plain.bin -o plain.bin.fcry --key-file key.bin
 fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry -o plain.bin --key-file key.bin
 ```
 For non-interactive passphrase use:
 ```sh
 FCRY_PASSWORD='correct horse battery staple' \
  fcry -i plain.bin -o plain.bin.fcry --passphrase-env FCRY_PASSWORD
 ```
 `--passphrase-env` is useful for automation, but the environment variable can
 remain visible to the current process environment and platform tooling. Prefer
 interactive entry or a protected key file when possible.
 ## Safety Properties
 - File outputs are written to private, randomly named temporary files and are
  renamed into place only after encryption or decryption succeeds. Existing
  outputs require `--force`, except for the self-replacement case that is
  handled through the temporary file.
 - New passphrase encryptions use Argon2id by default with 1024 MiB of memory,
  2 passes, and 4 lanes. Passphrases must be non-empty and at least 12 UTF-8
  bytes unless `--allow-weak-kdf` is explicitly supplied for tests or legacy
  interop.
 - Decryption enforces a memory ceiling for Argon2id headers. The default cap is
  the lower of 4096 MiB, the architecture limit, and available Linux memory
  when that can be detected. Override it with `--max-argon-memory-mib` only for
  files you trust.
 - Chunk size is bounded to `1..=64 MiB`. Worker threads are capped at 256, and
  the pipeline bounds in-flight chunk memory.
 - v3 files carry a key commitment derived from the stretched key and committed
  header fields. This gives a fast, clear wrong-key failure before chunk
  processing and prevents stripping or downgrading the commitment without
  authentication failure.
 - On Unix, `fcry` makes a best-effort call to disable core dumps for the process
  before handling secrets.
 ## Format
 The current on-disk format version is v3.
 ```text
 magic             "fcry"           4 bytes
 version           u8               1
 alg_id            u8               1   (1 = XChaCha20-Poly1305)
 flags             u8               1
 reserved          u8               1   (must be 0)
 chunk_size        u32 LE           4
 kdf_id            u8               1   (0 = raw key, 1 = Argon2id)
 kdf_params        variable
 nonce_prefix      [u8; 19]
 plaintext_length  u64 LE           only when flags bit 0 is set
 key_commitment    [u8; 32]         only when flags bit 1 is set
 ciphertext chunks each plaintext chunk plus a 16-byte Poly1305 tag
 ```
 The encoded header is AEAD associated data for every chunk. Changing the chunk
 size, KDF parameters, nonce prefix, committed plaintext length, key commitment,
 or other header bytes causes authentication failure.
 Version history:
 - v1: no flags and no committed plaintext length.
 - v2: adds the length-committed flag and optional `plaintext_length`.
 - v3: requires the key-commitment flag and stores the 32-byte key commitment.
 Regular file encryption commits `plaintext_length` in the header. Stdin
 encryption cannot know the final length up front, so stdin-produced files do
 not support random-access decrypt.
 ## Streaming And Ranges
 Normal decrypt-to-stdout emits each plaintext chunk after that chunk has
 authenticated. This means a truncated ciphertext can produce an authentic
 prefix on stdout before the final truncation error is reported. That is
 inherent to chunked streaming AE when bytes are released immediately.
 Use `--buffer-verify` when decrypting to stdout if downstream consumers must
 not see any plaintext until the whole file has authenticated:
 ```sh
 fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry --passphrase --buffer-verify > plain.bin
 ```
 `--buffer-verify` writes plaintext to a private temporary file first, verifies
 the complete ciphertext, and copies to stdout only after success. File outputs
 already get atomic temporary-file behavior, so `--buffer-verify` is only valid
 for decrypt-to-stdout.
 Random-access decrypt requires `--decrypt`, `--input-file`, `--offset`, and
 `--length`, and the input must have a length-committed header:
 ```sh
 fcry -d -i plain.bin.fcry --passphrase --offset 1048576 --length 4096 > slice.bin
 ```
 A successful range decrypt authenticates the requested chunks and header. It
 does not prove that the rest of the file is present or untampered. Use a full
 decrypt when you need whole-file integrity. `--length 0` is rejected because it
 would authenticate no chunks.
 ## Threat Model
 `fcry` aims to provide confidentiality and integrity for file contents against
 an attacker who can read, copy, truncate, replace, or modify ciphertext files
 after encryption. With passphrase mode, offline guessing is still possible; the
 Argon2id parameters make each guess expensive but cannot make a weak passphrase
 safe.
 The format authenticates all header fields that affect decryption, including
 KDF parameters, chunk size, nonce prefix, committed plaintext length, and key
 commitment. Unknown header flags and unsupported algorithms are rejected.
 The following are explicit non-goals:
 - Hiding plaintext length or access patterns. `plaintext_length` is cleartext
  for regular-file encryptions, and ciphertext length already reveals an
  approximate plaintext size. There is no padding scheme.
 - Preventing plaintext exposure after successful decrypt. Plaintext written to
  stdout, files, pipes, shell history, terminals, swap, backups, or downstream
  tools is outside `fcry`'s control.
 - Protecting plaintext chunk buffers from every local memory-forensics route.
  Keys and passphrases use protected/zeroizing storage where practical, and
  chunk buffers are zeroized on drop, but decrypted plaintext necessarily exists
  in ordinary process memory while being processed.
 - Disabling Windows Error Reporting or minidumps. Unlike Unix core dumps, those
  are controlled by per-machine Windows policy; `fcry` records this as an
  operator/deployment responsibility rather than changing host-wide policy.
 - Recovering from loss of the passphrase or raw key file. There is no escrow or
  backdoor.
 ## Operational Notes
 - Keep backups of important plaintext until you have verified the encrypted
  file and your recovery path.
 - Store raw key files with restrictive permissions. On Unix, `fcry` warns when
  a key file is group/world accessible.
 - Use `--allow-weak-kdf` only for tests or compatibility with old intentionally
  weak files.
 - Use `--temp-dir` when the default temporary-file location is not acceptable
  for decrypt-to-stdout buffering or output staging.
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
 set positional-arguments
 run *args:
    cargo run -- "$@"
 build:
    cargo build
 build-release:
    cargo build --release
 build-production:
    cargo build --profile production
 fmt:
    cargo +nightly fmt
    tombi format
    just --fmt
 _fix:
    cargo fix
    cargo clippy --fix
 fix: _fix fmt
 clippy:
    cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings
 test:
    cargo test --workspace
 clean:
    cargo clean
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 use chacha20poly1305::{KeyInit, XChaCha20Poly1305, XNonce, aead::AeadInPlace};
 use std::fs::File;
@@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use crate::error::*;
 use crate::header::{
-    AlgId, FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED, Header, KdfParams, NONCE_PREFIX_LEN, TAG_LEN, VERSION_CURRENT,
+    AlgId, FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED, FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED, Header, KdfParams, NONCE_PREFIX_LEN, TAG_LEN,
    VERSION_CURRENT,
 };
 use crate::pipeline;
 use crate::policy;
 use crate::reader::{AheadReader, ReadInfoChunk};
 use crate::secrets::{SecretBytes32, SecretVec};
 use crate::utils::*;
 use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 /// XChaCha20Poly1305 nonce: 24 bytes total. STREAM splits the trailing 5 bytes
 /// into a 4-byte big-endian counter and a 1-byte "last block" flag.
@@ -40,7 +43,7 @@ pub fn derive_key(
    match kdf {
        KdfParams::Raw => {
            let raw =
-                raw_key.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("raw kdf requires --raw-key".into()))?;
+                raw_key.ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("raw kdf requires --key-file".into()))?;
            raw.with_array(|raw| out.with_mut_array(|out| out.copy_from_slice(raw)));
        }
        KdfParams::Argon2id {
@@ -67,6 +70,32 @@ fn build_aead(key: &SecretBytes32) -> Arc<XChaCha20Poly1305> {
    Arc::new(key.with_array(|key| XChaCha20Poly1305::new(key.into())))
 }
 fn compute_key_commitment(key: &SecretBytes32, header: &Header) -> [u8; 32] {
    key.with_array(|key| {
        let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new_keyed(key);
        hasher.update(b"fcry-kcv-v3");
        hasher.update(&[0]);
        hasher.update(&header.commitment_input_encoding());
        *hasher.finalize().as_bytes()
    })
 }
 fn verify_key_commitment(header: &Header, key: &SecretBytes32) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    let Some(expected) = header.key_commitment else {
        return Ok(());
    };
    let actual = compute_key_commitment(key, header);
    let mut diff = 0u8;
    for (a, b) in actual.iter().zip(expected.iter()) {
        diff |= a ^ b;
    }
    if diff == 0 {
        Ok(())
    } else {
        Err(FcryError::WrongKey)
    }
 }
 /// Bump the per-chunk counter; surface a domain error on overflow rather than
 /// panicking on debug or wrapping in release.
 pub(crate) fn bump_counter(counter: u32) -> Result<u32, FcryError> {
@@ -75,6 +104,7 @@ pub(crate) fn bump_counter(counter: u32) -> Result<u32, FcryError> {
        .ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("STREAM counter overflow (input too large)".into()))
 }
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: Option<S>,
    output_file: Option<S>,
@@ -83,11 +113,31 @@ pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
    kdf: KdfParams,
    threads: usize,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
-    let chunk_sz = chunk_size as usize;
+    encrypt_with_output_options(
        input_file,
        output_file,
        key,
        chunk_size,
        kdf,
        threads,
        &OutSinkOptions::default(),
    )
 }
 pub fn encrypt_with_output_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: Option<S>,
    output_file: Option<S>,
    key: &SecretBytes32,
    chunk_size: u32,
    kdf: KdfParams,
    threads: usize,
    output_options: &OutSinkOptions,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    let chunk_sz = policy::validate_chunk_size(chunk_size)?;
    let input = open_input(input_file)?;
    let plaintext_length = input.length;
    let mut f_plain = AheadReader::from(input.reader, chunk_sz);
-    let mut f_encrypted = OutSink::open(output_file)?;
+    let mut f_encrypted = OutSink::open_with_options(output_file, output_options)?;
    let mut nonce_prefix = [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN];
    getrandom::fill(&mut nonce_prefix)?;
@@ -96,8 +146,8 @@ pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
        FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED
    } else {
        0
-    };
+    } | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED;
-    let header = Header {
+    let mut header = Header {
        version: VERSION_CURRENT,
        alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
        flags,
@@ -105,7 +155,9 @@ pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
        kdf,
        nonce_prefix,
        plaintext_length,
        key_commitment: None,
    };
    header.key_commitment = Some(compute_key_commitment(key, &header));
    let aad = Arc::new(header.encode());
    f_encrypted.write_all(&aad)?;
@@ -124,7 +176,7 @@ pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
        );
    }
-    let mut buf = vec![0u8; chunk_sz];
+    let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; chunk_sz]);
    let mut counter: u32 = 0;
    let mut bytes_seen: u64 = 0;
@@ -132,18 +184,18 @@ pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
        match f_plain.read_ahead(&mut buf)? {
            ReadInfoChunk::Normal(_) => {
                let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, false);
-                aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut buf)?;
+                aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
                f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?;
                buf.truncate(chunk_sz);
-                bytes_seen = bytes_seen.saturating_add(chunk_sz as u64);
+                bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, chunk_sz, "bytes read")?;
                counter = bump_counter(counter)?;
            }
            ReadInfoChunk::Last(n) => {
                buf.truncate(n);
                let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, true);
-                aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut buf)?;
+                aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
                f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?;
-                bytes_seen = bytes_seen.saturating_add(n as u64);
+                bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, n, "bytes read")?;
                break;
            }
            ReadInfoChunk::Empty => {
@@ -151,7 +203,7 @@ pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
                // authenticates the (empty) stream rather than silently producing nothing.
                buf.clear();
                let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, counter, true);
-                aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut buf)?;
+                aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
                f_encrypted.write_all(&buf)?;
                break;
            }
@@ -173,24 +225,65 @@ pub fn encrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
    Ok(())
 }
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn decrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: Option<S>,
    output_file: Option<S>,
    raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
    passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
    threads: usize,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    decrypt_with_argon_cap(
        input_file,
        output_file,
        raw_key,
        passphrase,
        threads,
        policy::default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib(),
    )
 }
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn decrypt_with_argon_cap<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: Option<S>,
    output_file: Option<S>,
    raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
    passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
    threads: usize,
    max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    decrypt_with_output_options(
        input_file,
        output_file,
        raw_key,
        passphrase,
        threads,
        max_argon_memory_mib,
        &OutSinkOptions::default(),
    )
 }
 pub fn decrypt_with_output_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: Option<S>,
    output_file: Option<S>,
    raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
    passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
    threads: usize,
    max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
    output_options: &OutSinkOptions,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    let mut reader = open_input(input_file)?.reader;
-    let header = Header::read(&mut reader)?;
+    let header = Header::read_with_argon_cap(&mut reader, max_argon_memory_mib)?;
    let aad = Arc::new(header.encode());
    let key = derive_key(&header.kdf, raw_key, passphrase)?;
    verify_key_commitment(&header, &key)?;
-    let chunk_sz = header.chunk_size as usize;
+    let chunk_sz = policy::validate_chunk_size(header.chunk_size)?;
-    let cipher_chunk = chunk_sz + TAG_LEN;
+    let cipher_chunk = policy::cipher_chunk_len(chunk_sz)?;
    let mut f_encrypted = AheadReader::from(reader, cipher_chunk);
-    let mut f_plain = OutSink::open(output_file)?;
+    let mut f_plain = OutSink::open_with_options(output_file, output_options)?;
    let aead = build_aead(&key);
@@ -207,7 +300,7 @@ pub fn decrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
        );
    }
-    let mut buf = vec![0u8; cipher_chunk];
+    let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; cipher_chunk]);
    let mut counter: u32 = 0;
    let mut bytes_written: u64 = 0;
@@ -215,18 +308,20 @@ pub fn decrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
        match f_encrypted.read_ahead(&mut buf)? {
            ReadInfoChunk::Normal(_) => {
                let nonce = make_nonce(&header.nonce_prefix, counter, false);
-                aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut buf)?;
+                aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
                f_plain.write_all(&buf)?;
-                bytes_written = bytes_written.saturating_add(buf.len() as u64);
+                bytes_written =
                    policy::checked_count_add(bytes_written, buf.len(), "bytes written")?;
                buf.resize(cipher_chunk, 0);
                counter = bump_counter(counter)?;
            }
            ReadInfoChunk::Last(n) => {
                buf.truncate(n);
                let nonce = make_nonce(&header.nonce_prefix, counter, true);
-                aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut buf)?;
+                aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
                f_plain.write_all(&buf)?;
-                bytes_written = bytes_written.saturating_add(buf.len() as u64);
+                bytes_written =
                    policy::checked_count_add(bytes_written, buf.len(), "bytes written")?;
                break;
            }
            ReadInfoChunk::Empty => {
@@ -253,6 +348,7 @@ pub fn decrypt<S: AsRef<str>>(
 /// whose header has `FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED` set, so we know exactly where
 /// each ciphertext chunk lives and which chunk is the last (its nonce uses
 /// the STREAM last-block flag).
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn decrypt_range<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: &str,
    output_file: Option<S>,
@@ -261,9 +357,56 @@ pub fn decrypt_range<S: AsRef<str>>(
    offset: u64,
    length: u64,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    decrypt_range_with_argon_cap(
        input_file,
        output_file,
        raw_key,
        passphrase,
        offset,
        length,
        policy::default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib(),
    )
 }
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn decrypt_range_with_argon_cap<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: &str,
    output_file: Option<S>,
    raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
    passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
    offset: u64,
    length: u64,
    max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    decrypt_range_with_output_options(
        input_file,
        output_file,
        raw_key,
        passphrase,
        offset,
        length,
        max_argon_memory_mib,
        &OutSinkOptions::default(),
    )
 }
 #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub fn decrypt_range_with_output_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
    input_file: &str,
    output_file: Option<S>,
    raw_key: Option<&SecretBytes32>,
    passphrase: Option<&SecretVec>,
    offset: u64,
    length: u64,
    max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
    output_options: &OutSinkOptions,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    if length == 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Format("--length 0 is not allowed".into()));
    }
    let file = File::open(input_file)?;
    let mut reader = BufReader::new(file);
-    let header = Header::read(&mut reader)?;
+    let header = Header::read_with_argon_cap(&mut reader, max_argon_memory_mib)?;
    let aad = header.encode();
    let header_len = aad.len() as u64;
@@ -283,10 +426,13 @@ pub fn decrypt_range<S: AsRef<str>>(
    }
    let key = derive_key(&header.kdf, raw_key, passphrase)?;
    verify_key_commitment(&header, &key)?;
    let aead = build_aead(&key);
-    let chunk_sz = header.chunk_size as u64;
+    let chunk_sz_usize = policy::validate_chunk_size(header.chunk_size)?;
-    let cipher_chunk = chunk_sz + TAG_LEN as u64;
+    let cipher_chunk_usize = policy::cipher_chunk_len(chunk_sz_usize)?;
    let chunk_sz = chunk_sz_usize as u64;
    let cipher_chunk = cipher_chunk_usize as u64;
    // Layout invariants:
    //   n_chunks = ceil(total / chunk_sz), but always ≥ 1 (the empty file
@@ -297,23 +443,21 @@ pub fn decrypt_range<S: AsRef<str>>(
        (1u64, 0u64)
    } else {
        let n = total.div_ceil(chunk_sz);
-        let last = total - (n - 1) * chunk_sz;
+        let before_last = policy::checked_mul_u64(n - 1, chunk_sz, "last chunk offset")?;
        let last = total
            .checked_sub(before_last)
            .ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("last chunk length underflow".into()))?;
        (n, last)
    };
    let last_idx = n_chunks - 1;
-    let mut out = OutSink::open(output_file)?;
+    let mut out = OutSink::open_with_options(output_file, output_options)?;
    if length == 0 {
        out.commit()?;
        return Ok(());
    }
    let start_chunk = offset / chunk_sz;
    let end_chunk = (end - 1) / chunk_sz;
    // Reusable buffer sized to a full chunk + tag.
-    let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(cipher_chunk as usize);
+    let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(Vec::with_capacity(cipher_chunk_usize));
    let mut file = reader.into_inner();
@@ -329,19 +473,23 @@ pub fn decrypt_range<S: AsRef<str>>(
        let cipher_len_usz =
            usize::try_from(cipher_len).map_err(|_| FcryError::Format("chunk too big".into()))?;
-        let chunk_offset = header_len + i * cipher_chunk;
+        let chunk_offset = policy::checked_add_u64(
            header_len,
            policy::checked_mul_u64(i, cipher_chunk, "ciphertext chunk offset")?,
            "ciphertext chunk offset",
        )?;
        file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(chunk_offset))?;
        buf.clear();
        buf.resize(cipher_len_usz, 0);
        file.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
        let nonce = make_nonce(&header.nonce_prefix, i_u32, is_last);
-        aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut buf)?;
+        aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, &aad, &mut *buf)?;
        // `buf` is now plaintext for this chunk. Compute the chunk's plaintext
        // window in absolute bytes and intersect with the requested range.
-        let chunk_start = i * chunk_sz;
+        let chunk_start = policy::checked_mul_u64(i, chunk_sz, "plaintext chunk offset")?;
-        let chunk_end = chunk_start + buf.len() as u64;
+        let chunk_end = policy::checked_count_add(chunk_start, buf.len(), "plaintext chunk end")?;
        let lo = offset.max(chunk_start) - chunk_start;
        let hi = end.min(chunk_end) - chunk_start;
        out.write_all(&buf[lo as usize..hi as usize])?;
@@ -375,6 +523,7 @@ mod tests {
            kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
            nonce_prefix,
            plaintext_length: None,
            key_commitment: None,
        };
        let aad = header.encode();
        // First byte after MAGIC is the version — verify our fixture really
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 use chacha20poly1305::aead;
 use std::io;
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ pub enum FcryError {
    Format(String),
    Kdf(String),
    Passphrase(String),
    WrongKey,
 }
 impl From<io::Error> for FcryError {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 //! On-disk file format for fcry.
 //!
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 //!   kdf_params        variable             (depends on kdf_id)
 //!   nonce_prefix      [u8; 19]         19  (STREAM nonce prefix)
 //!   plaintext_length  u64 LE           8   (only if version >= 2 and flags & 0x01)
 //!   key_commitment    [u8; 32]         32  (only if version >= 3 and flags & 0x02)
 //!   --- end of header ---
 //!   chunk[0..N]                            each chunk_size + 16 bytes,
 //!                                          last may be shorter
@@ -28,13 +29,16 @@
 //! * v2 — adds `FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED` (bit 0); when set, the total plaintext
 //!   length is appended after `nonce_prefix`. This enables random-access
 //!   decryption without scanning predecessors.
 //! * v3 — adds `FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED` (bit 1) and an authenticated key
 //!   commitment for fast wrong-key detection before chunk processing.
 use std::io::Read;
 use crate::error::FcryError;
 use crate::policy;
 const MAGIC: [u8; 4] = *b"fcry";
-pub const VERSION_CURRENT: u8 = 2;
+pub const VERSION_CURRENT: u8 = 3;
 const VERSION_MIN: u8 = 1;
 pub const NONCE_PREFIX_LEN: usize = 19;
@@ -43,9 +47,11 @@ pub const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
 /// Set in `flags` when the header carries an authenticated `plaintext_length`
 /// field. Required for random-access decryption.
 pub const FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED: u8 = 0x01;
 pub const FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED: u8 = 0x02;
 /// Mask of all flag bits this build understands. Unknown bits → reject.
-const FLAG_KNOWN_MASK: u8 = FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED;
+const FLAG_KNOWN_MASK: u8 = FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED;
 pub const KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN: usize = 32;
 #[repr(u8)]
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -142,11 +148,13 @@ pub struct Header {
    pub nonce_prefix: [u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
    /// Total plaintext byte count. `Some` iff `flags & FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED`.
    pub plaintext_length: Option<u64>,
    /// v3 key commitment. `Some` iff `flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED`.
    pub key_commitment: Option<[u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]>,
 }
 impl Header {
-    pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+    fn encode_without_commitment(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(72);
+        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(104);
        out.extend_from_slice(&MAGIC);
        out.push(self.version);
        out.push(self.alg as u8);
@@ -165,7 +173,30 @@ impl Header {
        out
    }
    pub fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut out = self.encode_without_commitment();
        if (self.flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) != 0 {
            let commitment = self
                .key_commitment
                .expect("FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED set but key_commitment is None");
            out.extend_from_slice(&commitment);
        }
        out
    }
    pub fn commitment_input_encoding(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
        self.encode_without_commitment()
    }
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    pub fn read(r: &mut impl Read) -> Result<Self, FcryError> {
        Self::read_with_argon_cap(r, policy::default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib())
    }
    pub fn read_with_argon_cap(
        r: &mut impl Read,
        max_argon_memory_mib: u32,
    ) -> Result<Self, FcryError> {
        let mut magic = [0u8; 4];
        r.read_exact(&mut magic)?;
        if magic != MAGIC {
@@ -189,18 +220,25 @@ impl Header {
        if version < 2 && flags != 0 {
            return Err(FcryError::Format("v1 header must have flags == 0".into()));
        }
        if version < 3 && (flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) != 0 {
            return Err(FcryError::Format(
                "key commitment flag requires v3 header".into(),
            ));
        }
        if version >= 3 && (flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) == 0 {
            return Err(FcryError::Format("v3 header must commit the key".into()));
        }
        let alg = AlgId::from_u8(alg_id)?;
        let mut chunk_size_bytes = [0u8; 4];
        r.read_exact(&mut chunk_size_bytes)?;
        let chunk_size = u32::from_le_bytes(chunk_size_bytes);
-        if chunk_size == 0 {
+        policy::validate_chunk_size(chunk_size)?;
            return Err(FcryError::Format("chunk_size must be > 0".into()));
        }
        let mut kdf_id = [0u8; 1];
        r.read_exact(&mut kdf_id)?;
        let kdf = KdfParams::read_from(kdf_id[0], r)?;
        policy::validate_header_kdf(&kdf, max_argon_memory_mib)?;
        let mut nonce_prefix = [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN];
        r.read_exact(&mut nonce_prefix)?;
@@ -213,6 +251,14 @@ impl Header {
            None
        };
        let key_commitment = if (flags & FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED) != 0 {
            let mut b = [0u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN];
            r.read_exact(&mut b)?;
            Some(b)
        } else {
            None
        };
        Ok(Self {
            version,
            alg,
@@ -221,6 +267,7 @@ impl Header {
            kdf,
            nonce_prefix,
            plaintext_length,
            key_commitment,
        })
    }
 }
@@ -235,11 +282,12 @@ mod tests {
        let h = Header {
            version: VERSION_CURRENT,
            alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
-            flags: 0,
+            flags: FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED,
            chunk_size: 1024 * 1024,
            kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
            nonce_prefix: [7u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
            plaintext_length: None,
            key_commitment: Some([1u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
        };
        let bytes = h.encode();
        let mut cur = Cursor::new(&bytes);
@@ -250,6 +298,7 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(parsed.chunk_size, h.chunk_size);
        assert_eq!(parsed.nonce_prefix, h.nonce_prefix);
        assert_eq!(parsed.plaintext_length, None);
        assert_eq!(parsed.key_commitment, h.key_commitment);
        assert_eq!(cur.position() as usize, bytes.len());
    }
@@ -258,20 +307,49 @@ mod tests {
        let h = Header {
            version: VERSION_CURRENT,
            alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
-            flags: FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED,
+            flags: FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED,
            chunk_size: 65536,
            kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
            nonce_prefix: [9u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
            plaintext_length: Some(123_456_789),
            key_commitment: Some([2u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
        };
        let bytes = h.encode();
        let mut cur = Cursor::new(&bytes);
        let parsed = Header::read(&mut cur).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(parsed.flags, FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED);
+        assert_eq!(parsed.flags, FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED);
        assert_eq!(parsed.plaintext_length, Some(123_456_789));
        assert_eq!(parsed.key_commitment, h.key_commitment);
        assert_eq!(cur.position() as usize, bytes.len());
    }
    #[test]
    fn v3_encoding_layout_stable() {
        let h = Header {
            version: VERSION_CURRENT,
            alg: AlgId::XChaCha20Poly1305,
            flags: FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED | FLAG_KEY_COMMITTED,
            chunk_size: 0x0102_0304,
            kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
            nonce_prefix: [0x55u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
            plaintext_length: Some(0x0807_0605_0403_0201),
            key_commitment: Some([0xaau8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
        };
        let commitment_input = h.commitment_input_encoding();
        assert_eq!(commitment_input.len(), 40);
        assert_eq!(&commitment_input[..4], b"fcry");
        assert_eq!(commitment_input[4], 3);
        assert_eq!(
            &commitment_input[32..40],
            &0x0807_0605_0403_0201u64.to_le_bytes()
        );
        let aad = h.encode();
        assert_eq!(aad.len(), 72);
        assert_eq!(&aad[..40], &commitment_input);
        assert_eq!(&aad[40..], &[0xaau8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]);
    }
    #[test]
    fn rejects_bad_magic() {
        let mut bytes = Header {
@@ -282,6 +360,7 @@ mod tests {
            kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
            nonce_prefix: [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
            plaintext_length: None,
            key_commitment: Some([3u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
        }
        .encode();
        bytes[0] ^= 1;
@@ -301,6 +380,7 @@ mod tests {
            kdf: KdfParams::Raw,
            nonce_prefix: [0u8; NONCE_PREFIX_LEN],
            plaintext_length: None,
            key_commitment: Some([4u8; KEY_COMMITMENT_LEN]),
        }
        .encode();
        // flags byte is at offset 6 (4 magic + version + alg)
@@ -328,6 +408,7 @@ mod tests {
        assert_eq!(parsed.flags, 0);
        assert_eq!(parsed.chunk_size, 1024);
        assert_eq!(parsed.plaintext_length, None);
        assert_eq!(parsed.key_commitment, None);
        // Re-encoding must reproduce the original v1 bytes exactly so the
        // recomputed AAD matches what the file was authenticated with.
        assert_eq!(parsed.encode(), bytes);
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 mod crypto;
 mod error;
 mod header;
 mod pipeline;
 mod policy;
 mod reader;
 mod secrets;
 mod utils;
@@ -12,9 +13,13 @@ use crypto::*;
 use error::FcryError;
 use header::{ARGON2_SALT_LEN, KdfParams};
 use secrets::{SecretBytes32, SecretVec, read_passphrase_tty};
-use utils::DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE;
+use utils::{DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE, OutSinkOptions};
 use clap::Parser;
 use std::fs::File;
 use std::io::Read;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
 use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 /// fcry - [f]ile[cry]pt: A file en-/decryption tool for easy use
@@ -34,13 +39,11 @@ struct Cli {
    #[clap(short, long)]
    output_file: Option<String>,
-    /// The raw bytes of the crypto key. Has to be exactly 32 bytes.
+    /// Read the raw 32-byte crypto key from a file.
-    /// *** DANGEROUS: visible in process listings (ps/proc). Testing only. ***
+    #[clap(short = 'k', long, conflicts_with_all = ["passphrase", "passphrase_env"])]
-    #[clap(short, long, conflicts_with_all = ["passphrase", "passphrase_env"])]
+    key_file: Option<PathBuf>,
    raw_key: Option<Zeroizing<String>>,
    /// Read passphrase interactively (terminal). Implies argon2id KDF on encrypt.
    /// This is the default when no key source is specified.
    #[clap(short, long)]
    passphrase: bool,
@@ -54,22 +57,43 @@ struct Cli {
    chunk_size: u32,
    /// Argon2id memory in MiB (encryption only). Default: 1024 (= 1 GiB).
-    #[clap(long, default_value_t = 1024)]
+    #[clap(long, default_value_t = policy::DEFAULT_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB)]
    argon_memory: u32,
    /// Argon2id passes / iterations (encryption only).
-    #[clap(long, default_value_t = 2)]
+    #[clap(long, default_value_t = policy::MIN_ARGON_PASSES)]
    argon_passes: u32,
    /// Argon2id parallelism / lanes (encryption only).
-    #[clap(long, default_value_t = 4)]
+    #[clap(long, default_value_t = policy::DEFAULT_ARGON_PARALLELISM)]
    argon_parallelism: u32,
    /// Permit intentionally weak passphrase/KDF parameters for tests or legacy interop.
    #[clap(long)]
    allow_weak_kdf: bool,
    /// Maximum Argon2id memory accepted while decrypting, in MiB.
    /// Overrides the dynamic default. Raising it can OOM constrained machines.
    #[clap(long)]
    max_argon_memory_mib: Option<u32>,
    /// Number of worker threads for AEAD work. Defaults to the number of
    /// available CPUs. Set to 1 for fully serial encrypt/decrypt.
    #[clap(short = 'j', long, value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..))]
    threads: Option<u32>,
    /// Replace an existing different output file after encryption/decryption succeeds.
    #[clap(long)]
    force: bool,
    /// Directory for private temporary files.
    #[clap(long)]
    temp_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
    /// For decrypt-to-stdout, verify the whole plaintext in a private temp file before emitting it.
    #[clap(long, requires = "decrypt")]
    buffer_verify: bool,
    /// Random-access decrypt: byte offset of the slice to read.
    /// Requires `--decrypt`, an `--input-file` whose header has the
    /// length-committed flag set, and `--length`.
@@ -92,25 +116,76 @@ struct Cli {
    length: Option<u64>,
 }
-fn parse_raw_key(s: &str) -> Result<SecretBytes32, FcryError> {
+fn read_key_file(path: &Path) -> Result<SecretBytes32, FcryError> {
-    let raw = s.as_bytes();
+    warn_if_key_file_world_readable(path);
-    if raw.len() != 32 {
+    let mut file = File::open(path)?;
    let mut buf = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 33]);
    let mut n = 0usize;
    while n < buf.len() {
        match file.read(&mut buf[n..]) {
            Ok(0) => break,
            Ok(read) => n += read,
            Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
            Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
        }
    }
    if n < 32 {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
-            "raw_key must be exactly 32 bytes, got {}",
+            "key file {} is too short: expected exactly 32 bytes, got {n}",
-            raw.len()
+            path.display()
        )));
    }
    if n > 32 {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
            "key file {} is too long: expected exactly 32 bytes; possible trailing newline",
            path.display()
        )));
    }
    let mut extra = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 1]);
    if file.read(&mut *extra)? != 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
            "key file {} is too long: expected exactly 32 bytes; possible trailing newline",
            path.display()
        )));
    }
    let mut key = SecretBytes32::zeroed();
-    key.with_mut_array(|key| key.copy_from_slice(raw));
+    key.with_mut_array(|key| key.copy_from_slice(&buf[..32]));
    Ok(key)
 }
 #[cfg(unix)]
 fn warn_if_key_file_world_readable(path: &Path) {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::metadata(path) {
        let mode = meta.permissions().mode();
        if (mode & 0o077) != 0 {
            eprintln!(
                "Warning: key file {} is group/world accessible; consider chmod 600",
                path.display()
            );
        }
    }
 }
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 fn warn_if_key_file_world_readable(_path: &Path) {}
 /// Source of a passphrase: either the terminal or a named env var.
 enum PassphraseSource {
    Tty,
    EnvVar(String),
 }
 fn normalize_passphrase(pw: SecretVec) -> Result<SecretVec, FcryError> {
    let normalized = pw.with_slice(|bytes| {
        let s = std::str::from_utf8(bytes).map_err(|_| {
            FcryError::Passphrase("passphrase must be valid UTF-8 after normalization".into())
        })?;
        Ok::<Zeroizing<String>, FcryError>(Zeroizing::new(s.nfc().collect::<String>()))
    })?;
    Ok(SecretVec::from_vec(normalized.as_bytes().to_vec()))
 }
 fn read_passphrase(src: &PassphraseSource, confirm: bool) -> Result<SecretVec, FcryError> {
    match src {
        PassphraseSource::EnvVar(var) => {
@@ -118,17 +193,22 @@ fn read_passphrase(src: &PassphraseSource, confirm: bool) -> Result<SecretVec, F
            // protected storage. The source Vec is zeroed after the copy.
            // Note: a copy still exists in the process `environ` table; that is
            // a known and accepted leak for the env-var path.
-            let v = std::env::var(var).map_err(|_| {
+            let v = Zeroizing::new(std::env::var(var).map_err(|_| {
                FcryError::Passphrase(format!("environment variable {var} not set or not unicode"))
-            })?;
+            })?);
-            Ok(SecretVec::from_vec(v.into_bytes()))
+            let normalized = Zeroizing::new(v.as_str().nfc().collect::<String>());
            Ok(SecretVec::from_vec(normalized.as_bytes().to_vec()))
        }
        PassphraseSource::Tty => {
-            let pw = read_passphrase_tty("Passphrase: ")
+            let pw = normalize_passphrase(
-                .map_err(|e| FcryError::Passphrase(e.to_string()))?;
+                read_passphrase_tty("Passphrase: ")
                    .map_err(|e| FcryError::Passphrase(e.to_string()))?,
            )?;
            if confirm {
-                let pw2 = read_passphrase_tty("Confirm passphrase: ")
+                let pw2 = normalize_passphrase(
-                    .map_err(|e| FcryError::Passphrase(e.to_string()))?;
+                    read_passphrase_tty("Confirm passphrase: ")
                        .map_err(|e| FcryError::Passphrase(e.to_string()))?,
                )?;
                if pw != pw2 {
                    return Err(FcryError::Passphrase("passphrases do not match".into()));
                }
@@ -156,16 +236,11 @@ fn disable_core_dumps() {
 fn run(mut cli: Cli) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    // Move the secret-bearing fields out of `Cli` immediately so they don't
    // sit in the parsed struct for the rest of the function.
-    let raw_key_str: Option<Zeroizing<String>> = cli.raw_key.take();
+    let key_file: Option<PathBuf> = cli.key_file.take();
    let pw_src: Option<PassphraseSource> = if cli.passphrase {
        Some(PassphraseSource::Tty)
    } else if let Some(var) = cli.passphrase_env.take() {
        Some(PassphraseSource::EnvVar(var))
    } else if raw_key_str.is_none() {
        // Default to interactive TTY passphrase when no key source is given.
        Some(PassphraseSource::Tty)
    } else {
-        None
+        cli.passphrase_env.take().map(PassphraseSource::EnvVar)
    };
    let decrypt_mode = cli.decrypt;
@@ -175,18 +250,54 @@ fn run(mut cli: Cli) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    let argon_memory = cli.argon_memory;
    let argon_passes = cli.argon_passes;
    let argon_parallelism = cli.argon_parallelism;
-    let threads = cli.threads.map(|n| n as usize).unwrap_or_else(|| {
+    let allow_weak_kdf = cli.allow_weak_kdf;
-        std::thread::available_parallelism()
+    let argon_cap = policy::resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(cli.max_argon_memory_mib)?;
-            .map(|n| n.get())
+    if argon_cap.overridden && argon_cap.effective_mib > argon_cap.default_mib {
-            .unwrap_or(1)
+        eprintln!(
-    });
+            "Warning: --max-argon-memory-mib raises the Argon2 decrypt trust ceiling from {} MiB to {} MiB; this can OOM constrained machines",
            argon_cap.default_mib, argon_cap.effective_mib
        );
    }
    let (threads, thread_warning) = policy::normalize_worker_threads(cli.threads);
    if let Some(requested) = thread_warning {
        eprintln!(
            "Warning: requested {requested} worker threads; capped at {}",
            policy::MAX_WORKER_THREADS
        );
    }
    let force = cli.force;
    let temp_dir = cli.temp_dir.take();
    let buffer_verify = cli.buffer_verify;
    let offset = cli.offset;
    let length = cli.length;
    drop(cli);
    if pw_src.is_none() && key_file.is_none() {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(
            "must provide one of --key-file, --passphrase, --passphrase-env".into(),
        ));
    }
    if buffer_verify && !decrypt_mode {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(
            "--buffer-verify is only valid for decrypt".into(),
        ));
    }
    if buffer_verify && output.is_some() {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(
            "--buffer-verify is only meaningful when decrypting to stdout".into(),
        ));
    }
    let output_options = OutSinkOptions {
        force,
        input_file: input.as_ref().map(PathBuf::from),
        temp_dir,
        buffer_verify_stdout: buffer_verify,
    };
    if decrypt_mode {
-        let raw_key = match raw_key_str.as_deref() {
+        let raw_key = match key_file.as_deref() {
-            Some(s) => Some(parse_raw_key(s)?),
+            Some(path) => Some(read_key_file(path)?),
            None => None,
        };
        let pw = match &pw_src {
@@ -202,10 +313,27 @@ fn run(mut cli: Cli) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
                        "--offset/--length require --input-file (random-access needs a seekable file)".into(),
                    )
                })?;
-                decrypt_range(path, output, raw_key.as_ref(), pw.as_ref(), o, l)?;
+                decrypt_range_with_output_options(
                    path,
                    output,
                    raw_key.as_ref(),
                    pw.as_ref(),
                    o,
                    l,
                    argon_cap.effective_mib,
                    &output_options,
                )?;
            }
            (None, None) => {
-                decrypt(input, output, raw_key.as_ref(), pw.as_ref(), threads)?;
+                decrypt_with_output_options(
                    input,
                    output,
                    raw_key.as_ref(),
                    pw.as_ref(),
                    threads,
                    argon_cap.effective_mib,
                    &output_options,
                )?;
            }
            _ => {
                return Err(FcryError::Format(
@@ -217,9 +345,12 @@ fn run(mut cli: Cli) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
        let (key, kdf) = if let Some(src) = &pw_src {
            let mut salt = [0u8; ARGON2_SALT_LEN];
            getrandom::fill(&mut salt)?;
-            let m_cost_kib = argon_memory.checked_mul(1024).ok_or_else(|| {
+            let m_cost_kib = policy::validate_new_argon_params(
-                FcryError::Format("argon-memory too large (overflow when converting to KiB)".into())
+                argon_memory,
-            })?;
+                argon_passes,
                argon_parallelism,
                allow_weak_kdf,
            )?;
            let kdf = KdfParams::Argon2id {
                salt,
                m_cost: m_cost_kib,
@@ -227,13 +358,22 @@ fn run(mut cli: Cli) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
                p_cost: argon_parallelism,
            };
            let pw = read_passphrase(src, true)?;
            policy::validate_new_passphrase(&pw, allow_weak_kdf)?;
            let key = derive_key(&kdf, None, Some(&pw))?;
            (key, kdf)
        } else {
-            let key = parse_raw_key(raw_key_str.as_deref().unwrap())?;
+            let key = read_key_file(key_file.as_deref().unwrap())?;
            (key, KdfParams::Raw)
        };
-        encrypt(input, output, &key, chunk_size, kdf, threads)?;
+        encrypt_with_output_options(
            input,
            output,
            &key,
            chunk_size,
            kdf,
            threads,
            &output_options,
        )?;
    }
    Ok(())
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 //! Multi-threaded encrypt/decrypt pipeline.
 //!
@@ -42,31 +42,33 @@ use crossbeam_channel::{Receiver, RecvTimeoutError, Sender, bounded};
 use crate::crypto::{bump_counter, make_nonce};
 use crate::error::FcryError;
 use crate::header::NONCE_PREFIX_LEN;
 use crate::policy;
 use crate::reader::{AheadReader, ReadInfoChunk};
 use crate::utils::OutSink;
 use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 struct Job {
    counter: u32,
    last: bool,
-    buf: Vec<u8>,
+    buf: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
 }
 struct Done {
    counter: u32,
-    buf: Vec<u8>,
+    buf: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
 }
 /// Job-channel capacity: small multiples of worker count, enough to keep
 /// workers fed without unbounded memory.
-fn channel_capacity(threads: usize) -> usize {
+fn channel_capacity(threads: usize, in_flight: usize) -> usize {
-    (threads * 2).max(2)
+    policy::pipeline_channel_capacity(threads, in_flight)
 }
 /// Total in-flight chunk cap (jobs queued + at workers + in writer's reorder
 /// buffer). Permit count; bounded above the job-channel capacity to absorb
 /// reordering without blocking workers unnecessarily.
-fn in_flight_capacity(threads: usize) -> usize {
+fn in_flight_capacity(threads: usize, chunk_len: usize) -> usize {
-    (threads * 4).max(4)
+    policy::pipeline_in_flight_capacity(threads, chunk_len)
 }
 #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
@@ -152,8 +154,8 @@ fn run_pipeline(
    threads: usize,
    is_encrypt: bool,
 ) -> Result<(OutSink, u64), FcryError> {
-    let cap = channel_capacity(threads);
+    let in_flight = in_flight_capacity(threads, chunk_sz);
-    let in_flight = in_flight_capacity(threads);
+    let cap = channel_capacity(threads, in_flight);
    let (jobs_tx, jobs_rx) = bounded::<Job>(cap);
    let (done_tx, done_rx) = bounded::<Done>(cap);
@@ -193,7 +195,7 @@ fn run_pipeline(
                        Err(RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => return Ok(bytes_seen),
                    }
                }
-                let mut buf = vec![0u8; chunk_sz];
+                let mut buf = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; chunk_sz]);
                match input.read_ahead(&mut buf)? {
                    ReadInfoChunk::Normal(_) => {
                        if jobs_tx
@@ -206,7 +208,7 @@ fn run_pipeline(
                        {
                            return Ok(bytes_seen);
                        }
-                        bytes_seen = bytes_seen.saturating_add(chunk_sz as u64);
+                        bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, chunk_sz, "bytes read")?;
                        counter = bump_counter(counter)?;
                    }
                    ReadInfoChunk::Last(n) => {
@@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ fn run_pipeline(
                            last: true,
                            buf,
                        });
-                        bytes_seen = bytes_seen.saturating_add(n as u64);
+                        bytes_seen = policy::checked_count_add(bytes_seen, n, "bytes read")?;
                        return Ok(bytes_seen);
                    }
                    ReadInfoChunk::Empty => {
@@ -261,9 +263,9 @@ fn run_pipeline(
                }
                let nonce = make_nonce(&nonce_prefix, job.counter, job.last);
                let res = if is_encrypt {
-                    aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, aad.as_slice(), &mut job.buf)
+                    aead.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, aad.as_slice(), &mut *job.buf)
                } else {
-                    aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, aad.as_slice(), &mut job.buf)
+                    aead.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, aad.as_slice(), &mut *job.buf)
                };
                if let Err(e) = res {
                    cancel.store(true, Ordering::Release);
@@ -343,13 +345,13 @@ fn ordered_writer(
    permit_tx: Sender<()>,
 ) -> Result<(OutSink, u64), FcryError> {
    let mut next: u32 = 0;
-    let mut pending: BTreeMap<u32, Vec<u8>> = BTreeMap::new();
+    let mut pending: BTreeMap<u32, Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>> = BTreeMap::new();
    let mut total: u64 = 0;
    for done in done_rx.iter() {
        pending.insert(done.counter, done.buf);
        while let Some(buf) = pending.remove(&next) {
            output.write_all(&buf)?;
-            total = total.saturating_add(buf.len() as u64);
+            total = policy::checked_count_add(total, buf.len(), "bytes written")?;
            // `bump_counter` rejects overflow upstream; a wrap here would be
            // a real bug, so use plain addition and let it panic in debug.
            next += 1;
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 //! Central resource and format policy.
 use std::fs;
 use crate::error::FcryError;
 use crate::header::{KdfParams, TAG_LEN};
 use crate::secrets::SecretVec;
 pub const MAX_CHUNK_SIZE: u32 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
 pub const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: u32 = 1024 * 1024;
 pub const DEFAULT_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB: u32 = 1024;
 pub const MIN_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB: u32 = 64;
 pub const DEFAULT_ARGON_DECRYPT_CAP_MIB: u32 = 4096;
 pub const MIN_ARGON_PASSES: u32 = 2;
 pub const MAX_ARGON_PASSES: u32 = 64;
 pub const DEFAULT_ARGON_PARALLELISM: u32 = 4;
 pub const MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM: u32 = 64;
 pub const MIN_PASSPHRASE_BYTES: usize = 12;
 pub const MAX_WORKER_THREADS: usize = 256;
 pub const PIPELINE_IN_FLIGHT_BYTES: usize = 128 * 1024 * 1024;
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct ArgonDecryptCap {
    pub default_mib: u32,
    pub effective_mib: u32,
    pub overridden: bool,
 }
 pub fn architecture_argon_cap_mib() -> u32 {
    let usize_cap_mib = usize::MAX / 1024 / 1024;
    let argon_m_cost_cap_mib = (u32::MAX / 1024) as usize;
    usize_cap_mib
        .min(argon_m_cost_cap_mib)
        .min(u32::MAX as usize) as u32
 }
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 fn available_memory_mib() -> Option<u32> {
    let meminfo = fs::read_to_string("/proc/meminfo").ok()?;
    for line in meminfo.lines() {
        let Some(rest) = line.strip_prefix("MemAvailable:") else {
            continue;
        };
        let kib = rest.split_whitespace().next()?.parse::<u64>().ok()?;
        return u32::try_from(kib / 1024).ok();
    }
    None
 }
 #[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
 fn available_memory_mib() -> Option<u32> {
    None
 }
 pub fn default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib() -> u32 {
    let mut cap = DEFAULT_ARGON_DECRYPT_CAP_MIB.min(architecture_argon_cap_mib());
    if let Some(available) = available_memory_mib() {
        cap = cap.min(available);
    }
    cap.max(1)
 }
 pub fn resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(override_mib: Option<u32>) -> Result<ArgonDecryptCap, FcryError> {
    let default_mib = default_argon_decrypt_cap_mib();
    let Some(effective_mib) = override_mib else {
        return Ok(ArgonDecryptCap {
            default_mib,
            effective_mib: default_mib,
            overridden: false,
        });
    };
    if effective_mib == 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(
            "--max-argon-memory-mib must be at least 1".into(),
        ));
    }
    let arch = architecture_argon_cap_mib();
    if effective_mib > arch {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
            "--max-argon-memory-mib {effective_mib} exceeds this build's supported cap {arch}"
        )));
    }
    Ok(ArgonDecryptCap {
        default_mib,
        effective_mib,
        overridden: true,
    })
 }
 pub fn mib_to_kib(mib: u32, name: &str) -> Result<u32, FcryError> {
    mib.checked_mul(1024).ok_or_else(|| {
        FcryError::Format(format!("{name} too large (overflow converting MiB to KiB)"))
    })
 }
 pub fn validate_chunk_size(chunk_size: u32) -> Result<usize, FcryError> {
    if chunk_size == 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Format("chunk_size must be > 0".into()));
    }
    if chunk_size > MAX_CHUNK_SIZE {
        return Err(FcryError::Format(format!(
            "chunk_size {chunk_size} exceeds maximum {MAX_CHUNK_SIZE}"
        )));
    }
    usize::try_from(chunk_size)
        .map_err(|_| FcryError::Format("chunk_size does not fit in usize".into()))
 }
 pub fn cipher_chunk_len(plain_chunk_len: usize) -> Result<usize, FcryError> {
    plain_chunk_len
        .checked_add(TAG_LEN)
        .ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format("cipher chunk length overflow".into()))
 }
 pub fn validate_new_argon_params(
    memory_mib: u32,
    passes: u32,
    parallelism: u32,
    allow_weak_kdf: bool,
 ) -> Result<u32, FcryError> {
    if !allow_weak_kdf && memory_mib < MIN_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-memory must be at least {MIN_ARGON_MEMORY_MIB} MiB for new encryption (use --allow-weak-kdf only for tests/legacy interop)"
        )));
    }
    if !allow_weak_kdf && passes < MIN_ARGON_PASSES {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-passes must be at least {MIN_ARGON_PASSES} for new encryption (use --allow-weak-kdf only for tests/legacy interop)"
        )));
    }
    validate_argon_common(memory_mib, passes, parallelism, "new encryption")?;
    mib_to_kib(memory_mib, "argon-memory")
 }
 pub fn validate_new_passphrase(pw: &SecretVec, allow_weak_kdf: bool) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    let len = pw.len();
    if len == 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Passphrase("passphrase must not be empty".into()));
    }
    if !allow_weak_kdf && len < MIN_PASSPHRASE_BYTES {
        return Err(FcryError::Passphrase(format!(
            "passphrase must be at least {MIN_PASSPHRASE_BYTES} UTF-8 bytes for new encryption (use --allow-weak-kdf only for tests/legacy interop)"
        )));
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 pub fn validate_header_kdf(kdf: &KdfParams, max_argon_memory_mib: u32) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    match kdf {
        KdfParams::Raw => Ok(()),
        KdfParams::Argon2id {
            m_cost,
            t_cost,
            p_cost,
            ..
        } => {
            let cap_kib = mib_to_kib(max_argon_memory_mib, "max argon memory")?;
            if *m_cost == 0 {
                return Err(FcryError::Format("argon2id memory cost must be > 0".into()));
            }
            if *t_cost == 0 {
                return Err(FcryError::Format("argon2id passes must be > 0".into()));
            }
            if *p_cost == 0 {
                return Err(FcryError::Format("argon2id parallelism must be > 0".into()));
            }
            if *m_cost > cap_kib {
                return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
                    "argon2id memory cost {} KiB exceeds configured decrypt cap {} MiB",
                    *m_cost, max_argon_memory_mib
                )));
            }
            if *t_cost > MAX_ARGON_PASSES {
                return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
                    "argon2id passes {} exceeds maximum {}",
                    *t_cost, MAX_ARGON_PASSES
                )));
            }
            if *p_cost > MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM {
                return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
                    "argon2id parallelism {} exceeds maximum {}",
                    *p_cost, MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM
                )));
            }
            Ok(())
        }
    }
 }
 pub fn validate_argon_common(
    memory_mib: u32,
    passes: u32,
    parallelism: u32,
    context: &str,
 ) -> Result<(), FcryError> {
    if memory_mib == 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-memory must be > 0 for {context}"
        )));
    }
    if passes == 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-passes must be > 0 for {context}"
        )));
    }
    if passes > MAX_ARGON_PASSES {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-passes {passes} exceeds maximum {MAX_ARGON_PASSES}"
        )));
    }
    if parallelism == 0 {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-parallelism must be > 0 for {context}"
        )));
    }
    if parallelism > MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-parallelism {parallelism} exceeds maximum {MAX_ARGON_PARALLELISM}"
        )));
    }
    if memory_mib > architecture_argon_cap_mib() {
        return Err(FcryError::Kdf(format!(
            "argon-memory {memory_mib} exceeds this build's supported cap {}",
            architecture_argon_cap_mib()
        )));
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 pub fn normalize_worker_threads(requested: Option<u32>) -> (usize, Option<u32>) {
    let requested = requested.map(|n| n as usize).unwrap_or_else(|| {
        std::thread::available_parallelism()
            .map(|n| n.get())
            .unwrap_or(1)
    });
    let capped = requested.clamp(1, MAX_WORKER_THREADS);
    let warning = (requested > MAX_WORKER_THREADS).then_some(requested as u32);
    (capped, warning)
 }
 pub fn pipeline_in_flight_capacity(threads: usize, chunk_len: usize) -> usize {
    let chunk_len = chunk_len.max(1);
    let thread_cap = threads.saturating_mul(4).max(1);
    let byte_cap = (PIPELINE_IN_FLIGHT_BYTES / chunk_len).max(1);
    thread_cap.min(byte_cap)
 }
 pub fn pipeline_channel_capacity(threads: usize, in_flight: usize) -> usize {
    threads.saturating_mul(2).max(1).min(in_flight.max(1))
 }
 pub fn checked_add_u64(a: u64, b: u64, what: &str) -> Result<u64, FcryError> {
    a.checked_add(b)
        .ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format(format!("{what} overflow")))
 }
 pub fn checked_mul_u64(a: u64, b: u64, what: &str) -> Result<u64, FcryError> {
    a.checked_mul(b)
        .ok_or_else(|| FcryError::Format(format!("{what} overflow")))
 }
 pub fn checked_count_add(total: u64, delta: usize, what: &str) -> Result<u64, FcryError> {
    checked_add_u64(total, delta as u64, what)
 }
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
    #[test]
    fn chunk_size_bounds() {
        assert!(validate_chunk_size(1).is_ok());
        assert!(validate_chunk_size(MAX_CHUNK_SIZE).is_ok());
        assert!(validate_chunk_size(0).is_err());
        assert!(validate_chunk_size(MAX_CHUNK_SIZE + 1).is_err());
    }
    #[test]
    fn argon_cap_override_replaces_default() {
        let down = resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(Some(1)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(down.effective_mib, 1);
        assert!(down.overridden);
        let default = resolve_argon_decrypt_cap(None).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(default.effective_mib, default.default_mib);
        assert!(!default.overridden);
    }
    #[test]
    fn pipeline_capacity_has_one_chunk_minimum() {
        assert_eq!(
            pipeline_in_flight_capacity(4, PIPELINE_IN_FLIGHT_BYTES * 2),
            1
        );
    }
 }
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 use std::io;
 use std::io::{BufRead, Read};
 use zeroize::Zeroizing;
 pub enum ReadInfoChunk {
    Normal(#[allow(dead_code)] usize),
@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ pub enum ReadInfoChunk {
 pub struct AheadReader {
    inner: Box<dyn BufRead + Send>,
-    buf: Vec<u8>,
+    buf: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
    bufsz: usize,
    capacity: usize,
 }
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ impl AheadReader {
    pub fn from(reader: Box<dyn BufRead + Send>, capacity: usize) -> Self {
        Self {
            inner: reader,
-            buf: vec![0; capacity],
+            buf: Zeroizing::new(vec![0; capacity]),
            bufsz: 0,
            capacity,
        }
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ impl AheadReader {
        }
        // 2nd read directly into our internal buf
-        let mut tmp = vec![0u8; self.capacity];
+        let mut tmp = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; self.capacity]);
        let n2 = self.read_until_full(&mut tmp)?;
        self.buf = tmp;
        self.bufsz = n2;
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ impl AheadReader {
        let userbuf_sz = self.bufsz;
        // 2nd read directly into our internal buf
-        let mut tmp = vec![0u8; self.capacity];
+        let mut tmp = Zeroizing::new(vec![0u8; self.capacity]);
        let n2 = self.read_until_full(&mut tmp)?;
        self.buf = tmp;
        self.bufsz = n2;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 //! Secret-handling primitives.
 //!
@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@ impl SecretVec {
        let inner = self.inner.borrow();
        f(&inner[..self.len])
    }
    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
        self.len
    }
 }
 impl PartialEq for SecretVec {
@@ -192,13 +196,15 @@ mod imp {
 mod imp {
    use super::{MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN, SecretVec};
    use std::fs::OpenOptions;
-    use std::io::{self, Read, Write};
+    use std::io::{self, Write};
    use std::os::windows::io::AsRawHandle;
    use std::ptr;
    use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::HANDLE;
    use windows_sys::Win32::System::Console::{
-        ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT, ENABLE_LINE_INPUT, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT, GetConsoleMode,
+        ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT, ENABLE_LINE_INPUT, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT, GetConsoleMode, ReadConsoleW,
        SetConsoleMode,
    };
    use zeroize::Zeroizing;
    struct ConsoleModeGuard {
        handle: HANDLE,
@@ -214,7 +220,7 @@ mod imp {
    }
    pub fn read_passphrase_tty(prompt: &str) -> io::Result<SecretVec> {
-        let mut tty_in = OpenOptions::new().read(true).write(true).open("CONIN$")?;
+        let tty_in = OpenOptions::new().read(true).write(true).open("CONIN$")?;
        let mut tty_out = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open("CONOUT$")?;
        let h_in = tty_in.as_raw_handle() as HANDLE;
@@ -236,18 +242,38 @@ mod imp {
        write!(tty_out, "{prompt}")?;
        tty_out.flush()?;
-        let mut buf = SecretVec::with_capacity(MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
+        let mut wide = Zeroizing::new(Vec::<u16>::with_capacity(MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN));
        let mut byte = [0u8; 1];
        loop {
-            match tty_in.read(&mut byte) {
+            let mut unit = 0u16;
-                Ok(0) => break,
+            let mut read = 0u32;
-                Ok(_) => match byte[0] {
+            let ok = unsafe {
-                    b'\n' => break,
+                ReadConsoleW(
-                    b'\r' => continue,
+                    h_in,
-                    b => buf.push(b)?,
+                    (&mut unit as *mut u16).cast(),
-                },
+                    1,
-                Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
+                    &mut read,
-                Err(e) => return Err(e),
+                    ptr::null_mut(),
                )
            };
            if ok == 0 {
                return Err(io::Error::last_os_error());
            }
            if read == 0 {
                break;
            }
            const LF: u16 = b'\n' as u16;
            const CR: u16 = b'\r' as u16;
            match unit {
                LF | CR => break,
                u => {
                    if wide.len() >= MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN {
                        return Err(io::Error::new(
                            io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
                            "secret buffer full",
                        ));
                    }
                    wide.push(u);
                }
            }
        }
@@ -255,6 +281,22 @@ mod imp {
        let _ = writeln!(tty_out);
        let _ = tty_out.flush();
        let utf8 = Zeroizing::new(String::from_utf16(&wide).map_err(|_| {
            io::Error::new(
                io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
                "console passphrase is not valid UTF-16",
            )
        })?);
        if utf8.len() > MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN {
            return Err(io::Error::new(
                io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
                "secret buffer full",
            ));
        }
        let mut buf = SecretVec::with_capacity(MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
        for b in utf8.as_bytes() {
            buf.push(*b)?;
        }
        Ok(buf)
    }
 }
@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
-use std::fs::{self, File};
+use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions};
-use std::io::{self, BufRead, BufReader, Write};
+use std::io::{self, BufRead, BufReader, Seek, SeekFrom, Write};
-use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use crate::policy;
 /// Default plaintext chunk size: 1 MiB.
 ///
 /// Stored in the header per file, so callers may override via CLI without
 /// breaking older files (the decryptor reads the size from the header).
-pub const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: u32 = 1024 * 1024;
+pub const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: u32 = policy::DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE;
 /// Opened input.
 ///
@@ -45,63 +47,225 @@ pub(crate) fn open_input<S: AsRef<str>>(input_file: Option<S>) -> io::Result<Inp
    }
 }
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
 pub struct OutSinkOptions {
    pub force: bool,
    pub input_file: Option<PathBuf>,
    pub temp_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
    pub buffer_verify_stdout: bool,
 }
 pub(crate) struct SecureTempFile {
    path: PathBuf,
    file: Option<File>,
    remove_on_drop: bool,
 }
 impl SecureTempFile {
    fn create(dir: &Path, prefix: &str) -> io::Result<Self> {
        fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
        for _ in 0..128 {
            let mut rand = [0u8; 16];
            getrandom::fill(&mut rand).map_err(io::Error::other)?;
            let name = format!("{prefix}.{}.tmp", hex(&rand));
            let path = dir.join(name);
            let mut opts = OpenOptions::new();
            opts.read(true).write(true).create_new(true);
            #[cfg(unix)]
            {
                use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
                opts.mode(0o600);
            }
            match opts.open(&path) {
                Ok(file) => {
                    return Ok(Self {
                        path,
                        file: Some(file),
                        remove_on_drop: true,
                    });
                }
                Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => continue,
                Err(e) => return Err(e),
            }
        }
        Err(io::Error::new(
            io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
            "could not create a unique temporary file after 128 attempts",
        ))
    }
    fn file_mut(&mut self) -> &mut File {
        self.file
            .as_mut()
            .expect("temporary file handle taken before commit")
    }
    fn sync_file(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
        let file = self.file_mut();
        file.flush()?;
        file.sync_all()
    }
    fn persist(mut self, final_path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
        self.sync_file()?;
        self.file.take();
        #[cfg(windows)]
        if final_path.exists() {
            fs::remove_file(final_path)?;
        }
        fs::rename(&self.path, final_path)?;
        self.remove_on_drop = false;
        best_effort_fsync_parent(final_path);
        Ok(())
    }
    fn copy_to_stdout(mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
        self.sync_file()?;
        let mut file = self
            .file
            .take()
            .expect("temporary file handle taken before stdout commit");
        file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0))?;
        let mut stdout = io::stdout();
        io::copy(&mut file, &mut stdout)?;
        stdout.flush()?;
        Ok(())
    }
 }
 impl Drop for SecureTempFile {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        self.file.take();
        if self.remove_on_drop {
            let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.path);
        }
    }
 }
 fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
    const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef";
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
    for b in bytes {
        out.push(HEX[(b >> 4) as usize] as char);
        out.push(HEX[(b & 0x0f) as usize] as char);
    }
    out
 }
 fn best_effort_fsync_parent(path: &Path) {
    let Some(parent) = path.parent() else {
        return;
    };
    if let Ok(dir) = File::open(parent) {
        let _ = dir.sync_all();
    }
 }
 fn temp_dir_for_target(final_path: &Path, explicit: Option<&Path>) -> PathBuf {
    if let Some(dir) = explicit {
        return dir.to_path_buf();
    }
    final_path
        .parent()
        .filter(|p| !p.as_os_str().is_empty())
        .map(Path::to_path_buf)
        .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."))
 }
 fn temp_dir_for_stdout(explicit: Option<&Path>) -> PathBuf {
    explicit
        .map(Path::to_path_buf)
        .unwrap_or_else(std::env::temp_dir)
 }
 fn file_name_prefix(path: &Path) -> String {
    path.file_name()
        .and_then(|name| name.to_str())
        .filter(|name| !name.is_empty())
        .unwrap_or("fcry")
        .to_owned()
 }
 fn output_aliases_input(output: &Path, input: Option<&Path>) -> io::Result<bool> {
    let Some(input) = input else {
        return Ok(false);
    };
    match same_file::is_same_file(input, output) {
        Ok(same) => Ok(same),
        Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(false),
        Err(e) => Err(e),
    }
 }
 /// Output sink that supports atomic file replacement.
 ///
-/// For file outputs: bytes are written to `<path>.tmp`. On `commit()`, the
+/// For file outputs: bytes are written to a private, randomly named temp file.
-/// temp file is renamed into place. If dropped without commit (panic, error,
+/// On `commit()`, the temp file is fsynced and renamed into place. If dropped
-/// process exit), the temp file is deleted so a partial/garbage file does
+/// without commit (panic, error, process exit), the temp file is deleted so a
-/// not replace any existing target.
+/// partial/garbage file does not replace any existing target.
 ///
 /// For stdout: behaves as a passthrough; `commit()` is a no-op.
 pub enum OutSink {
    Stdout(io::Stdout),
    BufferVerify {
        temp: SecureTempFile,
    },
    File {
        tmp_path: PathBuf,
        final_path: PathBuf,
-        file: Option<File>,
+        temp: SecureTempFile,
        committed: bool,
    },
 }
 impl OutSink {
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    pub fn open<S: AsRef<str>>(output_file: Option<S>) -> io::Result<Self> {
        Self::open_with_options(output_file, &OutSinkOptions::default())
    }
    pub fn open_with_options<S: AsRef<str>>(
        output_file: Option<S>,
        options: &OutSinkOptions,
    ) -> io::Result<Self> {
        match output_file {
            None if options.buffer_verify_stdout => {
                let dir = temp_dir_for_stdout(options.temp_dir.as_deref());
                Ok(Self::BufferVerify {
                    temp: SecureTempFile::create(&dir, "fcry-buffer")?,
                })
            }
            None => Ok(Self::Stdout(io::stdout())),
            Some(f) => {
                let final_path = PathBuf::from(f.as_ref());
-                let mut tmp_path = final_path.clone();
+                if final_path.exists()
-                let name = tmp_path
+                    && !options.force
-                    .file_name()
+                    && !output_aliases_input(&final_path, options.input_file.as_deref())?
-                    .map(|n| n.to_os_string())
+                {
-                    .unwrap_or_default();
+                    return Err(io::Error::new(
-                let mut tmp_name = name;
+                        io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
-                tmp_name.push(".tmp");
+                        format!(
-                tmp_path.set_file_name(tmp_name);
+                            "output file {} already exists (use --force to replace it)",
-                let file = File::create(&tmp_path)?;
+                            final_path.display()
-                Ok(Self::File {
+                        ),
-                    tmp_path,
+                    ));
-                    final_path,
+                }
-                    file: Some(file),
+                let dir = temp_dir_for_target(&final_path, options.temp_dir.as_deref());
-                    committed: false,
+                let prefix = file_name_prefix(&final_path);
-                })
+                let temp = SecureTempFile::create(&dir, &prefix)?;
                Ok(Self::File { final_path, temp })
            }
        }
    }
    pub fn commit(mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
-        if let Self::File {
+        match &mut self {
-            tmp_path,
+            Self::Stdout(s) => s.flush()?,
-            final_path,
+            Self::BufferVerify { .. } => {}
-            file,
+            Self::File { .. } => {}
-            committed,
+        }
-        } = &mut self
+        match self {
-        {
+            Self::Stdout(_) => {}
-            if let Some(mut f) = file.take() {
+            Self::BufferVerify { temp } => temp.copy_to_stdout()?,
-                f.flush()?;
+            Self::File { final_path, temp } => temp.persist(&final_path)?,
                f.sync_all()?;
            }
            fs::rename(&*tmp_path, &*final_path)?;
            *committed = true;
        }
        Ok(())
    }
@@ -111,33 +275,16 @@ impl Write for OutSink {
    fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
        match self {
            Self::Stdout(s) => s.write(buf),
-            Self::File { file, .. } => file.as_mut().expect("file taken before commit").write(buf),
+            Self::BufferVerify { temp } => temp.file_mut().write(buf),
            Self::File { temp, .. } => temp.file_mut().write(buf),
        }
    }
    fn flush(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
        match self {
            Self::Stdout(s) => s.flush(),
-            Self::File { file, .. } => match file.as_mut() {
+            Self::BufferVerify { temp } => temp.file_mut().flush(),
-                Some(f) => f.flush(),
+            Self::File { temp, .. } => temp.file_mut().flush(),
                None => Ok(()),
            },
        }
    }
 }
 impl Drop for OutSink {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        if let Self::File {
            tmp_path,
            committed,
            file,
            ..
        } = self
            && !*committed
        {
            file.take(); // close the file before unlink
            let _ = fs::remove_file(tmp_path);
        }
    }
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0
 //
 // Integration tests for the `fcry` binary.
 //
@@ -7,19 +7,28 @@
 // wrong key, truncation, bad magic).
 use std::fs;
-use std::io::Write;
+use std::io::{ErrorKind, Write};
 use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
 use assert_cmd::cargo::CommandCargoExt;
 use tempfile::TempDir;
 const KEY: &[u8; 32] = b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
 const KEY_STR: &str = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
 fn fcry() -> Command {
    Command::cargo_bin("fcry").unwrap()
 }
 fn write_key_file(dir: &std::path::Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
    let key = dir.join("key.bin");
    fs::write(&key, KEY).unwrap();
    key
 }
 fn key_file_near(path: &std::path::Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
    write_key_file(path.parent().unwrap())
 }
 /// Deterministic pseudo-random plaintext of `n` bytes (xorshift, seedable).
 /// We avoid `/dev/urandom` so tests are reproducible on failure.
 fn pseudo_random(seed: u64, n: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
@@ -37,12 +46,13 @@ fn pseudo_random(seed: u64, n: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
 fn encrypt_file(plain: &std::path::Path, ct: &std::path::Path, chunk_size: Option<u32>) {
    let mut cmd = fcry();
    let key = key_file_near(ct);
    cmd.arg("-i")
        .arg(plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(ct)
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR);
+        .arg(key);
    if let Some(cs) = chunk_size {
        cmd.arg("--chunk-size").arg(cs.to_string());
    }
@@ -55,14 +65,15 @@ fn encrypt_file(plain: &std::path::Path, ct: &std::path::Path, chunk_size: Optio
 }
 fn decrypt_file(ct: &std::path::Path, rt: &std::path::Path) {
    let key = key_file_near(ct);
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(rt)
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(key)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
@@ -133,10 +144,12 @@ fn roundtrip_chunk_size_one_byte() {
 #[test]
 fn roundtrip_pipe_stdin_stdout() {
    let data = pseudo_random(42, 200_000);
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
    let mut enc = fcry()
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(&key)
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
@@ -152,8 +165,8 @@ fn roundtrip_pipe_stdin_stdout() {
    let mut dec = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(&key)
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
@@ -182,19 +195,24 @@ fn rejects_wrong_key() {
    fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(1, 1000)).unwrap();
    encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
-    let wrong = "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff";
+    let wrong = dir.path().join("wrong.key");
-    assert_ne!(wrong.as_bytes(), KEY);
+    fs::write(&wrong, b"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(wrong)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!out.status.success(), "decrypt with wrong key should fail");
    assert!(
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("WrongKey"),
        "expected distinct WrongKey error, got {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
 }
 #[test]
@@ -216,8 +234,8 @@ fn rejects_tampered_header() {
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(key_file_near(&ct))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
@@ -246,8 +264,8 @@ fn rejects_tampered_ciphertext() {
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(key_file_near(&ct))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
@@ -275,8 +293,8 @@ fn rejects_truncated_ciphertext() {
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(key_file_near(&ct))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
@@ -296,8 +314,8 @@ fn rejects_bad_magic() {
        .arg(&bogus)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("rt.bin"))
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
@@ -312,25 +330,145 @@ fn rejects_bad_magic() {
 }
 #[test]
-fn rejects_short_raw_key() {
+fn rejects_short_key_file() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let key = dir.path().join("short.key");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    fs::write(&key, b"tooshort").unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg("tooshort")
+        .arg(&key)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !out.status.success(),
-        "encrypt with short raw_key should fail"
+        "encrypt with short key file should fail"
    );
 }
 #[test]
 fn rejects_long_key_file_and_trailing_newline() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let key = dir.path().join("long.key");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    fs::write(&key, b"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef\n").unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(&key)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!out.status.success(), "long key file should fail");
    assert!(
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("too long"),
        "expected too-long error, got {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
 }
 #[test]
 fn non_utf8_key_file_roundtrips() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let key = dir.path().join("key.bin");
    let plain = dir.path().join("plain.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("ct.bin");
    let rt = dir.path().join("rt.bin");
    let key_bytes: Vec<u8> = (0..32u8).map(|b| b ^ 0x80).collect();
    let data = pseudo_random(31, 8192);
    fs::write(&key, key_bytes).unwrap();
    fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
    let enc = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(&key)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        enc.status.success(),
        "non-UTF-8 key encrypt failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc.stderr)
    );
    let dec = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&rt)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(&key)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        dec.status.success(),
        "non-UTF-8 key decrypt failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr)
    );
    assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), data);
 }
 #[cfg(unix)]
 #[test]
 fn split_fifo_key_file_read_roundtrips() {
    use std::ffi::CString;
    use std::fs::OpenOptions;
    use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStrExt;
    use std::thread;
    use std::time::Duration;
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let fifo = dir.path().join("key.fifo");
    let fifo_c = CString::new(fifo.as_os_str().as_bytes()).unwrap();
    let rc = unsafe { libc::mkfifo(fifo_c.as_ptr(), 0o600) };
    assert_eq!(rc, 0, "mkfifo failed: {}", std::io::Error::last_os_error());
    let plain = dir.path().join("plain.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("ct.bin");
    let rt = dir.path().join("rt.bin");
    let data = pseudo_random(33, 8192);
    fs::write(&plain, &data).unwrap();
    let fifo_writer = fifo.clone();
    let writer = thread::spawn(move || {
        let mut file = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(&fifo_writer).unwrap();
        file.write_all(&KEY[..8]).unwrap();
        file.flush().unwrap();
        thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
        file.write_all(&KEY[8..]).unwrap();
    });
    let enc = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(&fifo)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    writer.join().unwrap();
    assert!(
        enc.status.success(),
        "split FIFO key encrypt failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc.stderr)
    );
    decrypt_file(&ct, &rt);
    assert_eq!(fs::read(&rt).unwrap(), data);
 }
 #[test]
 fn roundtrip_passphrase_argon2id() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
@@ -352,6 +490,7 @@ fn roundtrip_passphrase_argon2id() {
        .arg("8")
        .arg("--argon-passes")
        .arg("1")
        .arg("--allow-weak-kdf")
        .env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "correct horse battery staple")
        .output()
        .unwrap();
@@ -394,6 +533,70 @@ fn roundtrip_passphrase_argon2id() {
    assert!(!bad.status.success(), "wrong passphrase should fail");
 }
 #[test]
 fn weak_passphrase_kdf_rejected_without_override() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    let enc = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
        .arg("--passphrase-env")
        .arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
        .arg("--argon-memory")
        .arg("8")
        .arg("--argon-passes")
        .arg("1")
        .env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "short")
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!enc.status.success(), "weak KDF/passphrase should fail");
 }
 #[test]
 fn decrypt_argon_memory_cap_rejects_hostile_header() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    let enc = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--passphrase-env")
        .arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
        .arg("--argon-memory")
        .arg("8")
        .arg("--argon-passes")
        .arg("1")
        .arg("--allow-weak-kdf")
        .env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "correct horse battery staple")
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(enc.status.success());
    let dec = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--passphrase-env")
        .arg("FCRY_TEST_PW")
        .arg("--max-argon-memory-mib")
        .arg("1")
        .env("FCRY_TEST_PW", "correct horse battery staple")
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!dec.status.success(), "low decrypt cap should reject file");
    assert!(
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr).contains("decrypt cap"),
        "expected cap error, got {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr)
    );
 }
 #[test]
 fn atomic_output_no_stale_tmp_on_failure() {
    // A failed decrypt (wrong key) should not leave the output file behind.
@@ -404,15 +607,16 @@ fn atomic_output_no_stale_tmp_on_failure() {
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello world").unwrap();
    encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
-    let wrong = "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff";
+    let wrong = dir.path().join("wrong.key");
    fs::write(&wrong, b"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&rt)
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(wrong)
+        .arg(&wrong)
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!out.status.success());
@@ -422,6 +626,131 @@ fn atomic_output_no_stale_tmp_on_failure() {
    assert!(!tmp.exists(), "temp file must be cleaned up");
 }
 #[test]
 fn existing_output_refuses_without_force() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    fs::write(&ct, b"existing").unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!out.status.success(), "existing output should refuse");
    assert_eq!(fs::read(&ct).unwrap(), b"existing");
 }
 #[test]
 fn force_replaces_only_after_success() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    fs::write(&ct, b"existing").unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--force")
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        out.status.success(),
        "force encrypt failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
    assert_ne!(fs::read(&ct).unwrap(), b"existing");
 }
 #[test]
 fn in_place_replacement_roundtrips() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let path = dir.path().join("data.bin");
    let original = pseudo_random(41, 50_000);
    fs::write(&path, &original).unwrap();
    let enc = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&path)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&path)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        enc.status.success(),
        "in-place encrypt failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc.stderr)
    );
    assert_ne!(fs::read(&path).unwrap(), original);
    let dec = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&path)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&path)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        dec.status.success(),
        "in-place decrypt failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&dec.stderr)
    );
    assert_eq!(fs::read(&path).unwrap(), original);
 }
 #[test]
 fn old_predictable_temp_name_input_is_not_truncated() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let input = dir.path().join("out.bin.tmp");
    let output = dir.path().join("out.bin");
    let original = pseudo_random(42, 1024);
    fs::write(&input, &original).unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&input)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&output)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        out.status.success(),
        "encrypt failed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
    assert_eq!(fs::read(&input).unwrap(), original);
    assert!(output.exists());
 }
 #[cfg(unix)]
 #[test]
 fn output_file_mode_is_0600() {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
    let mode = fs::metadata(&ct).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
    assert_eq!(mode, 0o600);
 }
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Multi-threaded pipeline + length-committed + random-access tests
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -433,12 +762,13 @@ fn encrypt_file_threads(
    threads: usize,
 ) {
    let mut cmd = fcry();
    let key = key_file_near(ct);
    cmd.arg("-i")
        .arg(plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(ct)
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(key)
        .arg("-j")
        .arg(threads.to_string());
    if let Some(cs) = chunk_size {
@@ -453,14 +783,15 @@ fn encrypt_file_threads(
 }
 fn decrypt_file_threads(ct: &std::path::Path, rt: &std::path::Path, threads: usize) {
    let key = key_file_near(ct);
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(rt)
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(key)
        .arg("-j")
        .arg(threads.to_string())
        .output()
@@ -517,10 +848,12 @@ fn roundtrip_pipe_multi_threaded() {
    // length when we don't know the input size), but encrypt/decrypt must still
    // round-trip cleanly across the pipeline.
    let data = pseudo_random(14, 200_000);
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
    let mut enc = fcry()
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(&key)
        .arg("-j")
        .arg("4")
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
@@ -536,16 +869,17 @@ fn roundtrip_pipe_multi_threaded() {
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&enc_out.stderr)
    );
-    // flags byte at offset 6 must be 0 (no length committed for stdin input).
+    // flags byte at offset 6 must not set length commitment for stdin input.
    assert_eq!(
-        enc_out.stdout[6], 0,
+        enc_out.stdout[6] & 0x01,
        0,
        "stdin-encrypted file unexpectedly committed length"
    );
    let mut dec = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(&key)
        .arg("-j")
        .arg("4")
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
@@ -567,6 +901,104 @@ fn roundtrip_pipe_multi_threaded() {
    assert_eq!(dec_out.stdout, data);
 }
 #[test]
 fn stdin_chunk_size_zero_fails_but_empty_valid_chunk_succeeds() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
    let mut bad = fcry()
        .arg("--chunk-size")
        .arg("0")
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(&key)
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
        .spawn()
        .unwrap();
    // Invalid options can make the child exit before it drains stdin.
    if let Err(err) = bad.stdin.as_mut().unwrap().write_all(b"x") {
        assert_eq!(
            err.kind(),
            ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
            "unexpected stdin write error for failing chunk-size 0 process: {err}"
        );
    }
    let bad_out = bad.wait_with_output().unwrap();
    assert!(!bad_out.status.success(), "chunk-size 0 should fail");
    let mut good = fcry()
        .arg("--chunk-size")
        .arg("1")
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(&key)
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::piped())
        .spawn()
        .unwrap();
    drop(good.stdin.take());
    let good_out = good.wait_with_output().unwrap();
    assert!(
        good_out.status.success(),
        "empty stdin with valid chunk should succeed: {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&good_out.stderr)
    );
 }
 #[test]
 fn huge_thread_count_is_bounded() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, b"hello").unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .arg("-j")
        .arg("1000000")
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        out.status.success(),
        "huge -j should be capped, got {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
    assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("capped"));
 }
 #[test]
 fn forged_huge_chunk_header_fails_before_allocation() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let forged = dir.path().join("forged.bin");
    let mut bytes = Vec::new();
    bytes.extend_from_slice(b"fcry");
    bytes.push(3); // version
    bytes.push(1); // alg
    bytes.push(0x02); // key commitment flag
    bytes.push(0); // reserved
    bytes.extend_from_slice(&u32::MAX.to_le_bytes());
    fs::write(&forged, bytes).unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&forged)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!out.status.success(), "huge chunk header should fail");
    assert!(
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).contains("chunk_size"),
        "expected chunk_size error, got {}",
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
    );
 }
 #[test]
 fn file_input_commits_length() {
    // Encrypting from a regular file must auto-set FLAG_LENGTH_COMMITTED (bit 0
@@ -580,8 +1012,39 @@ fn file_input_commits_length() {
    let bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
    // Magic(4) + version(1) + alg(1) + flags(1) = byte 6
-    assert_eq!(bytes[4], 2, "version should be 2");
+    assert_eq!(bytes[4], 3, "version should be 3");
    assert_eq!(bytes[6] & 0x01, 0x01, "length-committed flag should be set");
    assert_eq!(bytes[6] & 0x02, 0x02, "key-committed flag should be set");
 }
 #[test]
 fn v3_downgrade_or_commitment_stripping_fails_authentication() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    let rt = dir.path().join("r.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(51, 1000)).unwrap();
    encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, None);
    let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
    bytes[4] = 2;
    bytes[6] &= !0x02;
    fs::write(&ct, bytes).unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&rt)
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(key_file_near(&ct))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !out.status.success(),
        "downgraded/stripped v3 header must fail authentication"
    );
 }
 fn encrypt_random_access_fixture(
@@ -608,8 +1071,8 @@ fn random_access_decrypt(
        .arg(ct)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(out)
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(key_file_near(ct))
        .arg("--offset")
        .arg(offset.to_string())
        .arg("--length")
@@ -671,10 +1134,11 @@ fn random_access_rejects_stdin_encrypted() {
    let data = pseudo_random(18, 2000);
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    let key = write_key_file(dir.path());
    let mut enc = fcry()
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(&key)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(&ct)
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
@@ -693,14 +1157,13 @@ fn random_access_rejects_stdin_encrypted() {
 }
 #[test]
-fn random_access_zero_length() {
+fn random_access_rejects_zero_length() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let data = pseudo_random(19, 1000);
    let ct = encrypt_random_access_fixture(dir.path(), &data, 256);
    let out = dir.path().join("empty.bin");
    let r = random_access_decrypt(&ct, &out, 500, 0);
-    assert!(r.status.success(), "zero-length slice should succeed");
+    assert!(!r.status.success(), "zero-length slice should fail");
    assert_eq!(fs::read(&out).unwrap(), Vec::<u8>::new());
 }
 #[test]
@@ -723,6 +1186,33 @@ fn random_access_tampered_length_fails() {
    );
 }
 #[test]
 fn buffer_verify_stdout_emits_nothing_on_truncated_ciphertext() {
    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
    let plain = dir.path().join("p.bin");
    let ct = dir.path().join("c.bin");
    fs::write(&plain, pseudo_random(61, 3 * 1024 * 1024)).unwrap();
    encrypt_file(&plain, &ct, Some(64 * 1024));
    let mut bytes = fs::read(&ct).unwrap();
    bytes.truncate(bytes.len() - 32);
    fs::write(&ct, bytes).unwrap();
    let out = fcry()
        .arg("-d")
        .arg("-i")
        .arg(&ct)
        .arg("--buffer-verify")
        .arg("--key-file")
        .arg(key_file_near(&ct))
        .output()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(!out.status.success(), "truncated decrypt should fail");
    assert!(
        out.stdout.is_empty(),
        "buffer-verify must suppress partial stdout"
    );
 }
 #[test]
 fn rejects_zero_threads() {
    // -j 0 is almost certainly a user mistake. Clap should reject it before
@@ -735,8 +1225,8 @@ fn rejects_zero_threads() {
        .arg(&plain)
        .arg("-o")
        .arg(dir.path().join("c.bin"))
-        .arg("--raw-key")
+        .arg("--key-file")
-        .arg(KEY_STR)
+        .arg(write_key_file(dir.path()))
        .arg("-j")
        .arg("0")
        .output()
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ddidderr	f44cfc6190	build: add local just workflow Add a justfile for the common fcry developer commands. The run recipe is variadic and uses just positional arguments so program flags are forwarded through cargo run without needing a second separator. Keep the default release profile debuggable and checked, then move the stripped, LTO-enabled artifact settings into the production profile. This keeps day-to-day release builds easier to inspect while preserving an explicit production build recipe for optimized distributable binaries. The clippy recipe uses workspace, all-target, all-feature coverage and denies warnings so the task runner matches the stricter local verification path. Test Plan: - cargo clippy - cargo clippy --benches - cargo clippy --tests - cargo +nightly fmt - just --fmt --check - just run --help - just clippy - git diff --cached --check Refs: none	2026-06-10 21:18:10 +02:00
ddidderr	126a86ec07	cleanup: remove old review files	2026-06-10 20:51:29 +02:00
ddidderr	227f78a767	[release] fcry v0.12.0	2026-06-10 20:49:21 +02:00
ddidderr	1ea1e65deb	license: change from GPL-3.0 to MIT-0	2026-06-10 20:49:12 +02:00
ddidderr	90707cc364	updated README	2026-06-10 01:41:41 +02:00
ddidderr	6febf8ee22	fmt: tombi format	2026-06-10 01:24:38 +02:00
ddidderr	d79e96c498	[release] fcry v0.11.0	2026-06-10 01:22:42 +02:00
ddidderr	99705afa9e	deps: cargo update	2026-06-10 01:21:42 +02:00
ddidderr	3f53c221c8	test: tolerate closed stdin in chunk-size failure The chunk-size-zero regression test spawned fcry with stdin piped and unconditionally unwrapped the write into that pipe. That made the test depend on scheduler timing: the child may validate --chunk-size 0, report the error, and exit before it has drained stdin. Treat BrokenPipe as the expected early-exit shape for this failing command, while still failing on any other write error and still asserting that the process exits unsuccessfully. The valid empty-stdin chunk-size case remains unchanged. Test Plan: - cargo fmt --check - cargo test - cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings - git diff --check Refs: none	2026-06-10 00:20:10 +02:00
ddidderr	725d33939e	fix: read key files through short reads Read --key-file input in a loop until EOF or until the 33-byte rejection threshold is reached. A single read call is enough for ordinary regular files in practice, but FIFOs and process substitution can legally return fewer than 32 bytes before EOF. Treating that first short read as final made the new key-file path fail spuriously for exactly the shell-friendly usage it was meant to support. Keep the existing exact-length policy: 32 bytes is accepted, shorter files are rejected, and 33 or more bytes are rejected with the trailing-newline hint. The intermediate buffer remains zeroizing. Test Plan: - cargo test split_fifo_key_file_read_roundtrips - cargo fmt --check - cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings - cargo test - git diff --check Refs: review finding for --key-file short reads	2026-06-09 23:46:27 +02:00
ddidderr	81ac1475ad	feat: harden fcry format and IO policy Introduce a central policy module for format and resource validation, then route header parsing, KDF acceptance, range arithmetic, and pipeline sizing through that policy. New encryptions now write v3 headers that include an authenticated key commitment, which lets decrypt reject wrong keys or passphrases before chunk processing while preserving valid v1/v2 decrypt compatibility inside the configured caps. Replace process-list-visible raw key input with --key-file, add passphrase NFC normalization, enforce stronger new-encryption passphrase/KDF floors unless --allow-weak-kdf is supplied, and add a configurable decrypt Argon2 memory ceiling. Chunk buffers in the serial, parallel, and lookahead paths now use zeroizing storage. Rework output handling around randomized create-new temporary files with Unix 0600 mode, file fsync before persist, best-effort parent directory fsync, default no-overwrite behavior, safe in-place replacement, --force, --temp-dir, and --buffer-verify for decrypt-to-stdout. Known caveat: --key-file currently reads with a single read call. That is fine for regular files but can reject short reads from pipes or process substitution. A follow-up fix will make key-file reads loop before EOF. Test Plan: - cargo fmt --check - cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings - cargo test - git diff --check - cargo run -- --help Refs: fcry security hardening plan	2026-06-09 23:45:02 +02:00
ddidderr	d7b0127d20	review: Claude Fable 5	2026-06-09 22:06:30 +02:00
ddidderr	67b412a1a5	fmt: tombi	2026-05-30 18:57:06 +02:00
ddidderr	6898297973	deps: cargo update	2026-05-16 17:26:15 +02:00
ddidderr	45571c98fe	Cargo.toml: remove authors, format with tombi	2026-05-16 17:25:57 +02:00
ddidderr	acd2712ade	sec review	2026-05-03 14:48:55 +02:00
ddidderr	ea2e43fe3d	Revert "feat(cli): default to interactive passphrase when no key source given" This reverts commit `f72f9034f3`.	2026-05-02 21:30:58 +02:00