fix: systematic byte fidelity for config strings and RV7 gaps

Resolves the 9 gap groups in docs/rewrite/notes/review-rv7-codex.md and
audits every string-typed config field against its consumers
(field -> consumers -> decode status table in final-Z9.md):
- Windows EnvMap keys use a port of Zig's nls.zig uppercase table
  (upcaseW); Windows locale init follows Zig's chain (setlocale +
  _putenv_s); malformed WTF-8 now fails process launch conversions like
  Zig instead of substituting U+FFFD; kitty file paths convert WTF-8.
- bash --rcfile/--init-file, configured TERM and inherited GTK LANG
  keep their original bytes.
- C API clipboard completion and ghostty_surface_binding_action take
  bytes; complete_clipboard_request is byte-typed through the core.
- text:/csi:/esc: bindings, enquiry-response, input = path:, embedded
  initial_input, search needles, titles, link regexes, clipboard
  codepoint map, command palette text and GTK font/namespace values
  decode the escape encoding before use.

Remaining by design: D-Bus a{ss} values and +new-window arguments are
UTF-8 by D-Bus type. C API key/preedit text follows separately.

Test Plan:
- cargo test --workspace
- just check-macos (both), just check-windows, just check-wasm

crates/ghostty-core/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -326,7 +326,10 @@ impl Harness {
                 .get(&cb_key(clipboard))
                 .cloned()
                 .unwrap_or_default();
-            match self.surface.complete_clipboard_request(req, &text, false) {
+            match self
+                .surface
+                .complete_clipboard_request(req, text.as_bytes(), false)
+            {
                 Ok(()) => {}
                 Err(ClipboardError::UnsafePaste | ClipboardError::UnauthorizedPaste) => {
                     self.rt

crates/ghostty-core/tests/e2e_bindings.rs

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ fn unbracketed_paste_converts_newlines_and_requires_confirmation_when_unsafe() {
     // Confirm it.
     let c = h.rt.confirmations.borrow()[0].clone();
     h.surface
-        .complete_clipboard_request(c.request, &c.text, true)
+        .complete_clipboard_request(c.request, c.text.as_bytes(), true)
         .unwrap();
     h.expect_input(b"rm -rf x\rls");
 }
@@ -367,6 +367,31 @@ fn text_csi_esc_and_ignore_bindings() {
     h.expect_input(b"hi!\x1b[1;5H\x1bx");
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn config_loaded_text_csi_esc_write_decoded_bytes() {
+    use ghostty_os::osbytes::EncodedOs;
+
+    let h = harness!(Harness::recorder("", &[]));
+    let enc = |raw: &[u8]| EncodedOs::from_bytes(raw).into_encoded();
+    // Byte FF and a literal U+FDD0 must reach the pty unchanged, not as
+    // the reversible escape encoding.
+    for (kind, raw, want) in [
+        ("text", &b"a\xffb"[..], b"a\xffb".to_vec()),
+        (
+            "text",
+            "\u{fdd0}".as_bytes(),
+            "\u{fdd0}".as_bytes().to_vec(),
+        ),
+        ("csi", &b"\xff"[..], b"\x1b[\xff".to_vec()),
+        ("esc", "\u{fdd0}".as_bytes(), b"\x1b\xef\xb7\x90".to_vec()),
+    ] {
+        h.mark();
+        let a = ghostty_input::binding::Action::parse(&format!("{kind}:{}", enc(raw))).unwrap();
+        assert!(h.surface.perform_binding_action(&a).unwrap());
+        h.expect_input(&want);
+    }
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn csi_binding_longer_than_the_zig_buffer_is_rejected() {
     let h = harness!(Harness::recorder("", &[]));

crates/ghostty-core/tests/e2e_term.rs

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ fn osc52_write_ask_requires_confirmation_and_deny_ignores() {
     // The user confirms: the apprt calls complete_clipboard_request.
     let c = h.rt.confirmations.borrow()[0].clone();
     h.surface
-        .complete_clipboard_request(c.request, &c.text, true)
+        .complete_clipboard_request(c.request, c.text.as_bytes(), true)
         .unwrap();
     assert_eq!(h.rt.writes.borrow().len(), 2);
 
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ fn osc52_read_requires_confirmation_by_default() {
     assert_eq!(h.recorded(), Vec::<u8>::new());
     let c = h.rt.confirmations.borrow()[0].clone();
     h.surface
-        .complete_clipboard_request(c.request, &c.text, true)
+        .complete_clipboard_request(c.request, c.text.as_bytes(), true)
         .unwrap();
     // base64("secret") = c2VjcmV0
     h.expect_input(b"\x1b]52;c;c2VjcmV0\x1b\\");