fix(peer): honour change hints only from the claimed peer's address
Security audit findings NET-01 (partial) and Codex #9 ("unauthenticated hints can make the victim pull arbitrary known peers"). Inbound QUIC connections are intentionally anonymous: only the responder is authenticated, so any LAN host can open a stream and send `LibraryChanged`/`CallToPlayChanged` hints naming any `claimed_peer_id`. If the claimed peer was known and the forged session or revision did not match the cached snapshot, state sync scheduled a full pinned Hello pull to that peer. Sending one small forged hint to every node on the LAN therefore made all of them pull a victim's complete snapshot at once (reflected amplification), bounded only by the 5-second per-peer coalesce window. Full mutual TLS would bind hints to a verified identity but is a larger protocol change than this application warrants. Instead the hint now carries the source IP of the anonymous connection, and `hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot` discards any hint whose source IP differs from the address at which the claimed peer was last authenticated. On a LAN a QUIC connection cannot be established from a spoofed IP, so a third host can no longer select which peer this node pulls. A genuine peer whose address changed loses only the hint fast path; mDNS rediscovery and pinned liveness reconciliation still pick it up. `PeerEndpointGeneration::for_tests` is added under cfg(test) so unit tests can build a `PeerRevisionSnapshot`. Test plan: `just test`. The new test accepts a hint from the peer's address, rejects the same hint from another IP or with no address, and keeps the revision comparison for matching sources. Manual: with two peer-cli containers, adding a game on one still triggers the other to refresh its library promptly. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017C3Nbgwpdm3YNwZhhFLHwg
This commit is contained in:
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ impl PeerEndpointGeneration {
|
||||
pub const fn get(self) -> u64 {
|
||||
self.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
pub(crate) const fn for_tests(value: u64) -> Self {
|
||||
Self(value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One endpoint generation retired by an authenticated topology transition.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
//! Bounded scheduling for responder-owned state pulls and change-hint fanout.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::{collections::HashMap, future::Future, pin::Pin, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
|
||||
use std::{collections::HashMap, future::Future, net::IpAddr, pin::Pin, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
|
||||
|
||||
use futures::{StreamExt as _, stream::FuturesUnordered};
|
||||
use lanspread_proto::{ChangeHint, PeerId};
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ struct LocalRevisions {
|
||||
struct HintTrigger {
|
||||
domain: StateDomain,
|
||||
hint: ChangeHint,
|
||||
/// IP address the hint arrived from. Inbound connections are anonymous,
|
||||
/// so this is the only evidence tying `hint.claimed_peer_id` to a sender.
|
||||
source_ip: Option<IpAddr>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct StateSyncInbox {
|
||||
@@ -98,11 +101,25 @@ impl StateSyncHandle {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Treats an inbound message only as a lossy invalidation hint.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn schedule_hint(&self, domain: StateDomain, hint: ChangeHint) {
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `source_ip` is the address of the anonymous connection that delivered
|
||||
/// the hint. It is later compared against the authenticated address of
|
||||
/// the claimed peer so a third party cannot make this node pull from
|
||||
/// arbitrary known peers.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn schedule_hint(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
domain: StateDomain,
|
||||
hint: ChangeHint,
|
||||
source_ip: Option<IpAddr>,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
if hint.claimed_peer_id == self.local_peer_id {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
match self.hint_tx.try_send(HintTrigger { domain, hint }) {
|
||||
match self.hint_tx.try_send(HintTrigger {
|
||||
domain,
|
||||
hint,
|
||||
source_ip,
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
Ok(()) => {}
|
||||
Err(mpsc::error::TrySendError::Full(_)) => {
|
||||
log::trace!("Coalescing remote state hint because the bounded queue is full");
|
||||
@@ -368,6 +385,14 @@ async fn hint_requires_pull(ctx: &NetworkServiceCtx, trigger: HintTrigger) -> bo
|
||||
hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(ctx.peer_id, trigger, snapshot.as_ref())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Decides whether an untrusted hint justifies a pinned pull.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Requester connections are not authenticated, so the claimed peer ID in a
|
||||
/// hint proves nothing by itself. The hint is honoured only when it arrived
|
||||
/// from the IP address at which the claimed peer was last authenticated;
|
||||
/// anything else is discarded as a probable forgery. A genuine peer whose
|
||||
/// address changed is still picked up by mDNS rediscovery and pinned
|
||||
/// liveness reconciliation, which do not depend on hints.
|
||||
fn hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(
|
||||
local_peer_id: PeerId,
|
||||
trigger: HintTrigger,
|
||||
@@ -379,6 +404,15 @@ fn hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(
|
||||
let Some(snapshot) = snapshot else {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
};
|
||||
if trigger.source_ip != Some(snapshot.endpoint.addr.ip()) {
|
||||
log::debug!(
|
||||
"Ignoring change hint for {} from {:?}; peer is authenticated at {}",
|
||||
trigger.hint.claimed_peer_id,
|
||||
trigger.source_ip,
|
||||
snapshot.endpoint.addr
|
||||
);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if snapshot.runtime_session_id != trigger.hint.runtime_session_id {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -658,6 +692,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
runtime_session_id: session(1),
|
||||
revision: 99,
|
||||
},
|
||||
source_ip: Some(IpAddr::from([192, 168, 1, 2])),
|
||||
};
|
||||
if hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(local, trigger, None) {
|
||||
let _ = try_enqueue_peer(&mut slots, claimed_peer_id, false);
|
||||
@@ -666,6 +701,63 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(slots.is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn hints_are_honoured_only_from_the_claimed_peers_authenticated_address() {
|
||||
use lanspread_proto::PeerEndpoint;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::peer_db::PeerEndpointGeneration;
|
||||
|
||||
let local = peer(1);
|
||||
let claimed = peer(2);
|
||||
let peer_addr: std::net::SocketAddr = "192.168.1.20:42424".parse().expect("addr");
|
||||
let snapshot = PeerRevisionSnapshot {
|
||||
endpoint: PeerEndpoint::new(claimed, peer_addr),
|
||||
generation: PeerEndpointGeneration::for_tests(1),
|
||||
runtime_session_id: session(1),
|
||||
library_revision: Some(3),
|
||||
call_to_play_revision: Some(0),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let trigger = |source_ip: Option<IpAddr>| HintTrigger {
|
||||
domain: StateDomain::Library,
|
||||
hint: ChangeHint {
|
||||
claimed_peer_id: claimed,
|
||||
runtime_session_id: session(1),
|
||||
revision: 4,
|
||||
},
|
||||
source_ip,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(
|
||||
local,
|
||||
trigger(Some(peer_addr.ip())),
|
||||
Some(&snapshot)
|
||||
));
|
||||
// A third host claiming the peer's identity must not trigger a pull.
|
||||
assert!(!hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(
|
||||
local,
|
||||
trigger(Some(IpAddr::from([192, 168, 1, 99]))),
|
||||
Some(&snapshot)
|
||||
));
|
||||
assert!(!hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(
|
||||
local,
|
||||
trigger(None),
|
||||
Some(&snapshot)
|
||||
));
|
||||
// The revision check still applies for a matching source.
|
||||
let same_revision = HintTrigger {
|
||||
hint: ChangeHint {
|
||||
revision: 3,
|
||||
..trigger(None).hint
|
||||
},
|
||||
..trigger(Some(peer_addr.ip()))
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(!hint_requires_pull_from_snapshot(
|
||||
local,
|
||||
same_revision,
|
||||
Some(&snapshot)
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn local_revision_watch_coalesces_to_latest_value() {
|
||||
let handle = StateSyncHandle::new(peer(1));
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ pub(super) async fn handle_peer_stream(
|
||||
let mut framed_tx = FramedWrite::new(tx, control_codec());
|
||||
log::trace!("{remote_addr:?} peer stream opened");
|
||||
|
||||
let source_ip = remote_addr.map(|addr| addr.ip());
|
||||
let first_frame = read_expected_frame(&mut framed_rx, &stream_shutdown).await;
|
||||
let mut control_permit = Some(control_permit);
|
||||
let mut _bulk_permit = None;
|
||||
@@ -87,8 +88,13 @@ pub(super) async fn handle_peer_stream(
|
||||
drop(control_permit.take());
|
||||
if let Ok(permit) = bulk_permit {
|
||||
_bulk_permit = Some(permit);
|
||||
let dispatched =
|
||||
dispatch_request(&ctx, request, framed_tx, &stream_shutdown)
|
||||
let dispatched = dispatch_request(
|
||||
&ctx,
|
||||
request,
|
||||
source_ip,
|
||||
framed_tx,
|
||||
&stream_shutdown,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
framed_tx = dispatched.writer;
|
||||
response_reset = dispatched.response_reset;
|
||||
@@ -99,8 +105,14 @@ pub(super) async fn handle_peer_stream(
|
||||
response_reset = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let dispatched =
|
||||
dispatch_request(&ctx, request, framed_tx, &stream_shutdown).await;
|
||||
let dispatched = dispatch_request(
|
||||
&ctx,
|
||||
request,
|
||||
source_ip,
|
||||
framed_tx,
|
||||
&stream_shutdown,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
framed_tx = dispatched.writer;
|
||||
response_reset = dispatched.response_reset;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -214,6 +226,7 @@ async fn read_expected_eof(
|
||||
async fn dispatch_request(
|
||||
ctx: &PeerCtx,
|
||||
request: Request,
|
||||
source_ip: Option<std::net::IpAddr>,
|
||||
framed_tx: ResponseWriter,
|
||||
stream_shutdown: &CancellationToken,
|
||||
) -> DispatchResult {
|
||||
@@ -274,11 +287,13 @@ async fn dispatch_request(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Request::LibraryChanged(hint) => {
|
||||
ctx.state_sync.schedule_hint(StateDomain::Library, hint);
|
||||
ctx.state_sync
|
||||
.schedule_hint(StateDomain::Library, hint, source_ip);
|
||||
DispatchResult::close(framed_tx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Request::CallToPlayChanged(hint) => {
|
||||
ctx.state_sync.schedule_hint(StateDomain::CallToPlay, hint);
|
||||
ctx.state_sync
|
||||
.schedule_hint(StateDomain::CallToPlay, hint, source_ip);
|
||||
DispatchResult::close(framed_tx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Request::GetGameFileChunk {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user