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refactor(peer): name streamed integrity boundary

NEXT_STEPS item 4 needed the streamed-install integrity model to be a
conscious decision. Keep the current runtime behavior, but name it as
sender archive integrity: the receiver verifies streamed file size and
RAR CRC32 from the sender's archive metadata before committing the
install transaction.

This protects against truncation, transport corruption, and stream
provider bugs. It deliberately does not claim malicious-peer protection,
because the sender controls both the streamed bytes and the RAR metadata.
The docs now say that trusted content requires a future catalog schema
with catalog-owned archive or extracted-file SHA-256 hashes.

Test Plan:
- just fmt
- just test
- just clippy
- python3 crates/lanspread-peer-cli/scripts/run_extended_scenarios.py S41 --build-image
- git diff --check
- git diff --cached --check

Refs: NEXT_STEPS.md item 4

2026-06-07 22:05:03 +02:00

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Streamed Install Next Steps

I’d treat the prototype as proof of the hard part: “can we stream archive-derived install bytes into local/ without making the receiver a source?” Yes. Next I’d harden the pieces that decide whether this is product-ready.

Done — Move from CLI-only to real app integration

The GUI now has an explicit “Low disk install” action in the game detail modal for remote-only games. The Tauri backend queues that path through stream_install_game, injects the shared external unrar stream provider, and hands fetched file details to StreamInstallGame instead of the normal download command.
Done — Replace per-file unrar p with a final archive provider

The shared external unrar stream provider now runs unrar lt once for the archive metadata and one sequential unrar p pass per archive for payload bytes. It frames directories, file starts, file chunks, and file ends from the technical listing, so CLI and GUI callers use one purpose-built provider instead of a per-file extraction loop.
Done — Handle solid archives deliberately

The provider exposes the RAR solid flag in ArchiveBegin and always uses one sequential payload pass per archive, which is the safe path for solid archives. S41 now verifies a real solid RAR fixture through the Docker peer-cli flow, including local-only final state, absent root archive/sentinel, byte count, and extracted payload SHA-256 hashes.
Done — Decide the integrity model

Streamed installs intentionally verify against sender archive metadata for now: each file must match the RAR-advertised size and CRC32. That catches transport corruption, truncation, and provider bugs, but does not claim malicious-peer protection. Trusted content remains a separate catalog schema step: add catalog-owned archive or extracted-file SHA-256 hashes, then verify those at the receiver before commit.
Upgrade retry/resume semantics

Right now, failed stream means failed operation and rollback. Next useful step:
- retry whole stream from another trusted peer
- later, maybe keep completed files and restart only the interrupted file
- avoid byte-offset resume until there’s a strong reason
Expand scenario coverage

I’d add cases for:
- sender disconnect mid-stream
- receiver cancel mid-stream
- corrupted/truncated stream fails and leaves no local/
- already-installed game rejects streamed install
- multi-archive .eti roots stream in sorted order
Clean product semantics

Decide how the UI labels this state. It is installed but not downloaded, so “Local only” is technically correct, but users may need a clear affordance like “Installed, not shareable”.

My recommended next slice: make the provider abstraction final-ish, then implement a real one-pass provider. Everything else builds cleanly on that.

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Streamed Install Next Steps

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