Security audit finding Codex #2 ("rejected bulk requests can populate
the persistent manifest cache"). `admit_outbound_transfer` loaded the
full catalog manifest for the requested game ID first and only then
compared the content ID and checked whether the game is locally
serveable. Because manifests are cached for the life of the process,
one anonymous LAN client could make a node parse and retain the entire
catalog's manifest corpus with requests for games it does not even
have, and every such request paid a disk read under the admission lock.
The catalog already exposes a compact content index that answers
identity and streamed-install support without I/O. Admission now
checks that index and in-memory local readiness first; only requests
that pass both load the manifest. Accepted requests behave exactly as
before, including the streamed-install support check.
Test plan: `just test`. Manual: with two peer-cli containers, chunk
downloads and Stream Install still complete; a request naming an
unknown game ID or wrong content ID is declined with the same log
message as before.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017C3Nbgwpdm3YNwZhhFLHwg
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